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Abstract
Essays on the Market Structure of the U.S. Health Care System
by
Ayse Sera Diebel

Advisor: Professor David A. Jaeger

This dissertation examines the welfare implications of vertical restraints in the U.S. health
care market. I focus on two phenomena that influence vertical relationships between hospitals and insurers: vertical integration and vertical bundling. Both of these practices have
potential efficiency-inducing and anti-competitive effects from a theoretical standpoint, making welfare implications ambiguous. I analyze their impact on welfare in an empirical setting.
This task requires structurally modeling the market by using data on hospitals, insurers, and
consumers, and simulating counterfactual worlds free of vertical restraints.
I construct my dataset by combining data from multiple sources. Hospital characteristics
come from the American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals. I create
an insurer dataset using three sources: Atlantic Information Services (AIS) Directory of
Health Plans, WEISS Ratings Guide to Health Insurers, and National Committee for Quality
Assurance (NCQA) Report on Health Plan Rankings. Patient level data comes from State
Inpatient Databases published by Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ), and
Public Patient Discharge data published by California Office of Statewide Health Planning
and Development (OSHPD). I observe the universe of discharges from all hospitals in eight
states. Finally, I manually collect hospital networks offered by insurers from individual
insurers’ websites.
Using this rich dataset, I separately model every component of the market, and use
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my results to predict the changes in actions of all agents under counterfactual simulations.
In particular, I estimate structural models of hospital and insurer demand along with a
bargaining model, and use results in counterfactual policy experiments that prohibit vertical
restraints. Following the simulation of the counterfactual world, I measure the change in
welfare. I use discrete choice models of demand when analyzing hospital and insurer markets,
and a Nash bargaining framework when modeling hospital-insurer negotiations.
In the first chapter, I investigate how vertical integration between hospitals and insurers
affects market outcomes and welfare. Hospital-insurer consolidation is expected to benefit
consumers through improved coordination and reduced costs, but can also lead to a decline in consumer welfare through anti-competitive outcomes such as market foreclosure and
barriers to entry. Using regression analysis, I demonstrate vertical integration is associated
with lower premiums and higher quality. However, vertically-integrated entities engage in
anti-competitive activities by denying their competitors access to their hospitals (upstream
foreclosure) and health plans (downstream foreclosure).
Since I find evidence that both effects exist, I structurally model the market and simulate
a counterfactual scenario to assess the overall impact on welfare. In this policy experiment,
I remove vertical integration from the market altogether and measure changes in consumer
welfare and producer surplus. Overall, consumers benefit from vertical integration, although
the majority of hospitals and insurers are better off in its absence. Banning exclusionary
restrictions gets rid of market foreclosure and gives access to vertically-integrated entities.
As a result, insurers offer wider hospital networks but increase their premiums, which harms
consumers. Producers, on the other hand, are better off in the absence of vertical integration
as many hospitals and insurers enjoy higher profits driven by higher market shares and
increased premiums. I also find evidence that vertical integration acts as an entry barrier
to the downstream market due to the cost advantages vertically-integrated entities achieve
through upstream foreclosure.
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The second chapter analyzes bundling practices exercised by hospital systems in the negotiation process with insurers. Hospital systems offer full-line forcing contracts to ensure
insurers carry all hospital system members in their networks. Vertical bundling can benefit
consumers if it reduces unit cost for insurers, but it can also have anti-competitive consequences if bundled hospitals are included in insurers’ networks at the expense of their rivals.
I estimate reduced-form regressions that demonstrate efficiency gains present themselves
through their impact on market coverage, but not premiums. I also find hospital systems
are unable to use these contracts to gain leverage over their rivals. To quantify the overall
impact on welfare, I estimate a structural model and simulate a counterfactual world free
of full-line forcing contracts. This policy experiment breaks vertical bundling and allows
system hospitals to negotiate individually. Results suggest that removal of full-line forcing
contracts from the market leads to a $16 billion decline in overall welfare. A majority of
insurers increase their profits upon removal of full-line forcing contracts, however many hospitals suffer losses. System hospitals lose the most since they no longer can use bundling to
maximize their profits. Individual hospitals also lose as a result of increased competition in
the upstream market. Consumers are worse off because they face higher premiums in the
absence of vertical bundling.
This dissertation provides empirical evidence on potential welfare-improving effects of
vertical restraints in the health care market. Results presented here imply increasing vertical
and horizontal consolidation in health care is not completely detrimental to consumers, and
can benefit them through unforeseen channels.
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Chapter 1
Vertical Integration in the U.S.
Health Care Market:
An Empirical Analysis of
Hospital-Insurer Consolidation
1.1

Introduction

The health care industry in the U.S. is becoming more consolidated. The number of highlyconcentrated markets has been on the rise, which raises anti-trust concerns. This trend is
expected to continue since market environments are becoming more challenging for small
providers and insurers (Ginsburg (2016)). The empirical literature to date has focused on
horizontal consolidation in the form of hospital mergers and insurer mergers, however the
effects of vertical integration in the market for health care remain to be discovered. Aiming
to fill this void, in this chapter, I empirically investigate the impact of hospital-insurer
consolidation on market outcomes and welfare using newly-available data.
1
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Theory does not provide a definitive answer as to whether vertical integration is welfareimproving (Tirole (1988), Perry (1989), Joskow (2008)). Vertical integration leads to efficiency gains through improved coordination and reduced costs, but it also raises anticompetitive concerns due to increased market foreclosure, market power, and barriers to
entry. The overall impact on welfare depends on which effect is dominant. In the case
of hospital-insurer consolidation, several factors contribute to gains in efficiency. Increased
quality stems from clinical integration of hospitals and insurers. Better coordination between the two entities facilitates tracking patients’ medical history and enables the health
system to take preventive measures accordingly. Cost savings are realized through three
main channels. Vertically-integrated (VI) entities have reduced transaction costs as they
no longer face contracting or negotiation costs. Cost of providing care is also reduced as
improved coordination of care prevents wasteful procedures. Finally, elimination of double
marginalization contributes to cost savings of VI insurers as they no longer pay a markup,
and instead access the input at its marginal cost.
On the other hand, hospital-insurer consolidation raises anti-competitive concerns. VI
entities aiming to gain monopoly power have an incentive to engage in market foreclosure
by raising their rivals’ costs and denying them access to their hospitals and health plans.
This results in increased market power of VI entities as well as increased hospital prices and
premiums in the market, leading to a decline in welfare. Presence of VI entities in the market
also acts as a barrier to entry in the downstream market. Unlike other insurers, VI insurers
have cost advantages as they have access to their own hospitals at lower prices and as they
are able to avoid the sunk costs associated with building a health plan (such as building a
provider network, finding compatible billing systems with hospitals etc.). As a result, they
are able to offer lower premiums, which deters entry of insurers who do not have the same
cost advantages, harming insurer competition.
Empirical papers that analyze the impacts of vertical integration also find conflicting

CHAPTER 1. VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN HEALTH CARE

3

evidence. Chipty (2001) finds vertical integration leads to market foreclosure as well as
reduced prices; and concludes the efficiency-inducing effects dominate. Lee (2013) shows
vertical integration harms consumers as it limits choices available to them. Ho (2009a)
predicts that the entry of VI insurers into the market increases consumer welfare, while
Crawford et al. (2015) assert that the impact on welfare depends on the extent of exclusion
and foreclosure. This chapter contributes to the empirical literature by investigating vertical
integration in the health care industry and analyzing its relationship to foreclosure, prices,
quality, bargaining power, and welfare.
There are two main components of this chapter. First, I illustrate that vertical integration
is associated with market foreclosure (both upstream and downstream), lower premiums, and
higher quality by conducting reduced-form analysis. Second, I show that vertical integration
benefits consumers but harms the majority of producers by estimating a full structural model.
In doing so, I combine estimates from discrete choice models of hospital and insurer demand
with hospital cost function estimates and use them to estimate a bargaining model. These
estimated models allow me to capture the changes for all participants in the market when
simulating the counterfactual scenario that removes vertical integration from the market.
My findings indicate that removal of vertical integration from the market would decrease
consumer surplus by $9.5 billion and increase producer surplus by $44 billion a year. I also
find evidence that VI hospitals have more bargaining power in the negotiation process, and
there are entry barriers in the downstream market.
The passage of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) in 2010 encouraged consolidation in health care and, as a result, the growth rate of number of VI plans has
increased from 1% to 3%.1 Three regulations passed under the ACA, in particular, make the
study of hospital-insurer consolidation valuable. Two pertain to incentivization of formation
1

Figures represent author’s calculations from Atlantic Information Services (AIS) Directory of Health
Plans and Weiss Ratings Guide to Health Insurers. Khanna et al. (2016) report the same growth rate using
data collected by McKinsey & Company.
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of VI entities, while one emphasizes the relevance for the future given the current policy
environment. First, the ACA provided incentives to both providers and insurers in the form
of bonus payments with the purpose of improving quality of care and reducing costs for
Medicare beneficiaries. These incentivizations led to formation of provider groups called Accountable Care Organizations (ACOs). Many ACOs vertically integrated with insurers that
offer private Medicare plans (called Medicare Advantage (MA) plans) to mutually benefit
from the current regulation. Bonus payments are given to ACOs and MA plans based on
quality measures. To the extent that integration achieves higher quality, providers and insurers have an incentive to integrate to guarantee the receipt of the bonus payments. Moreover,
ACOs face penalties if their spending is above a certain threshold level, which puts them
at financial risk. Therefore, provider groups that merge with insurers are at an advantage
(Frakt et al. (2013)). While vertical integration of this form took place to accommodate the
migration to value-based payment systems under Medicare, these VI entities also started offering plans in the commercial market. The expansion of these firms into the private market
likely took place because firms already absorbed the sunk cost of integrating. Another ACA
item that incentivized vertical integration is the medical loss ratio (MLR) regulation that
requires insurers to spend at least 85% of their premium revenues on medical claims and
quality improvement for large-group fully-insured enrollees.2 This made meeting the MLR
criterion easier for VI insurers as they could make internal transfer payments to their health
care facilities and label profits as costs (Dafny (2015)).
The last relevant policy change pertains to the formation of insurance exchange markets
under the ACA. In line with the above incentivizations, VI plans constituted 52% of all
entities in the market by 2016, with commercial plans -including the ones offered on the
exchanges- being their biggest growth area.3 By 2016, 22% of the population enrolled in
2

For small-group and individual enrollees, this minimum is 80%. Self-insured plans are not subject to
this regulation.
3
See https://aishealth.com/node/47256.
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health insurance through public exchanges were enrollees of VI plans.4 Implications of
their success are important, given the recent anti-competitive concerns about exchanges.
The number of VI insurers as a share of all the entities operating in exchanges nationwide
has risen from 23.6% in 2014 to 25.3% in 2017. Moreover, VI entities represented 20%
of all the entities operating in monopoly or duopoly exchange markets in 2014, while this
number increased to 24% in 2017.5 These figures strengthen the relevance of my finding
that foreclosure is present in the market since vertically integrated entities engage in market
foreclosure with the purpose of gaining more market power (Tirole (1988)). Lastly, even
though the traditional insurers have been struggling in exchanges, VI insurers managed to
survive in these markets. Among 34 VI insurers that entered exchanges in 2014, 20 were
active in the marketplace every year until 2017, implying a 4-year survival rate of 59%. Their
prominence in concentrated markets combined with their high survival rate call into question
whether consumer welfare will be harmed if VI entities become the dominant players in their
markets.
In order to assess the overall impact on welfare, I separately model every component of
the market and use these models to predict the changes in actions of consumers, hospitals,
and insurers under counterfactual simulations. I begin by using static discrete choice setup
to model patients’ choices for hospitals. In this setting, individuals maximize utility when
choosing hospitals taking into account hospital characteristics as well as their own characteristics such as sex, age, diagnosis. Hospital demand model is estimated using data on the
universe of discharges from every hospital in seven states. Identification in this model comes
from variation in patients’ choice sets of hospitals across markets. Next, using the parameter
4

Enrollment in VI plans constituted a substantial portion of the overall insured population in many states.
In 2015, around 36 million people were enrolled in integrated plans across all lines of business nationwide.
See Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 in the Appendix. Source of all calculations and figures is AIS Directory of
Health Plans.
5
All figures represent author’s calculations from AIS and Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services
(CMS) data. The figures for 2017 represent the lower bounds as I only observe VI insurers until the
beginning of 2016, and hence do not consider the vertical consolidations occurred between 2016 and 2017.
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estimates from the hospital demand model, I calculate the expected utility the average patient gets from a network of hospitals offered by an insurer. Then, I use this expected utility
measure as an input in my insurer demand estimation. The insurer demand specification
follows Berry et al. (1995) and takes into account unobserved insurer characteristics and
heterogeneity in individual preferences towards certain insurer characteristics. This model
is identified by the variation in insurer characteristics within a market as well as the variation in choice sets of individuals across markets. Ultimately, I estimate a bargaining model
that combines demand side estimates with the results from hospital cost function estimation.
Hospital-insurer bargaining is modeled in a Nash bargaining framework developed by Brooks
et al. (1997) and later extended by Lewis and Pflum (2015).
Following the estimation of the full structural model, I analyze the counterfactual environment where exclusionary vertical restraints are removed from the market. Under this
counterfactual scenario, I remove vertical integration from the market altogether. As a result, previously-VI entities become separate hospitals and insurers. This changes consumer
demand for hospitals, leads to formation of new insurer networks through the bargaining
model, and results in new premiums. I find that removal of vertical integration from the
market lowers consumer welfare as it generates higher premiums on average due to broader
insurer networks. While larger hospital choice sets benefit consumers, this increase in utility
is offset by the disutility from higher premiums. The overall producer surplus in the market
goes up, although this effect is a combination of some hospitals and insurers losing profits
while others are gaining. The main loss is endured by previously-VI insurers who no longer
can enjoy the dedicated market share they had through exclusivity, and by previously-non-VI
hospitals who now have more competitors in the market. Previously-non-VI insurers mostly
gain as they start including previously-VI hospitals in their networks. Majority of these hospitals also gain as they increase their shares. Finally, I also analyze the impact of removal
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of vertical integration from the incumbent on the entrant in the downstream market.6 I find
that the entrant is better off as it now also has the same cost advantages as the VI entities.
This result points to the presence of entry barriers in the downstream market, which harms
downstream competition.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 discusses industry background
and related literature. Section 1.3 describes the data. Section 1.4 presents results from
the reduced-form analysis. Section 1.5 lays out the structural model. Section 1.6 discusses
estimation details and results. Section 1.7 simulates the counterfactual scenario and analyzes
the change in welfare. Section 1.8 concludes.

1.2

Industry Background and Related Literature

As in every vertically-separated market, there are three main players in the market for health
care: providers (hospitals and physicians), who are the upstream entities that produce the
services; insurers, who are the downstream entities that bundle the upstream products; and
consumers, who purchase these bundles (health plans) to have access to the network of
providers offered by the insurer. The relationship between these players is vertical in nature,
implying every player belongs in a different tier. Given this structure, the market for health
care is prone to two kinds of consolidation: horizontal and vertical. Horizontal consolidation
occurs when firms in the same tier go through mergers and acquisitions. Literature to date
mostly focused on this kind of consolidation in the form of hospital mergers and insurer
mergers. Previous research on hospital mergers finds hospital consolidation has no impact
on quality of care (Ho and Hamilton (2000), Capps (2005)) but leads to increased hospital
prices (Gaynor and Town (2011)).7 Similarly, papers on insurer mergers point to the strong
6

In the data, all VI entities are incumbents and there is only one entrant to the insurer market which is
non-VI.
7
Gaynor and Town (2011) provide a survey of nine studies that analyze the relationship between hospital
mergers and prices.
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relationship between insurer consolidation and higher premiums. Dafny et al. (2012) study
the Aetna-Prudential merger and find premiums rose more quickly in more concentrated
insurance markets. Trish and Herring (2015) also find premiums are higher in insurance
markets with higher levels of concentration. Lastly, some papers study the impact of hospitalphysician integration on market outcomes.8 Among these, Baker et al. (2014) find hospitalphysician integration results in reduced health spending and increased quality of care, but
increases hospital prices and providers’ market power.
Research on vertical consolidation in the health care market, on the other hand, has been
somewhat limited, mainly due to unavailability of data. By definition, vertical integration
occurs when a firm starts offering services that it was not traditionally offering, by acquisition
of a player that belongs in another tier. In the market for health care, this happens when
providers and insurers merge or go through acquisitions to offer a health plan.9 These plans,
often called provider-sponsored health plans (PSHPs), are characterized by low premiums
and narrow networks where enrollees can visit only the member hospitals of the parent
organization or the few other hospitals it contracted with. The most commonly known
provider-sponsored plans are products from Kaiser Permanente, where enrollees can visit
only in-network Kaiser facilities while paying low premiums. Frakt et al. (2013) analyze
PSHPs in the Medicare Advantage market prior to the passage of the ACA and find these
plans charge higher premiums, controlling for quality. They also find such plans have higher
quality ratings. Ho (2009a) studies hospital-insurer integration and finds that entry of PSHPs
into new markets increases social surplus. I contribute to this strand of literature by assessing
the welfare impacts of the presence of vertical integration in the market for health care.
8

Most of the literature refers to hospital-physician integration as vertical integration even though integration occurs within the same tier (among providers).
9
Other examples of vertical integration in the health care market include hospitals acquiring or becoming
partners with other firms to offer durable medical equipment, hospice care, rehabilitation services, long-term
care, or home-health services. See Antitrust Health Care Handbook 4th edition, page 263, American Bar
Association.
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Mine is also the first paper to reveal that vertically-integrated health systems engage in both
upstream and downstream foreclosure.
While the literature from health care industry is limited, a number of empirical papers study vertical integration and exclusive contracting in other industries (Lee (2013) in
videogames, Crawford et al. (2015) and Chipty (2001) in cable television, Vita (2000) in
gasoline, Asker (2016) in beer). These empirical papers aim to assess the impact of vertical integration on welfare, as theory does not provide a definitive answer. The theoretical
literature (Tirole (1988), Perry (1989), Joskow (2008)) emphasizes firms have incentives to
vertically integrate due to both the efficiency gains and anti-competitive motives. Efficiency
gains occur through elimination of double-marginalization10 (Tirole (1988)), elimination of
transaction costs11 , and alignment of interests12 (Williamson (1971), Grossman and Hart
(1986)). The anti-competitive motives are present as firms can gain market power by foreclosing their rivals from the market through increased entry costs and input costs (Hart and
Tirole (1990), Ordover et al. (1990), Salop and Scheffman (1983)). Capturing these “efficiency” and “foreclosure” theories and assessing the impact on welfare requires estimation
of structural models of consumer demand, and in some cases, bargaining.
Estimation of a bargaining model is especially important when analyzing vertical integration in health care as reimbursement rates (prices paid to hospitals by insurers) are
determined in yearly negotiations in the absence of vertical integration. The empirical literature on hospital-insurer bargaining aims to uncover how the surplus in the market is
10

If both upstream and the downstream firms have market power, then they both charge a price above
marginal cost (both add markups). This phenomenon is called double-marginalization. Tirole (1988) examines the extreme case where both the upstream and downstream markets are monopolized and concludes
that the independent behavior of the two monopolies results in smaller profits compared to what they could
achieve if they set prices to maximize joint profits. Therefore, vertical integration benefits firms by increasing
profits, and benefits consumers by lowering prices.
11
Transaction costs involve writing, monitoring, and enforcing the contracts.
12
If the contracts are incomplete, divergent interests of the parties engaged in bilateral exchange can
lead to opportunistic behavior and therefore, losses. Vertical integration aligns interests of upstream and
downstream firms, hence remedies this problem.
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split between insurers and hospitals depending on their market power in the negotiation
process. Brooks et al. (1997) were the first to estimate hospital-insurer bargaining in a
Nash bargaining framework. Their model was later extended by many researchers, including
Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), Lewis and Pflum (2015), Ho and Lee (2017b) and Ho and Lee
(2017a). This literature finds that hospitals have higher bargaining power in the negotiation process, agents’ bargaining power increases in industry concentration, and hospitals
in systems are able to set higher prices and extract a larger share of the surplus generated
by contracting. I contribute to the bargaining literature by showing vertical integration
increases hospitals’ bargaining power after controlling for industry concentration, system
membership, and observable hospital characteristics.
The bargaining model in this chapter is also used to form new networks under the counterfactual policy experiment. The empirical literature on hospital-insurer network formation
has established that restricted hospital choice decreases consumer welfare (Ho (2006)) and
individuals value broader insurer networks (Ericson and Starc (2015)). Ho and Lee (2017a)
incorporate bargaining into this framework and analyze networks formed under insurers’
profit maximization problem. My analysis also synthesizes the bargaining model with network formation, but it takes into account hospital profits while forming new networks and
insurer profits while setting new premiums. Consistent with the findings in this literature, I
conclude that consumer welfare increases with broader insurer networks and decreases with
higher premiums.

1.3

Data

This chapter uses data from several sources. Patient characteristics and discharge reports
come from 2014 State Inpatient Databases (SID) published by the Health Care Utilization
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Project (HCUP)13 , and from California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) 2014 Public Patient Discharge data.14 Hospital characteristics come from
American Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals 2014. I supplement the
hospital dataset using hospital star ratings obtained from Centers for Medicare and Medicaid
Services (CMS). I also use financial data on hospitals reported in OSHPD Financial Disclosure Reports 2008-2014.15 Insurer characteristics come from Atlantic Information Services
(AIS) Directory of Health Plans 201616 with premium and enrollment data being supplemented by the WEISS Ratings Guide to Health Insurers 2016. Insurer characteristics from
AIS include vertical integration indicator17 , enrollment, and number of enrolled by sector
(commercial risk, public risk etc.). WEISS provides investment ratings, enrollment, age,
and premiums of insurers. Additional plan characteristics are taken from National Committee for Quality Assurance (NCQA) Report on Health Plan Rankings 2015-2016. These
characteristics include the type of insurance plan (HMO, PPO etc.), states served, NCQA
accreditation, an overall quality score as well as quality measures of consumer satisfaction,
prevention, and treatment. I also use U.S. Census data on population (by age and sex) and
number of uninsured by state to supplement the dataset.
I use SID data from Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
and Washington. These states represent over 20% of the entire U.S. population, and cover
1,152,081 discharges from 753 hospitals in total.18 SID reports patient’s ZIP code, diagno13

HCUP is operated by Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ).
California OSHPD data is used only in bargaining estimation and counterfactual simulations.
15
Hospital cost function estimation uses this dataset.
16
This issue of the directory reports the vertical integration indicator, which is key to my analysis. Other
data I use, such as SID or OSHPD, come from 2014 as this was the last year available at the time of this
study.
17
AIS defines a health plan as provider-sponsored if it is owned by, or owns, in whole or in part, a segment
of its provider network. My analysis only focuses on vertical integration of hospitals and insurers, therefore
I do not consider health plans offered by physician groups as vertically integrated. For every VI insurer, I
use data collected from the insurer’s website to determine which hospitals are VI.
18
I exclude federal government hospitals (such as Air Force hospitals, Veterans Affairs hospitals etc.) and
long-term care hospitals from my analysis.
14
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Table 1.1: Patient Characteristics

Distance (miles)
Female
Age

Mean
15.56
0.66
27.68

SD
117.25
0.47
21.91

Min
0.04
0
0

Max
428.31
1
64

Notes: N=1,152,081 discharges.
sis19 , treatment, age, sex, and charges. I use only in-state, non-emergency-room (non-ER)
hospital visits in my analysis. I observe patients’ ZIP codes and the hospitals they visited,
therefore I calculate the distance between a patient’s residence location and hospital location.20 This data is summarized in Table 1.1. Average patient in my data travels 16 miles to
get care at a hospital. Females constitute 66% of all discharges due to the large number of
pregnancies and childbirths. This chapter focuses only on the non-elderly population (ages
between 0 and 64) as people above 65 are likely to be enrolled in Medicare plans and I
analyze insurers active in the commercial business only. Since all newborns are considered
as new patients in this dataset, the average patient is younger than expected.
Table 1.2 provides a summary of select variables from the hospital dataset.21 I report
information on 753 hospitals that operate in the seven states mentioned above. I observe
ownership type, teaching status, system membership, total inpatient days, total number of
admissions, and services offered by each hospital among other variables.
Variables available at the insurer level are summarized in Table 1.3. More than a fifth of
the commercial plans reported in AIS are VI. Therefore, any impact they will have on the
market is expected to be substantial. Average premium per plan is calculated by dividing
the total premium revenue reported in Weiss Ratings Guide by the enrollment data reported
in AIS. Average premium per patient per month ranges between $42 and $1140 with an
19

I use 25 Major Diagnostic Categories (MDCs) defined by CMS.
Distance is calculated as the distance between two latitude and longitude points of the hospital (as
reported by AHA) and the centroid of the patient’s zip code (as reported by SID).
21
The full list of hospital characteristics used in the analysis can be found in Table A3.
20
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Table 1.2: Hospital Characteristics
Mean
SD
Min
Max
Teaching hospital
0.08
0.27
0
1
Beds
228
246
6
2,478
Admissions
10,169 12,356 36 146,388
Full-time physicians
32
99
0
1,346
Full-time nurses
333
494
0
5,819
Inpatient days
56,357 70,548 131 715,156
Nurses per bed
1.30
0.71
0
6.93
For-profit
0.24
0.43
0
1
Women’s health center 0.49
0.50
0
1
Kidney transplant
0.05
0.21
0
1
MRI
0.61
0.49
0
1
Pain management
0.49
0.50
0
1
Notes: N=753 hospitals.
average of $461. The range is large since all types of plans (low-premium HMOs, highpremium PPOs etc.) are present in the dataset. In addition to premiums, I observe the age
of the plan, the number of physicians who participated in the insurer’s network of providers,
and the total number of enrollees. I also create an indicator variable for Blue Cross Blue
Shield (BCBS) plans as these are the dominant players in many markets. The rest of the
variables are created using NCQA reports on plan performance. This source reports type22
of each plan, which I aggregate to two categories: HMO/POS and PPO/Indemnity. In my
data, 56% of the plans are PPO/Indemnity. NCQA also reports a score that takes into
account NCQA accreditation standards, member satisfaction, and clinical measures. The
average NCQA rating for a plan is 3.34 out of 5. For quality, I use three measures of plan
performance: consumer satisfaction, treatment, and prevention that also range between 1
(lowest performance level) and 5 (highest performance level).23
22
Plan types reported in NCQA are: Health Maintenance Organization (HMO), Point of Service (POS),
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO), and indemnity.
23
The clinical quality measures (treatment and prevention) are calculated using a subset of the Healthcare
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) measures whereas consumer satisfaction measure comes
from the HEDIS survey which is overseen by AHRQ. Consumer satisfaction measure covers patients’ satisfaction with health plans (handling claims, customer service etc.), satisfaction with physicians (doctors’
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Table 1.3: Insurer Characteristics
Mean
Vertically integrated
0.21
Premiums ($)
461
Age
28.83
Physicians
44,828
Total enrollment
467,271
PPO/Indemnity
0.56
Consumer satisfaction
3
Treatment
2.84
Prevention
2.92
NCQA rating
3.34
NCQA accreditation
0.81
BCBS
0.15

SD
Min
0.41
0
290
42
19.18
0
56,387
27
817,277 209
0.50
0
0.59
1.5
0.67
1
0.73
1
0.61
1.5
0.39
0
0.36
0

Max
1
1,140
165
574,650
8m
1
5
4.5
4.5
5
1
1

Notes: N=380 insurers.
Lastly, hospital networks offered by insurers are hand-collected from individual insurers’
websites. This data is available for 989 insurers from 50 states and Washington DC. It is
important to note that while 380 insurers reported in Table 1.3 are distinct, the 989 insurers
for which I have networks are not. I determine the insurers competing in a state by using
enrollment data from AIS. If an insurer has more than 200 enrollees and offers commercial
plans in a state, then that insurer is included in that state’s market. Therefore, the same
insurer can be listed in several states; however, it offers different hospital networks in different
states as I create networks using only in-state hospitals. VI hospitals are identified in 16
states24 by collecting data from VI insurers’ websites. 13% of all hospitals and 14% of all
insurers in these states are VI. This data is used in the reduced-form analysis whenever
identification of VI hospitals is necessary.
communication, care received etc.), and access of getting care in terms of ease and promptness. The treatment
measure evaluates scores in subcategories such as asthma, diabetes, heart attack, and mental health. Finally,
the prevention score assesses measures such as timeliness of prenatal check ups, breast cancer screening, and
early immunizations.
24
I have data on Alaska, Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, California, Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Kentucky,
Massachusetts, Maryland, Maine, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington. Percent of VI
hospitals ranges between 0% to 39%, percent of VI insurers ranges between 0% to 38% in these states.
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Reduced-Form Analysis
Foreclosure

I begin my analysis by examining the impact of vertical integration on market foreclosure.
Theory suggests that vertical integration can lead to two forms of market foreclosure: upstream and downstream. Upstream foreclosure arises when downstream firms’ access to an
upstream supplier is reduced as a result of commercial practices. In contrast, downstream
foreclosure occurs when upstream suppliers’ access to a downstream firm is limited (Tirole
(1988)). In the context of provider-insurer integration, upstream foreclosure arises if VI
hospitals are not included in rival insurers’ (VI or non-VI) hospital networks. Downstream
foreclosure, on the other hand, emerges if VI insurers are less likely to carry rival hospitals
(VI or non-VI) in their networks.
VI entities engage in market foreclosure with the purpose of weakening competition in
either upstream or downstream market (Tirole (1988), Bolton and Whinston (1991)). For
example, the VI entity may engage in upstream foreclosure by charging higher prices to
competing insurers with the purpose of increasing rivals’ costs. This practice will harm
downstream competition through one of the two channels. If the competing downstream
insurers are unwilling to or cannot afford to include the VI hospital in their networks, then
the part of the market represented by this hospital will no longer be available to them. If
they choose to include the VI hospital at the higher price, then they will have higher costs
and therefore higher premiums. The VI entity, on the other hand, will have absolute cost
advantages and hence can offer lower premiums and attract more consumers, all else being
equal. Similarly, downstream foreclosure practices might harm upstream competition as
the VI insurer does not give rival hospitals access to its health plan. A familiar example is
Kaiser Permanente that includes only its own health facilities in its network. In this case, the
rival hospitals do not have access to the VI insurer’s enrollees and upstream competition is
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Table 1.4: Foreclosure Estimation - Hospitals
(1)
Number of Percent of
plans
plans
included
included
-1.45**
-0.04*
VI-hospital
(0.72)
(0.03)
-0.003*
-0.0001*
Physicians
(0.002)
(0.00006)
-0.11
-0.0003
Star rating
(0.28)
(0.009)
0.57**
0.04***
ln(Expenditure per adm.)
(0.23)
(0.008)
-0.004
0.03
Teaching hospital
(0.97)
(0.04)
0.78*
0.02
System member
(0.43)
(0.02)
2.48**
0.08
Physician group
(1.11)
(0.05)
1.93**
0.08**
Burn care
(0.90)
(0.03)
0.27
0.01
Cardiology services
(0.60)
(0.02)
0.10
0.005
Chemotherapy
(0.56)
(0.02)
R2
0.85
0.85

(2)
Number of Percent of
VI-plans
VI-plans
included
included
0.85***
0.15***
(0.08)
(0.02)
0.0001
-0.00002
(0.0002)
(0.00005)
0.002
0.01
(0.03)
(0.009)
0.08***
0.05***
(0.03)
(0.007)
-0.07
0.006
(0.13)
(0.03)
0.003
0.002
(0.05)
(0.01)
-0.09
-0.01
(0.09)
(0.04)
0.14
0.05
(0.13)
(0.03)
0.14**
0.04*
(0.07)
(0.02)
0.13**
0.03*
(0.07)
(0.02)
0.69
0.71

(3)
Percent of
Number of
non-VI-plans non-VI-plans
included
included
-2.30***
-0.08***
(0.69)
(0.03)
-0.003**
-0.0001*
(0.002)
(0.00007)
-0.11
-0.001
(0.27)
(0.01)
0.50**
0.04***
(0.21)
(0.009)
0.07
0.03
(0.92)
(0.04)
0.77*
0.03
(0.41)
(0.02)
2.57**
0.09
(1.07)
(0.05)
1.80**
0.09**
(0.87)
(0.04)
0.13
0.01
(0.58)
(0.03)
-0.03
0.002
(0.54)
(0.02)
0.84
0.85

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. N = 1285 hospitals. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
State fixed effects included. All specifications control for hospital bed size category, primary service category,
control authority, and hospital services reported in Table A1. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically
significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.

harmed as the market represented by the VI insurer is no longer accessible to the competing
hospitals.
In order to investigate whether upstream foreclosure is present in the market, I start my
analysis at the hospital level. If VI hospitals engage in upstream foreclosure, access to them
should be reduced, hence they should be included in fewer health plans compared to non-VI
hospitals. To examine this, I estimate the following linear regression model at the hospital
level:
Yh = β0 + β1 V Ihospitalh + αXh + Ds + h

(1.1)

where the dependent variable Yh is the number (and percent) of health plans hospital h is

CHAPTER 1. VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN HEALTH CARE

17

included in within a state, V Ihospitalh is a dummy variable indicating whether hospital
h is VI or not, Xh are other hospital characteristics such as star rating, teaching status,
number of full-time physicians at a hospital etc., Ds are state fixed effects, and h is the
error term. Results are reported in Panel (1) of Table 1.4.25 The coefficient of interest, β1 , is
negative and statistically significant implying that VI hospitals, on average, are included in
4% fewer health plans compared to their non-VI counterparts. Therefore, one can conclude
foreclosure is present in the market. This estimation, however, does not inform us as to
whether upstream or downstream foreclosure is present in the market as β1 reflects multiple
mechanisms that are at work. In particular, β1 combines the following effects of efficiency,
upstream foreclosure, and downstream foreclosure:
1. Positive effect of VI hospital h∗ being included in its own VI insurer’s network due to
efficiency
2. Negative effect of VI hospital h∗ ’s upstream foreclosure of competing VI insurers
3. Negative effect of VI hospital h∗ ’s upstream foreclosure of competing non-VI insurers
4. Negative effect of competing VI insurers’ downstream foreclosure of hospital h∗
It is important to notice that three (1, 2, and 4) out of four mechanisms pertain to VI
insurers. Consequently, regressing the number (and percent) of VI health plans hospital h is
included in on the same set of hospital attributes gives a combination of these three effects.
Results from this estimation are reported in Panel (2) of Table 1.4. The positive estimate of
β1 implies that the efficiency effects dominate the foreclosure effects in the market when only
VI insurers are considered. Finally, to assess whether upstream foreclosure is exercised by VI
hospitals, I regress the number of non-VI health plans hospital h is included in on the same
set of hospital characteristics. Results from this specification are reported in Panel (3) of
25

Table A1 reports results from full specification with the entire set of hospital characteristics included.
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Table 1.4. The negative and significant estimate of β1 reflects only mechanism 3 above, and
suggests that upstream foreclosure is present in the market. VI hospitals are included in 8%
fewer non-VI health plans compared to their non-VI counterparts. While VI hospitals might
also foreclose rival VI insurers, it is not possible to capture this mechanism using regression
analysis.
Next, I investigate the presence of downstream foreclosure in the market using the same
setup but where the unit of observation is insurer-market and estimate the following equation:

Mjs = γ0 + γ1 V Iinsurerj + ζZj + Ds + js

(1.2)

where Mjs is the number (and percent) of hospitals covered in insurer j’s network in state
s, V Iinsurerj is a dummy variable indicating whether insurer j is VI or not, Zj are other
insurer characteristics such as not-for-profit status, PPO, BCBS etc., Ds are state fixed
effects, and js is the error term. I use two-way clustering (at the state level and at the
plan level) for the standard errors to account for the correlation in errors within a state and
within an insurer identifier as there are some large insurers that operate in multiple states
in my data. Results from this specification are reported in Panel (1) of Table 1.5. While the
negative and significant estimate of the coefficient of interest, γ1 , suggests that foreclosure
is present in the market, again it is not possible to disentangle the impact of efficiency,
upstream foreclosure, and downstream foreclosure. In this case, γ1 combines the following
analogous effects:
1. Positive effect of VI insurer j ∗ including its own VI hospitals in its network due to
efficiency
2. Negative effect of VI insurer j ∗ ’s downstream foreclosure of competing VI hospitals
3. Negative effect of VI insurer j ∗ ’s downstream foreclosure of non-VI hospitals
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Table 1.5: Foreclosure Estimation - Insurers

VI-insurer
Age
PPO
Not-for-profit
NCQA rating
NCQA Accr.
BCBS
Weiss rating
Enrollment
R2

(1)
Number of Percent of
hospitals
hospitals
covered
covered
-14.16*
-0.14*
(7.84)
(0.08)
0.05
0.0006
(012)
(0.0008)
7.36
0.008
(5.51)
(0.04)
19.29**
0.09***
(8.36)
(0.03)
-3.37
-0.04
(4.28)
(0.03)
-1.03
0.002
(8.26)
(0.05)
10.16
0.06
(9.11)
(0.04)
2.15*
0.005
(1.14)
(0.006)
0.003
0.000007
(0.006)
(0.00002)
0.61
0.38

(2)
Number of
Percent of
VI-hospitals VI-hospitals
covered
covered
0.31
0.03
(1.40)
(0.09)
0.003
0.0002
(0.01)
(0.0007)
1.51*
0.03
(0.78)
(0.02)
2.06**
0.07***
(0.91)
(0.02)
0.13
-0.004
(0.75)
(0.03)
-1.17
-0.04
(0.83)
(0.03)
1.50*
0.07
(0.83)
(0.05)
0.14
0.008*
(0.19)
(0.005)
0.0005
0.000007
(0.0003)
(0.00002)
0.71
0.64

(3)
Number of
Percent of
non-VI-hospitals non-VI-hospitals
covered
covered
-14.47**
-0.14*
(7.02)
(0.08)
0.05
0.0006
(0.12)
(0.0008)
5.85
0.009
(4.95)
(0.04)
17.23**
0.09***
(7.64)
(0.03)
-3.50
-0.04
(4.21)
(0.03)
0.14
0.007
(7.53)
(0.05)
8.66
0.05
(8.41)
(0.04)
2.01**
0.005
(1.004)
(0.006)
0.003
0.0001
(0.00002)
(0.00006)
0.62
0.39

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. N = 339 insurers from 16 markets. Robust, two-way
clustered (at the plan level and at the state level) standard errors in parentheses. All specifications include state
fixed effects. Enrollment is in thousands. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5%
level, * statistically significant at 10% level.

4. Negative effect of competing VI hospitals’ upstream foreclosure of insurer j ∗
Results in Panel (2) of Table 1.5 reflect the combination of effects 1, 2, and 4. I find that
efficiency and foreclosure effects balance each other out. Following the same reasoning as
above, I show that downstream foreclosure is present in the market by isolating mechanism
3 and estimating the analogue regression. Results are reported in Panel (3) of Table 1.5.
When I use the number (and percent) of non-VI hospitals included in insurer j’s network
as the dependent variable, I find that VI insurers are less likely to carry non-VI hospitals in
their networks, suggesting they engage in downstream foreclosure. In particular, VI insurers
carry 14% fewer non-VI hospitals in their networks, on average, compared to non-VI insurers.
While VI insurers might also engage in downstream foreclosure by denying rival VI hospitals
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access to their health plans, this mechanism cannot be captured using regression analysis.

1.4.2

Network Size, Premiums, and Quality

Network Size:
The results from previous section on foreclosure suggest that VI insurers, on average, offer
fewer hospitals in their networks. To investigate whether this result implies VI plan enrollees
have access to fewer resources, I use the same sample and the same specification as Equation
(1.2) with two measures of network size as dependent variables: beds per a hundred enrollee
population and physicians per a hundred enrollee population. Enrollment is not included as
an explanatory variable as it is accounted for in the dependent variable. I cluster standard
errors both at the state level and at the insurer level as errors might be correlated within a
state and are expected to be correlated for plans that operate in several states. Results are
represented in Table 1.6. In both specifications, while the coefficient of interest is negative,
it is not statistically significantly different than zero. This result suggests that even though
individuals enrolled in VI plans are constrained to narrower hospital networks, they do not
necessarily have fewer resources at their use.

Premiums:
Next, I investigate whether VI insurers charge higher or lower premiums compared to their
non-VI counterparts. If the VI insurers pass along the cost savings to their enrollees, then
one would expect the VI entity to charge lower premiums. If, on the other hand, they are
able to gain and exercise market power through foreclosure, they will be able to charge higher
premiums to their enrollees.
To my knowledge, the only paper to date that examined the impact of provider-insurer
integration on premiums is Frakt et al. (2013). The authors find VI insurers charge $28 more
per month in the Medicare Advantage market. Their data is from 2009, however, hence they
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Table 1.6: Network Size Estimation

VI-insurer
Age
PPO
Not-for-profit
NCQA rating
NCQA accreditation
BCBS
Weiss rating
R2

(1)
Beds
-0.76
(0.75)
-0.005
(0.01)
0.99*
(0.51)
1.30**
(0.52)
1.07***
(0.35)
-0.47
(0.50)
1.24**
(0.53)
-0.02
(0.08)
0.20

(2)
Physicians
-0.81
(0.75)
-0.005
(0.01)
1.004**
(0.51)
1.27**
(0.52)
1.03***
(0.34)
-0.57
(0.52)
1.33**
(0.54)
-0.03
(0.08)
0.20

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. N=339 insurers from 16 states. Robust,
two-way clustered (at the plan level and at the
state level) standard errors in parentheses. All
specifications include state fixed effects. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically
significant at 5% level, * statistically significant
at 10% level.
do not reflect the effects of the ACO bonus program that might have given these plans cost
advantages in the post-ACA era. Recent papers in the literature find that insurers charge
higher premiums if the insurance market concentration is high (Dafny et al. (2012)), the
upstream industry is consolidated (Town et al. (2006)), or insurers have lower bargaining
power while negotiating with providers (Trish and Herring (2015)).
I estimate the following linear model to examine the vertical integration-premium rela-
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tionship:
lnP remiumj = β0 + β1 V Iinsurerj + αZj + γMj + Ds + j

(1.3)

where P remiumj is insurer j’s premium per enrollee per month, Zj are insurer characteristics, Mj are market characteristics, Ds are state fixed effects, and j is the error term.
Since the unit of observation is at the insurer level, I aggregate all market-level variables to
insurer-level variables using insurer j’s state enrollments as weights for the states insurer j is
active in.26 I also include state fixed effects for every state the insurer operates in, therefore
more than one state fixed effect can be assigned to an observation.
Results are reported in Table 1.7. Specifications reported in first two columns use aggregated market variables mentioned above, and only differ in the market characteristics
included in the estimation.27 Specification in the last column uses state-level market characteristics (instead of weighted and aggregated) for the domicile state of the insurer (as
reported by Weiss) as well as state fixed effects for a single domicile state. Standard errors
in this specification are clustered at the state level.
The main finding is that VI insurers charge lower premiums after controlling for insurer
and market characteristics, and this result is robust across specifications. The magnitude of
reduction in premiums compared to non-VI insurers is between 20.5% to 27.4% depending
on the specification.28 The coefficient estimates for other variables are as expected and in
line with the previous findings in the literature. PPOs that are characterized by larger
networks charge higher premiums, while BCBS insurers have lower premiums likely because
they exercise their bargaining power in negotiations with hospitals, extract lower prices,
and pass on the savings to their enrollees. Percent of the health plans that are integrated
26

This is a common practice in the literature. See Song et al. (2012),Frakt et al. (2013), and Trish and
Herring (2015) among others.
27
I also estimated the baseline specification using additional market controls (such as percent Hispanic,
percent elderly, percent non-profit insurers, hospital discharges) and obtained similar results.
28
The percent impact on raw premiums is calculated as (eβ1 − 1) × 100.
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Table 1.7: Premium Estimation
ln Premium
(per person per month)
(1)
(2)
(3)
-0.23** -0.25*** -0.32***
VI-insurer
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.11)
-0.004** -0.004* -0.006**
Age
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
0.33*** 0.32***
0.27***
PPO
(0.07)
(0.07)
(0.08)
-0.45*** -0.46*** -0.45***
BCBS
(0.10)
(0.10)
(0.11)
0.04*** 0.03***
0.03**
Weiss rating
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.01)
-0.15
0.56
-1.77***
Percent integrated
(0.68)
(0.75)
(0.18)
-0.005*
-0.004
0.03*
Insurer HHI
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.02)
0.0005
-0.002
0.02**
Hospital HHI
(0.003)
(0.003)
(0.006)
0.50
0.04
1.64***
ln(Per capita income)
(0.52)
(0.59)
(0.21)
0.37
0.48
1.83***
ln(Medicare hospital payments)
(0.70)
(0.72)
(0.32)
1.97**
1.87**
-4.47***
ln(Input price)
(0.76)
(0.76)
(1.60)
-0.43
-0.02
-0.02
Unemployment rate
(0.33)
(0.39)
(0.05)
-1.42*
-4.69**
Percent Black
(0.73)
(2.01)
3.21
-12.42***
Percent Uninsured
(3.56)
(3.54)
2
R
0.38
0.39
0.34
Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. N=380 insurers. Robust standard errors in parentheses. State fixed effects
included. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically
significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.
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does not influence the premiums when all the states the insurer operates in are taken into
account. I use the commonly-accepted Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) as a measure
of market concentration in both insurer and hospital markets.29 Insurer HHI is positive
and significant in the last specification, implying insurers charge higher premiums when the
market gets closer to a monopoly. Hospital HHI coefficient is positive where significant, as
anticipated. As hospital HHI increases, hospital markets get more concentrated, and as a
result, hospital prices increase. This implies increased costs for insurers, which translates
into higher premiums.
Since I have only one year of data and no source of exogenous variation within this year,
I cannot assign a causal interpretation to my findings. The main result that VI insurers
charge lower premiums on average is, however, robust across specifications. It is also robust
to inclusion of other market level controls and different definitions of HHI as discussed above.
This result implies that VI insurers are indeed passing along the savings from reduced costs
to their enrollees. This is also in line with their strategies to offer low-premium high-quality
plans and attract large patient pools.30

Quality:
The last piece of my reduced-form analysis examines the relationship between quality and
vertical integration. Frakt et al. (2013) find that VI insurers in the Medicare Advantage
market offer higher quality plans. I conduct a similar analysis for the plans operating in the
29

HHI is calculated as the sum of squared market shares of individual entities in the market, scaled by 100.
Therefore, HHI ranges between [0, 100] with 100 representing the highest concentration possible. Both HHI
measures are calculated at the state level. Hospital HHI is calculated using inpatient days. I also estimated
the premium equation using hospital HHI calculated based on total admissions, total number of beds, and
total Medicare discharges, and obtained similar results. Insurer HHI is calculated using state enrollment as
reported by AIS.
30
Source: The Rapid Rise of Provider-Sponsored Health Plans: Two Case Studies webinar by AIS.
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commercial market, and estimate the following equation at the plan level:

Qualityj = β0 + β1 V Iinsurerj + αZj + γMj + Ds + j

(1.4)

I use the four quality measures as reported by NCQA: an overall quality measure (NCQA
Rating), quality of prevention, quality of treatment, and quality of consumer satisfaction.
Again, the market level variables are aggregated to insurer level using the states the insurer
is active in, and state fixed effects are included for the states the insurer operates in.
The results reported in Table 1.8 imply that, on average, VI insurers offer higher quality
plans in terms of all measures except consumer satisfaction. This superior quality of VI plans
compared to their non-VI counterparts likely arises from the clinical integration within the
VI entity that enables both the provider-side and insurer-side to better track the patients,
and take preventive measures or treat them accordingly.
To conclude, the reduced-form analysis shows that VI entities engage in both upstream
and downstream foreclosure, VI insurers offer fewer hospitals in their networks but not
necessarily fewer beds or physicians, and they charge lower premiums and provide better
quality in multiple dimensions. While consumer welfare might be harmed as a result of
limited choice due to foreclosure, it might also improve due to lower premiums and better
quality. Similarly, VI entities might attract more consumers as a result of lower premiums
and better quality, but they might also be losing consumers due to limited choice. Non-VI
hospitals and insurers might be harmed by vertical integration as they do not have access to
VI entities hence do not have the same cost advantages, but they might also be preferred by
consumers as the networks they offer are not necessarily limited. Consequently, the overall
impact of vertical integration on welfare remains to be ambiguous. I estimate the structural
model outlined in the next section and measure the overall impact on consumer and producer
welfare under a counterfactual scenario that removes vertical integration from the market.
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Table 1.8: Quality Estimation
(1)
NCQA Rating
0.39***
VI-insurer
(0.08)
0.001
Age
(0.002)
-0.21***
PPO
(0.06)
0.41***
BCBS
(0.09)
-0.006
Weiss rating
(0.01)
0.26
Percent integrated
(0.67)
-0.004
Insurer HHI
(0.003)
0.004*
Hospital HHI
(0.002)
1.45***
ln(Per capita income)
(0.52)
0.10
ln(Medicare hospital payments)
(0.64)
0.14
ln(Input price)
(0.68)
0.29
Unemployment rate
(0.35)
0.55
Percent black
(0.65)
-1.28
Percent uninsured
(3.16)
R2
0.48

(2)
Prevention
0.43***
(0.10)
0.003
(0.002)
-0.22***
(0.08)
0.56***
(0.11)
-0.02
(0.01)
1.04
(0.80)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.006***
(0.003)
1.66***
(0.63)
0.38
(0.76)
-0.25
(0.81)
-0.04
(0.42)
1.13
(0.78)
0.08
(3.80)
0.49

(3)
(4)
Treatment Consumer Satisfaction
0.52***
0.12
(0.09)
(0.09)
0.002
-0.003*
(0.002)
(0.002)
-0.21***
-0.10
(0.07)
(0.07)
0.46***
0.41***
(0.10)
(0.10)
-0.01
0.01
(0.01
(0.01)
0.38
-1.66**
(0.72)
(0.75)
-0.004
-0.004
(0.003)
(0.003)
0.002
-0.001
(0.002)
(0.002)
1.26**
-0.46
(0.56)
(0.58)
-1.35**
1.80**
(0.69)
(0.71)
-0.92
1.45*
(0.73)
(0.75)
0.69*
-1.26***
(0.38)
(0.39)
-0.28
2.75***
(0.70)
(0.72)
-1.38
0.93
(3.42)
(3.53)
0.40
0.31

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. N=380 insurers from 50 U.S. states. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. State fixed effects included for each state the insurer operates in. ***
statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at
10% level.
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Structural Analysis: Model and Methodology

The structural model, used to assess the overall impact on welfare, consists of three main
components. First, I use discrete choice models of demand to explain how consumers choose
hospitals to visit and choose insurance plans to enroll in. Demand side closely follows the
setup developed by Capps et al. (2003) and extended by Ho (2006). In the second stage,
I estimate a cost function to examine how hospital costs are determined. The final component of my model combines parameter estimates from demand models and cost function
to estimate a bargaining model. The hospital-insurer negotiations are modeled within a
Nash bargaining framework following Lewis and Pflum (2015). I use the bargaining model
to investigate how vertical integration affects bargaining power, and to determine the new
insurer networks under counterfactual simulations.

1.5.1

Estimation of the Demand Side

The vertical relationship between the three agents in the health care market calls for two
separate demand models: demand for hospitals by consumers and demand for insurers by
consumers. First, I estimate the hospital demand model using a conditional logit framework.31 Next, I use the results from hospital demand estimation to construct an “expected
utility” measure and use this as an insurer characteristic in health plan demand estimation.
This measure captures the predicted utility an average patient gets from a network of hospitals offered by an insurer. Finally, I estimate health plan demand using the contraction
mapping algorithm developed by Berry et al. (1995) (henceforth BLP) taking into account
unobserved plan characteristics as well as heterogeneity in consumer preferences towards
certain insurer characteristics.
31

I use the standard conditional logit model proposed in McFadden (1974).
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Hospital Demand Model

Let utility of patient i from visiting hospital h in market m given diagnosis l be:

uihlm = u(Xhm , Vilm |λ, θ)

(1.5)

where (λ, θ) are parameters to be estimated, and Xhm is a vector of observed hospital characteristics. Vilm = [Dim , Cilm ] is a vector of observed consumer characteristics where Dim
represents demographic characteristics such as sex, age, location and Cilm represents clinical
attributes such as diagnosis. Patients choose hospitals to maximize utility, so if patient i
with diagnosis l chooses hospital h, then the following inequality must hold for all other
hospitals h0 in the market, where the market subscript m will be suppressed for notational
ease:
uihl = u(Xh , Vil |λ, θ) ≥ uih0 l = u(Xh0 , Vil |λ, θ)

(1.6)

In particular, let the utility specification be:

uihl = θXh + λ1 Xh Di + λ2 Xh Cil − γ(Vi )OP C(Cil ) + ihl

(1.7)

where OP C(Cil ) is the out-of-pocket cost for patient i with diagnosis Cil and γ converts
money into utils based on patient characteristics Vil and informs us about the price sensitivity
of patients.32 I assume that the independently and identically distributed error term ihl
captures idiosyncratic tastes and has an Extreme Value Type 1 distribution. Then, the
hospital share equation can be written as:
32

In practice, a patient’s hospital choice depends on out-of-pocket expenditures at a hospital. However,
since I do not observe these costs, while estimating the hospital demand model, I make the common assumption (as in Capps et al. (2003), Ho (2006), Lewis and Pflum (2015)) that they are constant across
hospitals for a given patient and therefore do not affect hospital choice. Nonetheless, I still estimate the
price sensitivity parameter γ jointly with the parameters of the bargaining model.
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eu(Xh ,Vil |λ,θ)
sh (M) = P u(X ,V |λ,θ)
e h il

(1.8)

k∈M

where M is the set of hospitals that are in the same choice set as hospital h. There is no
outside option because I only observe sick patients who are hospitalized. Since I observe
the actual shares, I use maximum likelihood to obtain the parameter estimates λ̂ and θ̂.
Identification in this model comes from the variation in patients’ hospital choice sets across
markets. Unlike the health plan demand model (presented next), this model does not account
for unobserved quality of hospitals. I have very rich hospital characteristics data, therefore
I assume that the characteristics I use in estimation capture the quality of hospitals.

1.5.1.2

Expected Utility and Willingness-to-Pay

The hospital demand model presented above is used to create two measures: expected utility
from an insurer’s network of hospitals (used in insurer demand estimation) and willingnessto-pay (WTP) of an individual for a hospital to be included in his choice set (used in
bargaining estimation).33 The common element to both calculations is patient i’s interim
utility from having access to a set of hospitals M:
h
i
hX
i
V (M|Xh , Vil ) = E max û(Xh , Vil |λ̂, θ̂) = ln
eû(Xh ,Vil |λ̂,θ̂)
h∈M

(1.9)

h∈M

The expected utility a type q patient34 gets from a network of hospitals M offered by
insurer j is given by:
!
EUqj (M) =

X
l

33

pql V (M|Xh , Vql ) =

X
l

pql ln

X

e

û(Xh ,Vql |λ̂,θ̂)

(1.10)

h∈M

The construction of these measures follows Ho (2006) and Capps et al. (2003), respectively.
Patient types are defined by age-sex-ZIP code cells, where age brackets are 0-17, 18-34, 35-44, 45-54,
55-64.
34
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where pql is the probability that patient type q is hospitalized with diagnosis l. That is,
first I calculate a different interim utility for each diagnosis each patient type q might have.
Then, I take a weighted sum across these values where the weights are pql to calculate the
expected utility patient type q receives from having access to insurer j’s network of hospitals
M. The expected utility measure is calculated for type q patient (instead of individual i)
because I do not observe consumers’ choices of health plans. Health plan demand estimation
uses aggregate shares data to obtain the parameter estimates.
On the contrary, I calculate the WTP measure based on individual i’s interim utility
because I observe hospital choice at the individual level. The contribution of hospital h to
patient i’s interim utility from the network of hospitals M can be calculated as:

∆h V (M|Xh , Vil ) = V (M|Xh , Vil ) − V (M \ h|Xh , Vil ) = ln


1
1 − sh (M)

(1.11)

The total ex-ante WTP for inclusion of hospital h in the network of hospitals M is
then given by integrating (11) across a cumulative distribution of patient characteristics and
diagnosis F (Vil ):
Z
∆Wj (M) = Nj


1 
1
ln
dF (Vil )
γ
1 − sh (M)

(1.12)

V

where Nj is the number of patients enrolled with insurer j that visit a hospital.
1.5.1.3

Insurer Demand Model

I estimate consumer demand for insurers using a discrete choice setting that accounts for
unobserved individual characteristics as well as the expected utility a patient gets from a
network of hospitals. I start by estimating a benchmark logit model that closely follows the
specification in Berry (1994) and then move onto BLP estimation that takes into account
heterogeneity in individual preferences towards insurer characteristics as an additional layer.
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Logit Model:
Let utility individual i gets from plan j in market r be:

wijr =

X

xjkr βk + ξjr + ijr

(1.13)

k

where xjkr is the k th observed plan characteristic of plan j and ξj represents the unobserved
plan characteristic (such as patients’ perception about quality, status, service, reputation,
past experience etc.). For simplicity, I drop the market subscripts in the rest of the analysis.
Therefore, the utility function can be written as:

wij =

X

xjk βk + ξj + ij = δj (xj , ξj , β) + ij

(1.14)

k

where δj represents the mean utility level from plan j. The unobserved characteristics are
assumed to be mean independent of xj ’s and also independent across markets. The error term
ij is independently and identically distributed across consumers and plans and assumed to
have an Extreme Value Type 1 distribution. Normalizing the mean utility from the outside
good to be zero (i.e. δo = 0), the closed-form solution for the market share equation for
product j can be written as:
sj =
1+

eδj
G
P

(1.15)
e δg

g=1

where G is the number of plans in the market. The share of the outside good is given by:

so =
1+

1
G
P
g=1

(1.16)
eδg
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Dividing Equation (1.15) by Equation (1.16) gives:
sj
= eδj =⇒ ln(sj ) − ln(so ) = δj
so

(1.17)

Hence, I generate δ’s using the market share data. Having obtained the dependent variable,
I estimate the following equation to obtain the parameter estimates:

δj =

X

xjk βk + ξj

(1.18)

k

Before moving on with estimation, the endogeneity problem caused by premiums needs
to be addressed. The unobserved plan characteristic ξj (the error term in Equation (1.18))
is likely to be correlated with the plan’s premium which is one of the observed plan characteristics. One would expect a high-quality, better-service plan to charge a higher premium.
For this reason, I instrument for the premium variable. Traditional instruments used in the
literature for price are cost shifters (these are difficult to find as they are usually correlated
with ξ’s), characteristics of competing products in the same market, and prices of the same
product in other markets (because a shock to marginal cost will be carried to prices in other
markets). I use characteristics (other than premium) of other plans within the same market
as instruments. These instruments and the relevant validity tests are further discussed in
Section 1.6. Given these instruments Z, I form the moment conditions as follows. First, I
calculate the unobserved quality term ξj as a function of model parameters:

ξj = δj −

X
k

xjk βk = ln(sj ) − ln(so ) −

X

xjk βk

(1.19)

k

The instruments should be orthogonal to this unobserved quality term, so I form the moment
conditions as E[ξ(β)0 Z] = 0. In applying iterative Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),
I use the “optimal” weighting matrix W which is the inverse of the variance of moment
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conditions. Therefore, the problem reduces to:

min ξ(β)0 ZW Z 0 ξ(β) where W = (E[Z 0 ξξ 0 Z])−1
β

(1.20)

The analytical solution to this problem is:

β = (X 0 ZW Z 0 X)−1 (X 0 ZW Z 0 δ)

(1.21)

The iterative estimation algorithm starts with W = (Z 0 Z)−1 to get an initial estimate β̂,
and then I re-compute W = (E[Z 0 ξ(β̂)ξ(β̂)0 Z])−1 to get a new estimate of β.
Identification in the health plan demand model comes from the variation in consumers’
choice sets across markets as well as the variation of health plan characteristics within a
market. Markets are defined by states. Results from the health plan demand estimation are
presented in Table 1.10.

BLP:
The major drawback of the previous model is that it does not generate realistic substitution patterns. In this setting, the cross-price elasticity between any two plans depends only
on their market shares. Consider two health plans A and B whose market shares are the
same. Let A be an HMO plan with low premiums, narrow hospital and physician networks,
and low ratings; and B be a PPO plan with high premiums, large provider network, and
top ratings. Assume there is another PPO plan C in the market with high premiums, large
provider network, and high quality ratings. The cross-price elasticity of the previous model
implies that if plan C increases its premiums, the demand for plan A and plan B will increase
equally. This is unintuitive as we expect the cross-price effect to be larger for health plans
that are similar in characteristics. The model presented by BLP solves this problem and gen-

CHAPTER 1. VERTICAL INTEGRATION IN HEALTH CARE

34

erates realistic substitution patterns. With the BLP estimation outlined below, cross-price
elasticities are larger for products that are closer together in terms of their characteristics.
Let utility of patient i from insurer j in market r be:

wijr = ξjr +xjr φ+β1 EUjr +β2 P remjr +γ1 νi1 EUjr +γ2 νi2 P remjr +ηijr = δj +µ(νi1 , νi2 )+ηijr
(1.22)
where ξj are unobserved insurer characteristics, xj are observed insurer characteristics,
P remj is insurer j’s premium, νi are random draws from a normal distribution and represent unobserved individual preferences, and ηij are idiosyncratic shocks to consumer tastes
that are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with Extreme Value Type
1. The expected utility measure presented in the previous subsection is aggregated to insurer
level by taking a weighted sum across patient types where weights are population shares of
type q individuals obtained from Census data. δj is the mean utility level that a patient
gets from plan j. It is the presence of the interaction terms µ that allows me to capture the
heterogeneity of preferences. In this setting, consumers with similar characteristics prefer
similar products. Therefore, if an insurer is removed from the choice set, consumers will
substitute to other insurers that are similar in terms of characteristics and this generates
more realistic substitution patterns.
Identification in this model comes from the variation in patients’ plan choice sets across
markets. To address the endogeneity issue, I again instrument for premiums using the BLPtype instruments mentioned above. The outside good is defined as having no insurance and
its share is calculated using the Census data. In this setting, the share equation for plan j
cannot be solved analytically. As in BLP, I use simulation techniques to obtain the predicted
shares:
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ns

sˆjr (φ, γ, β) =

1 X
e(ξjr +xjm φ+β1 EUjr +β2 P remjr +γ1 νi1 EUjr +γ2 νi2 P remjr )
P (ξ +x φ+β EU +β P rem +γ ν EU +γ ν P rem )
1 i1
2 i2
kr
kr
kr
ns i=1 1 +
e kr kr 1 kr 2

(1.23)

k∈P

where ns is the number of random draws (1000 in my estimation), and P is the set of plans
in the market. That is, I calculate a different share with each distinct draw of the unobserved
individual preference term νi , and then obtain the predicted share as an average of these
simulated shares across draws. Dropping the market subscript and simplifying notation, one
can write the predicted shares as:

sˆj ns =

1 X
eδj +µ(xj ,νi )
P
ns i 1 + eδj +µ(xj ,νi )

(1.24)

j

Given the equation for predicted shares, I use the contraction mapping algorithm introduced by BLP to obtain δ, the mean utility level vector. This algorithm aims to match the
predicted shares ŝ to the observed true shares s using the following equation:

δ h = δ h−1 + ln(s) − ln(ŝ)

(1.25)

I begin by evaluating the right-hand side at an initial guess of parameters and δ, obtain
a new δ, put it back into the right-hand side and repeat this until convergence is reached.
Once I obtain δ, I rewrite the unobserved plan characteristics as ξj = δj − xj φ. Therefore, I
form the moment conditions as E[ξ 0 Z] = 0 and estimate via GMM.

1.5.2

Hospital Cost Function

I adapt the trans-log specification common in the literature (Fournier and Mitchell (1997),
Capps et al. (2010), Lewis and Pflum (2015)) that is used to estimate cost functions of
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multiproduct firms and hospitals. According to this specification, hospital h’s costs at time
t are given by:
ln(Costht ) = β0 + β1 ln(Yht ) + β2 ln(Yht ) × ln(Yht ) + β3 ln(Wht ) + β4 ln(Wht ) × ln(Wht )
+ β5 ln(Yht ) × ln(Wht ) + κht + t + ht
(1.26)
where Yh are hospital outputs, Wh are hospital inputs, κ are hospital fixed effects, and t is a
time trend. The error term ht is clustered at the hospital level, therefore it is allowed to be
correlated for a hospital across years, but errors are assumed to be distributed independently
across hospitals. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total operating
costs at a hospital. The hospital output vector, Yh , consists of inpatient days and outpatient
visits for private insurance, Medicare, and other payer types (such as Medi-Cal, workers’
compensation, county indigent programs, self-pay etc.). The hospital input vector, Wh ,
includes size measures for the hospital (such as number of beds, fixed assets, total number of
hours for registered nurses etc.), governance structure, for-profit status, rural status, vertical
integration status, teaching status, and full-line forcing (FLF) status.35 The marginal costs
of both components are allowed to vary by other inputs and outputs through the inclusion
of the interaction terms. The results from hospital cost function estimation are presented in
Table A4 in the Appendix.

1.5.3

Bargaining

The model used for bargaining estimation closely follows the specification in Lewis and Pflum
(2015).36 I use the Nash bargaining framework where the two agents negotiate to split the
35

A hospital system is defined as an FLF system if all of its member hospitals are included in at least one
insurer’s network. FLF status variable indicates whether the hospital belongs to an FLF system or not.
36
Different from their setup, I estimate the model at the insurer-hospital and insurer-system level using
data on insurer enrollment instead of aggregating the estimating equation to the hospital level. I explain
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surplus they jointly generate by successfully contracting. The outcome of the bargaining
game is a contract equilibrium as in Crémer and Riordan (1987) that relies on the following
assumptions:
1. All hospital-insurer pairs negotiate contracts simultaneously.
2. All hospital-insurer pairs negotiate under the anticipation that all other hospital-insurer
pairs will successfully negotiate contracts.
3. The bargaining outcome between a hospital and an insurer does not influence the
bargaining outcome of these parties with other insurers and hospitals.
4. When a hospital is removed from a choice set, patients re-allocate themselves to other
hospitals in the same choice set.
Given these assumptions, the objective function of the Nash bargaining game is:

max[Πh (H) − Πh (H\j)]αh [Πj (M) − Πj (M\h)]1−αh
phj

(1.27)

where Πh (H) are profits of hospital h when it contracts with a set of insurers H, Πh (H\j)
are profits of hospital h when it contracts with the same set of insurers except insurer j,
Πj (M) are profits of insurer j when it contracts with a set of hospitals M, Πj (M\h) are
profits of insurer j when it contracts with the same set of hospitals except hospital h, phj are
the negotiated prices between hospital h and insurer j, αh represents the bargaining power
of hospital h, while 1 − αh represents the bargaining power of insurer j.
The objective function can be expressed as max[∆j Πh ]αh [∆h Πj ]1−αh where:
phj

∆j Πh = Πh (H) − Πh (H\j) = phj Dh (M) − ∆Ch (Dh (M))
data and variable construction for each specification in detail in the next section.

(1.28)
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(1.29)

In the above expressions, the change in hospital h’s profits, ∆j Πh , is the difference between
the additional revenues it will generate (phj Dh (M)) and the additional costs it will bear,
∆Ch (Dh (M)) by contracting with insurer j, as a result of the expected change in hospital
visits that emerges from insurer j’s enrollees (Dh (M)). The change in insurer j’s profits by
successfully negotiating a contract with hospital h, ∆h Πj , is the difference between the change
in WTP of its enrollees (∆Wj (M)) to have access to hospital h and the change in insurer
j’s total reimbursements (∆R(pMj )) when hospital h is included in its network, compared
to the reimbursements when hospital h is not available as an option and the enrollees visit
P
P
other hospitals instead. Formally, ∆R(pMj ) =
pkj Dk (M) −
pkj Dk (M \ h).
k∈M

k∈M\h

Inserting these expressions into the objective function and taking the first order condition
leads to the estimating equation:

∆j Πh = αh [∆Wj (M) − ∆Ch (Dh (M)) − ∆Rj (pMj ) + phj Dh (M)]

(1.30)

All the elements of Equation (1.30) can be calculated from the previous parts of the structural
model. Change in WTP, ∆Wj (M), is calculated as in Equation (1.12), using results from
hospital demand estimation. Change in costs, ∆Ch (Dh (M)), is calculated by predicting the
change in hospital days using the hospital demand function, and then using these in hospital
cost function to obtain predicted change in costs. Change in reimbursements of insurer j,
∆Rj (pMj ), is calculated by using the hospital demand model to predict how patients will reallocate themselves to other hospitals if insurer j fails to successfully contract with hospital
h. Finally, change in hospital revenues, phj Dh (M), is calculated by using the predicted
change in hospital visits if a contract is reached, again using the estimates from the hospital
demand model. The only unknown, and the parameter of interest, is therefore the bargaining
power αh . I further parameterize αh as follows in order to analyze how hospital bargaining
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power is determined:
αh = α0 + βHh + ηMh + h

(1.31)

where Hh are hospital characteristics such as FLF status, teaching status etc., and Mh are
market characteristics such as HHI measure of market concentration. Therefore, I take the
following equation to estimation and use nonlinear least squares37 to obtain the parameter
estimates:

∆j Πh = (α0 + βHh + ηMh )[∆Wj (M) − ∆Ch (Dh (M)) − ∆Rj (pMj ) + phj Dh (M)] (1.32)

In the above equation, the term in brackets is the surplus generated by hospital h and insurer
j successfully signing a contract. Identification in this model comes from the variation that
identifies each individual component of surplus. In particular, parameters of the hospital
demand model are identified by the variation in patients’ choice sets across markets, while
the parameters of the hospital cost function are identified by relating the variation in hospital
costs to the variation in observable hospital input and output data. The parameters of the
bargaining model are identified by relating the variation in change in hospital profits to
predicted surplus that varies by the above-mentioned sources. Therefore, the parameters are
mainly identified by variation in the data as opposed to the functional form.

1.6
1.6.1

Estimation Details and Results
Hospital Demand Estimation

The hospital choice model uses two data sources: patient characteristics come from SID for
Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington while
37

Consumer price sensitivity parameter γ is estimated via this equation and is a part of the WTP measure
∆Wj (M) as defined by Equation (1.12).
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Table 1.9: Hospital Demand Estimation
Variable
Distance (miles)

Odds Ratio Variable
0.97***
Ultrasound
(0.0001)

Odds Ratio
1.42***
(0.02)

VI hospital

1.05***
(0.005)

Orthopedic services

1.02**
(0.01)

Distance × VI

0.997***
(0.0001)

Birthing room × Female

1.16***
(0.02)

Distance × Female

0.987***
(0.0001)

Adult cardiac surgery
× Circulatory system

3.67***
(0.09)

Distance × Age (18-34)

0.98***
(0.0002)

Burn care × Burns

42.35***
(5.43)

Nurses per bed

1.24***
(0.003)

Neurological services
× Nervous system

2.50***
(0.08)

Teaching hospital

1.06***
(0.005)

Hemodialysis
× Kidney and urinary tract

1.41***
(0.04)

Medical/surgical care

1.29***
(0.02)

Oncology services
× Blood disorders

2.14***
(0.24)

Chemotherapy

1.18***
(0.008)

Obstetrics care
× Pregnancy and childbirth

97.10***
(4.66)

Fertility clinic

1.02***
(0.006)

Fertility clinic × Female

0.96***
(0.006)

Notes: Results from maximum likelihood estimation. N=1,152,081 hospital discharges from 7 states. See Table A3 for a full set of covariates included in the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at 1% level, **
statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.
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hospital characteristics come from AHA Survey. I estimate a conditional logit model where
the utility specification38 is given by:

uihl = θXh + λ1 Xh Di + λ2 Xh Cil + ihl

(1.33)

where Xh is a vector of observed hospital characteristics, Di is a vector of demographic
characteristics such as sex, age, location, and Cilm is a vector of diagnosis. One of the
interaction terms Xh Di is the distance the patient travels to visit a hospital. In the model
presented here, patients’ choice sets are defined by ZIP codes. In particular, I put a hospital
in a patient’s choice set if another patient who lives in the same ZIP code visited that
hospital.39
Table 1.9 presents a subset40 of results from hospital demand estimation. Most hospital
characteristics and services offered have positive coefficients that are highly significant. Same
is true for the interaction terms. Consistent with the previous findings in the literature, I
find that having to travel an extra mile to get treated at a hospital decreases the odds of
that hospital being chosen by 3%.41 Odds of being chosen is 1.05 times higher for a VI
hospital compared to a non-VI one if both hospitals are at zero distance to the patient. This
effect decreases with distance. For every standard deviation increase in distance, effect of VI
hospital decreases by a factor of 0.997. In other words, the effect of a VI hospital that is one
standard deviation away is 1.046842 which implies that a VI hospital is 4.68% more likely to
38

While the original specification includes out-of-pocket costs (OPC), I exclude this term here as I do not
observe it. The coefficient in front of OPC is estimated along with the bargaining parameters, see Table
1.11.
39
I also estimated specifications where I constructed choice sets based on the Hospital Service Area (HSA)
and Hospital Referral Region (HRR) of the hospital the patient visited and obtained similar results. In
an ideal world, I would construct the choice sets based on the hospital network the patient’s insurer offers.
Unfortunately, I do not observe which individual is enrolled in which health plan in any of my datasets,
therefore I cannot use this approach.
40
For the full set of coefficient (not odds ratio) estimates, see Table A3.
41
The figure reported is for a male patient aged between 55-64 who visits a non-VI hospital. The effect of
distance decreases (becomes more negative) in various individual characteristics such as female and age.
42
As calculated by 0.997 × 1.05 = 1.0468
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be chosen over non-VI in this case. Finally, patients are more likely to visit hospitals that
offer services that are related to their diagnosis. For example, the effect of an adult cardiac
surgery unit for a patient diagnosed with a circulatory system disease is 3.7 times that of a
patient who is not diagnosed with circulatory system disease, as anticipated.

1.6.2

Insurer Demand Estimation

The insurer demand model uses data at the national level. A market is defined as a state
since health plans are observed to serve residents of specific states. An insurance plan is
assumed to be a competitor in a market if it serves the residents of that state. The logit
framework I use takes into account unobservable plan characteristics and is estimated via
GMM. The utility function is of the form:

wij =

X

xjk βk + ξj + ij = δj (xj , ξj , β) + ij

(1.34)

k

where the observable insurer characteristics xj are VI insurer indicator, insurer premium
per person per month (in $100s), expected utility, age of the insurer, physicians per 100
population, Weiss rating, NCQA rating, NCQA accreditation, prevention quality measure,
PPO indicator, BCBS indicator, and a large plan indicator.43 In addition to these variables,
the BLP specification includes interactions of expected utility and premiums with random
draws to capture heterogeneity in individual preferences. Both specifications also include
state fixed effects.
Since premiums are endogenous, I instrument for them using the average of characteristics of other plans (xn , n 6= j) in the same market. These characteristics are Weiss rating,
prevention, age, number of physicians, expected utility, and NCQA rating. These instru43

I define an insurer as large if it operates in multiple states. According to this definition, I mark Aetna,
Anthem, BCBS, CIGNA, Humana, Kaiser Permanente, United Healthcare as large health insurers. Consumers perceptions about these plans are likely to be reflected in their preferences.
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ments satisfy the three traditional conditions of instrumental variables. They are relevant
as they are correlated with premiums via competition and markups44 , they are uncorrelated
with the error term, and they affect utility only through their impact on premiums. To
further support the choice of the instruments, I analyze two statistics. The first stage results
report a partial R-squared of 0.72 and an F-statistic of 17.46. These statistics suggest a large
portion of the unexplained variation in premiums comes from the excluded instruments and
the instruments are not weak since the F-statistic is greater than 10.45
To complete the estimation, the last element needed is the share of the outside good.
Since I observe HMO/POS and PPO/indemnity plans in my data, I define the outside good
as being uninsured. U.S. Census reports number of uninsured and state population by age
group. Therefore, I calculate the share of the outside good, s0 , by dividing the number of
nonelderly uninsured by nonelderly population of that state.
The parameter estimates are reported in Table 1.10. The first column reports results
from Berry (1994) specification while the second column presents results from the BLP
estimation. The coefficient in front of premiums is negative and significant as expected.
Its magnitude implies an insurer-perspective elasticity of -2.11.46 This suggests that a $10
increase in monthly premiums per enrollee decreases the demand for that insurer by 6%.
The expected utility coefficient is positive and significant, implying people value the hospital
network offered by an insurer while making their choices. The parameter estimate for VI
insurer indicator is positive, however not statistically significantly different than zero in the
BLP specification. A plausible explanation is that consumers evaluate characteristics such as
premium, hospital network, physician network, or quality as opposed to ownership structure
while selecting their health plans. Therefore, the favorable and unfavorable aspects of VI
44

This relationship is implied by the first order conditions in the supply side that leads to the pricing
Equation (1.38).
45
See Bound et al. (1995).
46
This is the elasticity of demand with respect to premiums from insurer’s perspective, as opposed to the
elasticity from the consumer’s perspective that is based on out-of-pocket expenditures.
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Table 1.10: Insurer Demand Estimation

Premium ($00)
NCQA rating
NCQA accreditation
VI-insurer
FLF-insurer
Age
Weiss rating
Physicians
Prevention
Expected utility
PPO
Large Insurer FE
BCBS FE
State FE

(1)
-0.63*
(0.37)
0.72
(0.55)
0.63
(0.42)
0.96**
(0.48)
0.22
(0.33)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.10***
(0.03)
0.008***
(0.0003)
-0.94**
(0.44)
0.46***
(0.03)
1.10*
(0.66)
Yes
Yes
Yes

(2)
-0.22***
(0.05)
-0.33
(0.36)
0.46
(0.39)
0.19
(0.44)
0.76
(0.78)
0.007*
(0.004)
-0.11***
(0.04)
0.001***
(0.0002)
-0.15
(0.30)
0.49***
(0.03)
-0.001
(0.26)
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Results from GMM estimation. N=989
insurers from 50 states and Washington DC. Robust, clustered (at the state level) standard errors
in parentheses. First column follows Berry (1994),
second column follows BLP (1995). Physicians are
per 100 enrollee population. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at
5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.
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plans are likely captured by the remaining covariates in the estimation. As logit and BLP
specifications give similar coefficients in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance; I use the
estimates from the BLP model in counterfactual estimations as this model better captures
individual heterogeneity in preferences and creates more realistic substitution patterns.

1.6.3

Bargaining

The estimating equation for the bargaining model is:

∆j Πh = (α0 +βHh +ηMh )[∆Wj (M)−∆Ch (Dh (M))−∆Rj (pMj )+phj Dh (M)] = αh ×∆Shj (M)
(1.35)
where ∆Πh are the additional profits earned by hospital h when it successfully signs a contract
with insurer j, the first term in parentheses is the decomposition of hospital bargaining
power, while the second term in brackets is the total surplus generated by insurer j and
hospital h successfully negotiating a contract. In this model, hospital h’s bargaining power
is determined by market characteristics Mh such as hospital market HHI, as well as its own
characteristics Hh such as FLF status, VI status, teaching status, rural status, market share,
integration with a physician group, system membership etc. The elements of total surplus
are each calculated using the models in the previous steps, and their calculations are detailed
below. In an ideal world, the bargaining model would be estimated using data on negotiated
prices between each hospital-insurer pair, the insurance plan the individual is enrolled in,
and the hospital he/she visited. While I observe the hospital visited by each patient in
my data, I do not observe what health plan he/she is enrolled in. Lewis and Pflum (2015)
encounter the same problem, and aggregate the bargaining equation to the hospital level,
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and estimate the following equation at the hospital level:
X
j∈H

∆j Πh = αh ×

X

∆Shj (M)

(1.36)

j∈H

where every term is summed across the set of insurers the hospital contracts with, H. They
also use assumed shares from insurers at a hospital when calculating individual elements of
surplus. I extend their setup by using data on insurers and estimating the bargaining model
at the hospital-insurer level. Since I observe insurer networks as well as market shares, I
disaggregate the hospital level components of surplus into hospital-insurer level by using the
share of insurer for each hospital. For example, in the model outlined above, ∆Wj (M) is the
total WTP of the enrollees for hospital h to be included in insurer j’s network. Following
Equation (1.36), I first calculate the total WTP of all patients in the market for hospital h.
Then, I split this WTP measure into WTP for hospital h of each insurer, based on market
shares.47 Therefore, if the share of patients at hospital h from insurer j is sins−hosp
, then the
jh
WTP of enrollees of j for hospital h is ∆Wh × sins−hosp
where ∆Wh is the total WTP for
jh
hospital h.
In what follows, I discuss the calculation of each element of surplus and then discuss
results from the bargaining model. I use data from California OSHPD to estimate the
bargaining model and obtain welfare results. Note that the hospital demand model forms
the basis of components in bargaining model, therefore I start by estimating hospital demand.
Different from the hospital demand model discussed above, I use choice sets based on Hospital
Referral Regions (HRRs)48 and omit the individual-level variables.49 I estimate this demand
47

Calculation of the share of patients at a hospital from an insurer is outlined in the Appendix.
I also tried using the estimates from choice sets based on the narrower geographic measure, Hospital
Service Areas (HSAs). Since many of the HSAs have only 1 hospital, these choice sets needed to be dropped
while calculating change in insurer reimbursements when an agreement is not reached, as this calculation
requires patients to re-allocate themselves to other hospitals in their choice sets. Moreover, having a single
hospital in a choice set is not credible as many patients choose from multiple hospitals as opposed to one.
Therefore, I conducted my analysis using HRR choice sets.
49
Bargaining model uses data from California OSHPD. While previous papers in the literature used
48
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model with the same set of SID states, and then use the parameter estimates to predict what
hospital shares would be in California. I cannot adopt the alternative approach to create
choice sets based on ZIP codes as patient ZIP codes are not reported in California data.50
For each component of total surplus, I follow calculations in Lewis and Pflum (2015) to
obtain hospital level aggregate measures. The basis of the first element, ∆Wh , is the total
WTP for hospital h. I calculate the WTP of each individual for each hospital as ln(1/(1−sˆih ))
where sˆih is the predicted probability that patient i will choose hospital h. Then, I sum this
across individuals for every hospital to obtain ∆Wh . Then, the WTP of enrollees of insurer j
for hospital h to be included in j’s network is calculated as ∆Wj (M) =

1
γ

× ∆Wh × sins−hosp
jh

following Equation (1.12).
The second element of surplus, ∆Ch (Dh (M)), is the expected change in hospital costs
when hospital h joins insurer j’s network. This term is calculated using both hospital demand
model and hospital cost function. First, I estimate the hospital cost function where hospital
costs depend on hospital inputs and outputs such as inpatient days from private payers,
inpatient days from Medicare etc. Next, using results from hospital demand, I predict
private51 inpatient days at a hospital (predDays) by multiplying predicted probability of
choice with length of stay, and summing it across private patients for a particular hospital.
Finally, using parameter estimates from hospital cost function, I predict hospital costs using
two output measures: predDays and (1 − sins−hosp
) × predDays. The difference between the
jh
two predicted costs gives the change in costs at a hospital if it contracts with insurer j.
individual-level variables from the same data source, OSHPD stopped reporting these variables to protect patient confidentiality starting with 2012 data. Therefore, I am unable to use terms involving sex and
age in hospital demand estimation and prediction, as these are unavailable in the California data.
50
Starting with 2012 data, OSHPD only reports the first 3 digits of a patient’s ZIP code. Based on this,
I randomly assign individuals to ZIP codes starting with those 3 digits based on ZIP codes’ population
weights, and use this to calculate distance to be used in prediction. As these ZIP code assignments are not
precise, however, I refrain from using them as choice sets in hospital demand estimation. Estimating hospital
demand using exact distances from SID gives me more accurate coefficients for the covariates, and especially
for distance.
51
As I only work with commercial insurers in my data, I only consider changes in the private line of
business.
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The third component of surplus, ∆Rj (pMj ), is the change in reimbursements of an insurer if it does not include hospital h in its network and its patients re-allocate themselves
to the remaining hospitals.52 The outline of the calculation is as follows. For every hospital
h, I remove h from the market, focus on the choice set affected by removal of h, re-assign h’s
patients to other hospitals in this choice set based on the demand model, and then calculate
extra revenues at these hospitals. Finally, I get an extra revenue per hospital which is equivalent to extra reimbursement the hospital gets from all the insurers it contracts with. I then
decompose this to hospital-insurer level based on shares sins−hosp
. The detailed calculation
jh
of these steps is as follows. First, for every hospital that is removed from the market, I
calculate predicted extra days at other hospitals that are in the same choice set. If hospital
h is removed from the choice set, then the predicted extra days at hospital h0 are calculated
i
h
probh0
53
0
−
prob
In this expression, prob are original
as: extraP redDaysh0 = 1−prob
h × LOSh .
h
choice probabilities based on hospital demand estimation and LOSh is the patient’s length
of stay at hospital h as reported by OSHPD. The term in brackets represents the increased
choice probability of hospital h0 while LOSh represents the extra days available with the
removal of hospital h. In the next step, I use OSHPD Discharge and Financial Reports to
estimate the average revenue per inpatient day at a hospital for each MDC for a non-ER
private (nonERpr) patient, and then use it to calculate extra revenues at a hospital. For
example, average revenues for a patient diagnosed with MDC category 5 that is admitted
52

In an ideal world, I would calculate this component using insurer networks as choice sets. I do not
observe which individual is enrolled in which health plan, however, so I am forced to use HRRs as my choice
sets. While the re-assignment of patients to other hospitals in patient choice sets would be more precise
with insurer networks as choice sets, since the final product is calculated at the hospital level and then
decomposed to hospital-insurer level based on sins−hosp
, I assume the hospital level aggregated measure is
jh
close when using HRR choice sets to what it would be if I used insurer networks as choice sets. The choice
sets in Lewis and Pflum (2015) are also not based on insurer networks (except top five largest HMOs), and
they conduct a similar analysis to obtain the change in reimbursements of insurers using ZIP code choice
sets. Finally, I drop choice sets with only 1 hospital as patients are unable to re-allocate themselves if they
belong in these choice sets.
53
This expression is calculated at the individual level and then aggregated to hospital-MDC level at each
iteration.
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through non-ER is calculated as:

AvgRev/Day =

Net Revenues from Private Payers Total IP Charges for nonERpr MDC5
×
Gross Charges for Private Payers Total IP Days for nonERpr in MDC5

Given the average revenue measure, total extra revenues at a hospital are calculated by
multiplying predicted extra days with the average revenues that correspond to that MDC,
and then aggregating it to the hospital level. This hospital level measure is the total reimbursements from all insurers the hospital contracts with. Therefore, to break it down to
hospital-insurer level, I multiply it with sins−hosp
and use this final term in estimation.
jh
The final component of surplus, phj Dh (M), is the change in revenues of a hospital when
it contracts with an insurer. I use the same average revenue measure in lieu of the reimbursement price vector phj and calculate the change in expected demand for the hospital
Dh (M) based on hospital demand estimation. In particular, I start at the individual level
and calculate predDays as above (by multiplying hospital choice probability with length of
stay of each private individual), then predict the revenues from these days by MDC using
the average revenue measure, and finally aggregate these revenues to the hospital level. This
aggregate measure is again broken into hospital-insurer level using sins−hosp
. Finally, the left
jh
hand side variable, ∆j Πh , is calculated by subtracting the change in costs discussed above
from the total extra revenue generated.
I estimate two specifications of the bargaining model. The first specification is estimated
at the hospital-insurer level where the negotiating hospital unit is a hospital. This specification assumes hospitals negotiate with insurers individually and not as systems. Belonging
to a hospital system can still improve a hospital’s bargaining position in this specification
through the system membership variable. In the second specification, the negotiating hospital unit is a hospital if the hospital is a member of a non-FLF system or an individual hospital,
and a system otherwise. In other words, I only allow FLF-offering systems to negotiate as
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a system. In this dataset, binary hospital characteristics are calculated as a fraction when
the negotiating unit is a system.54 Hospital and system shares used in HHI are calculated
based on hospital visits in that hospital/system and in that HRR. While constructing the
components of the bargaining equation, I calculate each variable at the hospital level first,
and then aggregate to the system level by summing across member hospitals if the hospital
belongs to an FLF-offering system. The disaggregation from system level to system-insurer
level variables is again done by using sins−hosp
, which in these instances represent the share
jh
of patients at system h coming from insurer j.
The two specifications represent the two extremes of the health care market I observe
in the data. In practice, not all hospitals negotiate individually and independently with
insurers, as some systems tie their hospitals together and negotiate as a system. It is also
true, however, that not all systems try to impose full-line of their products to all insurers
they negotiate with. The system level bargaining model in this chapter improves upon the
previous bargaining estimations in the literature that assume all hospital systems negotiate
as systems55 by identifying FLF-offering systems as negotiating units. Nonetheless, while
the hospitals in these systems are often tied together, they also negotiate individually with
some insurers, which is not captured by the system level estimation.
Results from bargaining estimation are presented in Table 1.11. The coefficient estimates
are similar in terms of sign and significance across two specifications. The main finding
is that VI hospitals have significantly higher bargaining power in the negotiation process
compared to their non-VI counterparts. System membership also increases a hospital’s
bargaining power, consistent with the previous findings in the literature. At the individual
level specification, the positive impact of being a system member on a hospital’s bargaining
power is greater in terms of magnitude compared to the system level specification. This
54

For example, if 2 out of 4 system hospitals are teaching hospitals, the teaching indicator variable for
that system is 0.50.
55
See Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) and Lewis and Pflum (2015).
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Table 1.11: Determination of Bargaining Power
Dep. var.: ∆Πh
Base bargaining power
VI-hospital
FLF-hospital
Hospital share
Hospital market HHI
Predicted days
Teaching hospital
Rural hospital
For-profit hospital
Physician group
System member
γ −1 (×1000)
Bargaining Power:
Mean fitted value
Standard deviation
N
Adjusted R2

(1)
(2)
Individual Level System Level
0.98***
0.80**
(0.11)
(0.38)
0.53***
0.02**
(0.09)
(0.01)
-1.19**
-0.14
(0.54)
(0.34)
1.28***
0.11**
(0.47)
(0.05)
-2.78***
0.57
(0.81)
(1.13)
0.002
0.0003***
(0.004)
(0.00002)
-0.34***
-0.03**
(0.09)
(0.02)
-0.13
-0.02
(0.09)
(0.02)
0.02
0.01
(0.10)
(0.01)
0.04
-0.48***
(3.56)
(0.08)
1.33**
0.14***
(0.55)
(0.02)
1.24***
0.83***
(0.10)
(0.08)
0.69
0.19
4936
0.39

0.63
0.20
2163
0.95

Notes: Results from nonlinear least squares estimation using California data. Individual level sample includes 276
hospitals and 32 insurers, system level sample includes 116
systems/hospitals and 32 insurers. Both specifications include HRR fixed effects. Predicted patient days in thousands. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at
10% level.
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is as anticipated because system membership is one of the few variables that capture the
advantages of being in a hospital system in this specification that does not force systems to
tie their products. The bottom part of Table 1.11 reports the mean fitted values of hospital
bargaining power. Like previous papers in the literature, I find that hospitals, on average,
have higher bargaining power than insurers in the negotiation process. These results are
robust to dropping the VI hospital-insurer pairs from the dataset. These pairs likely do
not engage in bargaining since they own one another. I also estimated specifications where I
allowed hospital bargaining power to depend on the characteristics of the insurer it contracts
with. This approach did not improve the fit of the model and insurer characteristics never
proved to be informative in explaining hospital’s bargaining power. Given the results in
Table 1.11, I conclude the system level regression better models the market as is, given the
better fit and more sensible coefficients such as HHI. Results from this specification are used
in counterfactual simulations.

1.7

Welfare Analysis

In this section, I simulate a counterfactual scenario to assess the impact of vertical integration on welfare. In this policy experiment, I remove vertical integration from the market
altogether, force previously-VI entities to become independent hospitals and insurers, and
measure the change in consumer welfare and producer surplus. It is important to note that
these counterfactual simulations are “partial” in the sense that they do not take into account
all market responses such as changes in all product characteristics, due to the complexity
and infeasibility of calculating an equilibrium in both hospital and insurer markets in all
dimensions.56 In particular, I assume that hospital services, staffing, reimbursement rates,
governance, system membership, and insurer quality measures do not change when vertical
56

Other papers in the literature use the same approach and keep many attributes constant while estimating
the impact on welfare. See, for example, Lee (2013), Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), Ho (2006) among others.
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integration is removed from the market.
After I remove vertical integration from the market, I re-form the hospital networks offered by insurers based on the bargaining model, predict new premiums for insurers under
new networks, and calculate the change in consumer welfare and producer surplus. When
forming new networks, I use the system level bargaining model to isolate the effect of vertical integration. Upon removal of vertical integration from the market, the previously-VI
hospitals act as new players in the bargaining game, but other FLF-offering system hospitals
keep negotiating as systems. Using individual level bargaining model would imply allowing
both VI and FLF hospitals to negotiate individually, and the counterfactual scenario in this
case would capture the combined effect of removal of VI and FLF from the market together.
As the purpose here is to understand how VI affects welfare, I only break the VI entities
and allow FLF systems to impose full-line of their products. I estimate two counterfactual
scenarios as I impose two different assumptions of network formation. In the first one, I allow previously-VI systems to negotiate as systems upon removal of vertical integration. The
second counterfactual assumes the previously-VI hospitals will act as individual hospitals
and individually negotiate with insurers in the market. A potential policy change that bans
vertical integration is not likely to impose constraints on how these systems should negotiate
their hospitals (individually or as a system). A plausible scenario is that these VI system
hospitals will negotiate as systems with some insurers and individually with others. Hence,
the welfare results based on two counterfactuals in this chapter should be interpreted as the
upper and lower bounds of change in welfare.
Below, I explain welfare calculation in detail. To begin, I re-form insurer networks by
following the steps below:
1. Re-predict hospital choice probabilities. First, I remove vertical integration from the
market by setting VI dummy to zero for all previously-VI entities. The first counterfactual assumes previously-VI hospitals negotiate as systems, the second counterfactual
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assumes previously-VI hospitals negotiate individually. In both cases, I re-construct
the data accordingly. I also update hospital share and hospital market HHI to reflect
the new negotiating units in the data. Finally, I predict new probabilities using hospital demand model. These new shares imply new predDays and extraP redDays at a
hospital (or system).
2. Using the new probabilities from the first step, re-calculate every element of the bargaining model. In particular, I obtain new values for the hospital level variables
∆Wh (M), ∆Ch (Dh (M)), ∆Rh (phH ), and phH Dh (M).
3. Break hospital (or system) level variables into hospital-insurer level variables. In the
first iteration, I begin by assuming all hospitals/systems contract with all insurers, and
do the decomposition using sins−hosp
calculated under this assumption.
jh
4. Predict changes in hospital profits, ∆j Πh , for every hospital-insurer pair by using
parameter estimates from the bargaining model, setting VI dummy to zero for all
previously-VI entities, and using the re-calculated elements of surplus from step 3.
Hospital (or system) h chooses to sign a contract with insurer j if ∆j Πh > 0, hence
new networks are formed.
Given the new networks, I go back to step 3 and re-calculate shares at a hospital from
an insurer following the share calculation outlined in the Appendix that accounts for insurer
networks while imposing capacity constraints. I keep iterating using this routine until equilibrium is reached. At this equilibrium, no hospital has an incentive to deviate and change
the set of insurers it contracts with. This routine relies on the assumption that if a hospital
is willing to join an insurer’s network, the insurer will agree to establish a contract. This
assumption is supported by both theory57 and data.58
57

Capps et al. (2003) present a model of network formation which shows that the profit maximizing
strategy for an insurer is to include all the hospitals in the market in its network.
58
Lewis and Pflum (2015) state that their communications with a former contract negotiator for a major
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Next, I calculate new premiums given the new insurer networks. Insurers maximize a
standard profit function by choosing premiums:

πj = (premj − Cj × pip ) × sj × M

where M is market size, Cj =

P
h∈H

Psh

sk

(1.37)

× ph is the average reimbursement per day by insurer

k∈H

j to the set of hospitals H in its network, and pip is the number of inpatient days at a state
divided by total population. Maximizing the objective function leads to the following first
order condition that determines premiums:

sj + (premj − Cj × pip )

∂sj
=0
∂premj

(1.38)

Finally, given the new networks and new premiums, I calculate the change in producer surplus
and consumer welfare. Producer surplus is the aggregation of all hospital and insurer profits
P
in the market. Hospital profits are calculated as: πh = (ph × pip ×
M sjh ) − Costh where
j∈M

ph is the average revenue per inpatient day at hospital h, and Costh is the predicted cost of
the hospital given new predicted days. Insurer profits are calculated using Equation (1.37).
I use compensating variation (CV) to measure the change in consumer welfare when
vertical integration is removed from the market. Compensating variation refers to the amount
of money a consumer would need to give up following a change in prices or product quality
(hospital networks) in order to reach his pre-change utility level. Following Small and Rosen
national insurer revealed PPOs’ strategies are to include almost every hospital in the market in their network.
In their data, the median HMO covers 84% of hospitals in the market. Ho (2009b) reports, on average, 87%
of hospital-HMO pairs successfully sign a contract. In my data, the median HMO and PPO cover 42% and
60% of the hospitals in the market, respectively. Therefore, I assume both HMOs and PPOs aim to cover a
substantial portion of the market where possible.
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(1981), the compensating variation for consumer i is given by:
"

CVi = −

1
ln
αi

#
X

exp(Vijpost ) − ln

X

j

exp(Vijpre )

(1.39)

j

where the superscripts post and pre refer to the removal and presence of vertical integration,
respectively. −αi = −(β2 + γ2 vi2 ) is the negative of the premium coefficient and j still
represents an insurer. V is the observed portion of utility defined as:

Vij = ξj + xj φ̂ + βˆ1 EUj + βˆ2 premj + γˆ1 νi1 EUj (Hj ) + γˆ2 νi2 premj

(1.40)

Compensating variation is then the market size times the integral of compensating variation over the distribution of ν as given by:
Z
CV = M

CVi dν

(1.41)

where M is market size. Applying this to the random-coefficients model, I calculate the
compensating variation by simulation. In particular, I calculate compensating variation for
each draw of ν, and then take the average across these ns draws to obtain:
ns

1 X
CVi
CV = M
ns i=1

(1.42)

Counterfactual results are reported in Table 1.12. I simulate two counterfactual scenarios
using California data. Under the first scenario, previously-VI hospitals negotiate as systems
upon removal of vertical integration from the market. Results from this counterfactual
are reported in the first part of Table 1.12, labeled “System Level”. Under the second
counterfactual scenario, I allow previously-VI hospitals to negotiate as individual hospitals.
Results from this estimation are reported in the second part of Table 1.12, labeled “Individual
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Table 1.12: Counterfactual Results: Removal of Vertical Integration
All

System Level
VI
Non-VI

Entrant

All

Individual Level
VI
Non-VI

Entrant

∆ CS:

$ -9.5b

$ -1.9b

Premiums
$ CS lost

97%
$ -12.1b

-18%

124%

16%

94%
$ -4.2b

-34%

123%

3%

Network Size
$ CS gained

53%
$ 2.6b

50%

54%

55%

42%
$ 2.3b

39%

42%

45%

∆ PS:

$ 44b

$ 16.8b

Percent of hospitals at loss
Hospital Π lost

34%
$ -22.8b

36%
$ -4.8b

33%
$ -18b

50%
$ -35.7b

43%
$ -8.9b

54%
$ -26.8b

Percent of hospitals at gain
Hospital Π gained

66%
$ 65b

64%
$ 26.8b

67%
$ 38.2b

50%
$ 49b

57%
$ 21b

46%
$ 28b

Percent of insurers at loss
Insurer Π lost

41%
$ -3b

50%
$ -2.25b

38%
$ -750m

41%
$ -1.3b

67%
$ -706m

35%
$ -543m

Percent of insurers at gain
Insurer Π gained

59%
$ 4.9b

50%
$ 16.6m

62%
$ 4.85b

59%
$ 4.7b

33%
$ 2.5m

65%
$ 4.7b

$ 128m

$ 8.9m

Notes: Results from counterfactual simulations where vertical integration is removed from the market. Members
of previously-VI hospital systems negotiate as systems under the system level simulation; as individual hospitals
under the individual level simulation. Entrant is a non-VI insurer.

Level”. In both counterfactuals, the non-VI FLF hospital systems in the market continue
to negotiate as systems. The baseline model in both counterfactuals is the predicted world
where VI is present. In this baseline specification, VI hospitals are only included in their
own insurer’s network, and the remaining network formation in the market is done based on
the bargaining model. I present results for previously-VI entities, non-VI entities, and the
only entrant to the downstream market which is non-VI. In the first panel where I report
sources of change in consumer welfare, percentages represent average changes compared to
vertical integration being present in the market. In the second panel, percentages represent
the split within their own categories defined by VI status and entity type.
I find that removal of vertical integration from the market decreases consumer welfare by
$9.5 billion a year. When exclusionary vertical restraints are abolished, many previously-VI
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hospitals join other insurers’ networks. This leads to formation of larger insurer networks
that increase expected utility and benefit consumers. Previously-VI insurers lose exclusive
access to their own hospitals, and they compete with the rest of the market by lowering
their premiums. Non-VI insurers, on the other hand, increase their premiums on average
following the expansion in their networks. The increase in consumer utility induced by larger
networks is offset by the increase in premiums, leading to a decline in welfare.59 Increase
in network size is larger in the system level counterfactual as the new players are included
as systems in insurer networks. Under the individual level counterfactual, both network
size and premiums increase by less on average because not all system members are included
in insurer networks. While the result that removal of vertical integration harms consumer
welfare remains the same, the magnitude of change drops to $1.9 billion a year.
My findings further indicate that total producer surplus in the market increases by $44
billion when vertical integration is banned and previously-VI hospitals negotiate as systems.
Majority of this gain comes from the hospital industry. Among the previously-VI hospitals, 36% lose profits while 64% increase profits. The gain in profits is substantially larger
compared to the loss (+$26.8 billion vs. -$4.8 billion) when previously-VI hospitals are considered. This is mainly due to the fact that hospital visits increase as now they are included
in a larger number of insurer networks. While the predicted hospital costs also change under
the new networks (as a result of new predDays), the main driver of change in hospital profits
is change in shares. Overall, the insurer market benefits from removal of vertical integration.
The major increase in profits is achieved by previously-non-VI insurers who now have access
59

I also provide the breakdown of the dollar value of change in consumer surplus in the the first panel.
While I cannot precisely disentangle the effects of premiums and network size because the two dimensions
change simultaneously, I estimate two separate counterfactuals that change only one dimension and measure
the change in welfare. When I set the premiums to the new levels but keep the old networks, I find that
consumer surplus decreases by $12.1 billion. When I keep the premiums at the initial level and measure
the effect of change in networks, I find that consumer surplus increases by $2.6 billion in the system level
simulation. These figures are $4.2 billion and $2.3 billion for the individual level simulation, respectively.
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to previously-VI hospitals which are cheaper.60 The majority of loss is born by previouslyVI insurers, as expected. These insurers lose $2.25 billion in profits as they lower premiums
and no longer enjoy the dedicated market share to them from their own hospitals. When
previously-VI hospitals negotiate individually, producer surplus increases by $16.8 billion a
year. Patterns for this individual level counterfactual are very similar to the ones discussed
above, although the magnitudes of change are smaller. Since VI hospitals no longer negotiate
as systems, the increased market share obtained by tying hospitals together is now absent,
resulting in smaller changes in the same direction.
I also find entry barriers are present in the market due to upstream foreclosure.61 By
definition, entry barriers are cost advantages the incumbent enjoys compared to the entrant
(Stigler (1968)). In the case of hospital-insurer consolidation, the incumbent VI entities
have cost advantages over non-VI entrants as they have access to less expensive hospitals
while the entrants do not.62 When vertical integration is removed and the non-VI entrant is
allowed to access the same cost advantages, the entrant is better off. I find that the entrant
non-VI insurer increases its premiums by 16% and its network size by 55% by switching
to previously-VI hospitals. Since the entrant’s market share and premiums increase, its
60
Reimbursement rates in this chapter are approximated by average revenue per day per MDC category, as
outlined in the previous section. This measure is lower for VI hospitals for 23 out of 25 MDC categories. The
average revenue per day measure is 39% lower for VI hospitals, on average, compared to non-VI hospitals.
61
Downstream foreclosure also leads to entry barriers as insurers prevent hospitals from accessing their
markets. However, I only observe entrants in the insurer dataset, hence, I only investigate barriers to entry
in the downstream market.
62
The incumbent VI insurers have cost advantages over non-VI entrants also because they have an alreadyformed network (which is costly for the entrant insurer to form) and their administrative businesses are settled
(for example, entrant insurer needs to find compatible billing systems with the hospitals it contracts with
while the VI incumbent can use the same system for its health plan and hospitals). In practice, these cost
advantages also act as barriers to entry. Since the incumbent VI entities face lower costs, they are able to
charge lower premiums. The non-VI insurers who want to enter the market face higher costs, but they also
need to match the low premiums offered by incumbent VI insurers. Therefore, not all the entrants who
desire can enter the market. However, my model does not explain these entry barriers as it does not account
for network formation costs and administrative costs in counterfactual simulations. As outlined above, the
model assumes that the only costs to insurers are reimbursements to hospitals for the patients who get sick,
therefore, any cost advantages gained will be through formation of new networks that include less expensive
hospitals.
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profits go up by $128 million. Figures for individual level counterfactual are again smaller in
magnitude, but the same patterns are observed. Therefore, when entry barriers are removed
from the market, the current entrant is better off. This result suggests that with reduction
in barriers to entry, previously excluded firms may now be able to join the market.

1.8

Conclusion

This chapter investigates the impact of vertical integration on market outcomes and welfare
in the health care industry. Theory suggests vertical integration can lead to both efficiency
gains and market foreclosure, hence the overall impact on welfare is ambiguous. I focus on VI
entities that are formed by vertical mergers between hospitals and insurers. In most cases,
hospitals and insurers come together to offer their own health plan that restricts enrollees
to the parent organization hospitals. To compensate for the restricted choice, these plans
promise lower premiums and higher quality.
I conduct reduced-form analysis to examine the relationship between vertical integration and market foreclosure, prices, and quality. I find that VI insurers indeed offer lowerpremium, higher-quality plans controlling for market and product characteristics. Results
from estimation of a structural model of consumer demand and hospital-insurer bargaining
suggest that VI hospitals have higher bargaining power in the negotiation process compared
to their non-VI counterparts. Overall, consumers benefit from vertical integration, although
majority of hospitals and insurers are better off in its absence. I also find that the presence
of vertical integration in the market serves as an entry barrier to the downstream market,
mainly due to upstream foreclosure exercised by VI system hospitals.
While this chapter quantifies the welfare impacts of vertical integration for consumers
and producers, it does not fully model market responses in all product characteristics. Future
work in this area should analyze how reimbursement rates would change upon removal of
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vertical integration, and how the market would respond to these price changes. Improving
the model in this way would require estimating a bargaining model using administrative
claims data, ideally at the national level. Another direction for future research would be
to estimate a dynamic entry model to fully identify the barriers to entry caused by vertical
restraints in the health care industry. Such analyses will better inform the policy makers
with regard to the potential impacts of vertical integration over time.

Chapter 2
Welfare Effects of Full-Line Forcing
Contracts in the U.S. Health Care
Market
2.1

Introduction

Bundling arrangements between upstream and downstream firms have been frequently challenged on the grounds that they pose a threat to competition (Hilton (1958)). In particular,
two kinds of vertical bundling practices have been subjects of policy debates: tying the sale
of a good to the machine that processes it, and full-line forcing (FLF) contracts where the
upstream supplier forces the downstream distributor to carry full-line of its products. This
chapter focuses on the latter, and studies the welfare implications of FLF contracts in the
health care industry in the United States.1 FLF contracts are offered by hospital systems
to ensure insurers carry all system member hospitals in their networks.2 Understanding the
1
Presence of full-line forcing contracts in the health care industry has been documented in Antitrust
Health Care Handbook, American Bar Association, Third Edition, page 142.
2
Individual hospitals also can offer FLF contracts by requiring the insurer to carry all of the services
offered by that hospital. I do not observe services covered by an insurer at a hospital in my data, hence I
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welfare impacts of FLF contracts in health care is important, especially given the hospital
merger wave of 1990s that resulted in an increase in the number of hospital systems.
In the U.S. health care system, the price paid to providers by insurers per unit of care is
determined in yearly negotiations. This bargaining process creates incentives for both parties
to gain leverage as the total surplus in the market is shared between them based on their
bargaining positions. Historically, Health Maintenance Organizations (HMOs) managed
to drive hospital prices down as hospitals wanted to be included in their narrow provider
networks. Providers’ response to the rise of managed care was in the form of horizontal
consolidation (Fuchs (1997)). In order to increase their bargaining power, many individual
hospitals went through mergers and formed or became members of hospital systems. Since
1994, more than 1000 hospital mergers took place (Gaynor et al. (2015)). Today, among
5534 registered hospitals in the U.S., 3231 are members of hospital systems.3 As the system
hospitals represent a larger proportion of the hospital market every year4 , the FLF contracts
they offer are expected to have a substantial impact on welfare.
There is no consensus in the economic theory literature regarding the welfare impacts
of vertical bundling arrangements. A large portion of this literature studies the strategic
motives for firms to offer bundling contracts, and these motives have varying welfare implications. Among the most popular views are the intents to use vertical bundling as a device
to mimic the effects of vertical integration (Burstein (1960b), Burstein (1960a)), extend market power into new markets and exclude or deter entry of rivals (Whinston (1990)), price
discriminate (Stigler (1963), Adams and Yellen (1976)), and circumvent price control regulations (Hilton (1958)). Only the first two are relevant in the context of this chapter.5 FLF
focus only on the FLF contracts offered by hospital systems.
3
Source: American Hospital Association, Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, 2018.
4
System hospitals constituted 56.6% of all registered hospitals in 2016, and this figure increased to 57.5%
in 2017 and 58.4% in 2018. Source: American Hospital Association, Fast Facts on U.S. Hospitals, 2016,
2017, 2018.
5
Price discrimination argument does not apply to the case studied here because prices paid to hospitals
by insurers are determined in yearly negotiations (except in Maryland). Hence, if two insurers value a certain
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contracts can be used to imitate the efficiency effects of vertical integration because firms
with market power can attain higher profits by selling the bundle at a single price rather
than individually pricing their products. Offering discounts -and hence eliminating double
marginalization to some extent- is among the upstream firms’ motives to make the bundle
more attractive to downstream firms. On the other hand, vertical bundling can be used
to foreclose competition, gain leverage over rivals (Whinston (1990), Carlton and Waldman
(2002)), and restrict their entry (Choi and Stefanadis (2001), Nalebuff (2004)). Since both
efficiency-inducing and anti-competitive effects are present from a theoretical standpoint,
the overall impact on welfare is ambiguous.
Studying welfare impacts of FLF contracts is, therefore, an empirical question that needs
to be addressed based on the implications of these theoretical motives. In vertically-separated
markets, these motives translate into three potential effects: leverage, efficiency, and market
coverage (Ho et al. (2012a)). In the context of health care, the leverage effect might be
present if insurers that accept FLF contracts carry fewer rival hospitals in their networks.
This might have an adverse effect on consumer welfare if hospitals unfavorable to consumers
are included in an insurer’s network at the expense of more desired hospitals. Efficiency gains
might be realized if hospital systems offer discounts for all-or-nothing contracts, reducing the
unit cost for insurers. Insurers who accept FLF contracts can then offer lower premiums if
they choose to pass along these savings to their enrollees; or they can expand their market
coverage and include a greater number of hospitals in their network for the same cost. Either
way, consumer welfare will improve.
I begin my analysis by investigating the presence of these effects in the market for health
care. Using regression analysis, I demonstrate that the efficiency effect presents itself through
its impact on market coverage. FLF-accepting insurers have larger hospital networks comhospital differently, the hospital can charge different prices to the two insurers for the same set of services.
Hospital prices are controlled only in Maryland; there are no national price control regulations that will drive
the results in this chapter.
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pared to insurers who do not accept FLF contracts, but their premium levels do not differ
significantly. Moreover, accepting an FLF contract from a hospital system does not interfere
with the inclusion of any category of the rival hospitals in the market. In fact, FLF-accepting
insurers include more individual hospitals, non-FLF system hospitals, and rival FLF system
hospitals in their networks. Given the absence of the leverage effect along with increased
market coverage, one would expect FLF contracts’ impact on consumer welfare to be positive. In order to quantify this effect and measure the impact on producer surplus, I estimate
a structural model and simulate a counterfactual world where FLF contracts do not exist.
My structural model aims to understand how consumer demand for hospitals and insurers
as well as hospital costs are determined. I also estimate a bargaining model to understand
how networks are formed as a result of hospital-insurer negotiations. Simulation of the counterfactual world uses all parts of the structural model to predict how all agents in the market
would behave under the new scenario. In the counterfactual world, I ban FLF contracts.
This implies hospital systems that imposed all their member hospitals on insurers now enter
the bargaining game as individual entities. There are therefore no vertical restraints imposed by upstream entities, and all the hospitals in the market act individually. Given the
new players and results from bargaining estimation, I re-form hospital networks offered by
insurers. New networks imply new shares and new premiums in my model, hence I calculate
the change in producer surplus. New networks and new premiums imply new utility for
consumers, hence I calculate the change in consumer welfare.
Overall, I find that vertical bundling is welfare improving for both consumers and producers. Upon removal of FLF contracts from the market, consumers face wider networks and
higher premiums on average. Composition of networks also changes, as insurers shift from
covering a block of member hospitals from the same system to covering fewer hospitals per
system (but from more systems) and more individual hospitals. Disutility from increased
premiums offsets any utility consumers might get from increased choice, therefore consumer
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welfare drops by $5.9 billion a year. Producer surplus also decreases, however results are
mixed for individual hospitals and insurers. Majority of insurers increase their profits as
their premiums are higher and their networks contain hospitals from a less restrictive set.
The large amount of loss suffered in the hospital industry leads to the decline in overall
producer surplus. Some hospital systems lose profits as they can no longer bundle their
hospitals together. Some individual hospitals also lose since there are more competitors in
the market who are negotiating individually.
These results contribute to several strands of the literature. Hospital-insurer network
formation has been an important area of empirical investigation, and a number of papers
investigated its determinants and implications.6 Ho (2009b) finds system membership, capacity constraints, and “star” status7 improve hospitals’ leverage in the bargaining process
and enable them to achieve higher markups. Ericson and Starc (2015) find consumers have
a preference towards larger hospital networks offered by insurers, and this preference gets
stronger with age. Ho (2006) investigates welfare impacts of restricted network formation
and finds that consumer welfare increases when health plans include all the hospitals in
their networks, keeping prices and premiums fixed. While her result is intuitive, it does
not allow health plans to change premiums when they widen their networks. I incorporate
a bargaining model to her framework, re-form networks based on the bargaining game in
my counterfactual, and calculate premiums given new networks by solving insurers’ profit
maximization problem.
I use the Nash bargaining framework to model hospital-insurer negotiations. This framework was first used in health care research by Brooks et al. (1997) and later extended by
several papers.8 The Nash bargaining game aims to uncover how the total surplus in the
6

For a detailed literature review of firm behavior in the health care industry, see Gaynor et al. (2015).
Star hospitals are defined as providers that are very attractive to consumers.
8
For recent papers that study price negotiations in health care, see Gowrisankaran et al. (2015), Lewis
and Pflum (2015), HaasWilson and Garmon (2011), Dafny et al. (2016), and Ho and Lee (2017b).
7
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market is split between hospitals and insurers based on their bargaining power in the negotiation process. These studies find hospitals -especially ones that belong to systems- have
higher bargaining power and extract a higher share of the surplus. Recent papers in this
literature (Lewis and Pflum (2015), Gowrisankaran et al. (2015)) assume hospitals negotiate
as systems when they model the bargaining game. While this approach is more realistic
compared to modeling every hospital as an independent negotiating unit, it is still flawed,
as not all hospital systems bundle their hospitals together. I improve upon their approach
by identifying the hospital systems that engage in bundling and imposing this assumption
solely on these systems.
Finally, this chapter also contributes to the empirical literature on bundling. While there
is a vast literature on the theory of bundling, the empirical evidence is sparse, mostly due to
lack of data. Crawford and Yurukoglu (2012) analyze bundling practices in cable television
industry and simulate a counterfactual where they break bundling and impose an à la carte
choice set instead. Their findings indicate that removal of bundling increases utility due to
expanded choice sets, but this increase in utility is offset by the increase in prices. They
conclude removal of bundling does not have a positive impact on consumer welfare. Their
paper is similar to mine in terms of counterfactual simulations and results; however, it
analyzes bundling faced by consumers, not by producers. To my knowledge, the only papers
that study vertical bundling within the supply chain are Ho et al. (2012a) and Ho et al.
(2012b). These papers model the bundling practices between upstream and downstream
firms in the video rental industry in the United States. Ho et al. (2012b) structurally model
consumer demand and retailer portfolio choice problem, and use parameter estimates from
these models in their counterfactual simulations. Their findings indicate that most of the
upstream firms are making the profit maximizing decision when offering full-line forcing
contracts. Ho et al. (2012a) analyze the welfare impacts of full-line forcing contracts in the
video rental industry by studying their impact on market coverage, leverage, and efficiency.

CHAPTER 2. FULL-LINE FORCING IN HEALTH CARE

68

They find that bundling results in increased retailer profits as well as increased product
variety and availability for consumers. Hence, they conclude that FLF contracts are welfare
improving. My reduced-form analysis adopts the approach used in Ho et al. (2012a), but
my structural modeling differs from theirs given the differences in institutional details of the
two industries.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 discusses the data. Section 2.3 presents results from reduced-form regressions. Section 2.4 outlines the structural
model. Section 2.5 gives estimation details and results. Section 2.6 explains counterfactual
simulations and welfare results. Section 2.7 concludes.

2.2

Data

This chapter utilizes data from various sources. Hospital characteristics come from American
Hospital Association (AHA) Annual Survey of Hospitals 2014. Consumer characteristics and
discharge reports come from 2014 State Inpatient Databases (SID) provided by the Health
Care Utilization Project (HCUP), and from California Office of Statewide Health Planning
and Development (OSHPD) 2014 Public Patient Discharge data.9 I also use financial data
on hospitals reported in OSHPD Financial Disclosure Reports 2008-2014.10 Insurer characteristics come from Atlantic Information Services (AIS) Directory of Health Plans 2016 with
premium and enrollment data being supplemented by the WEISS Ratings Guide. Insurer
characteristics from AIS include total enrollment, number of enrolled by sector (commercial
risk, public risk etc.) and by state, as well as vertical integration and not-for-profit status. WEISS provides investment ratings of insurers, enrollment, premiums, and number of
physicians. Additional plan characteristics are taken from National Committee for Quality
Assurance (NCQA) Report on Health Plan Rankings 2015-2016. These characteristics in9
10

California OSHPD data is used only in bargaining estimation and counterfactual simulations.
Hospital cost function estimation uses this dataset.
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clude type of the insurance plan (HMO, PPO etc.), states served, an overall quality score
as well as measures of consumer satisfaction, prevention, and treatment. Hospital networks
offered by each insurer are collected from individual insurers’ websites in 2017-2018. I also
use U.S. Census data on population (by age and sex) and number of uninsured by state to
supplement the dataset.
I use AIS data on commercial enrollment to identify insurers that operate in each state
and collect hospital networks for these insurers. AHA data provides information on where
the hospital is located, whether the hospital belongs to a system, and if so, to which system.
Given the hand-collected networks and system membership information, I construct FLF
measures at hospital and insurer level. A hospital system is considered as an FLF-offering
system if all of its hospitals were included in at least one insurer’s network in that state. I
construct two more measures, one where the system is considered as an FLF-offering system
if 80% of its hospitals were included in at least one insurer’s network, and the other where
90% of its hospitals were included. I construct these alternative measures because of the
discrepancy in the timing of different data sources: AHA data is from 2014, while the hospital
networks are from 2017-2018. Due to hospital closures during the course of these four years,
the first strict measure of FLF would not accurately identify all FLF-offering systems.11
Insurer variables are constructed in a similar manner. An insurer is marked as an FLFaccepting insurer if it accepts all hospitals12 from at least one hospital system in that state.
Summary statistics and analyses in the rest of the chapter are reported for the alternative
measure that uses 80% of system hospitals, the figures for other measures are similar. These
alternative measures serve as robustness checks and results of econometric analyses for all
three are reported in the Appendix.
11

For example, if a hospital system has 16 hospitals in its system in 2014 and 15 hospitals in 2018, the
first strict measure of FLF would falsely identify this system as non-FLF even though it is offering FLF
contracts. The two alternative measures correct for such mistakes.
12
Analogously, 80% and 90% of all hospitals for the alternative measures.
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Table 2.1: Patient Characteristics

Distance (miles)
Female
Age

Mean
15.56
0.66
27.68

SD
117.25
0.47
21.91

Min
0.04
0
0

Max
428.31
1
64

Notes: N=1,152,081 discharges.
I use SID data from Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island,
and Washington. These states represent over 20% of the entire U.S. population, and cover
1,152,081 discharges from 753 hospitals in total. SID reports patient’s ZIP code, diagnosis,
treatment, age, sex, and charges. I aggregate diagnosis to the 25 Major Diagnostic Categories
(MDCs) as defined by the Centers for Medicare Services. I use only in-state, non-emergencyroom (non-ER) hospital visits in my analysis. I observe patients’ ZIP codes and the hospitals
they visited, therefore I calculate the distance between a patient’s residence location and
hospital location.13 This data is summarized in Table 2.1. Average patient in my data
travels 16 miles to get care at a hospital. Females constitute 66% of all discharges due to the
large number of pregnancies and childbirths. This chapter focuses only on the non-elderly
population (ages between 0 and 64) as people above 65 are likely to be enrolled in Medicare
plans and I analyze insurers active in the commercial business only. Since all newborns are
considered as new patients in this dataset, the average patient is younger than expected.
Table 2.2 reports means of select characteristics for all hospitals in the United States.14
I also report the averages of the same characteristics for system hospitals, hospitals that
belong to systems that offer FLF contracts, hospitals that belong to systems that do not
offer FLF contracts, and individual hospitals.15 Distribution of individual, non-FLF system,
13

Distance is calculated as the distance between two latitude and longitude points of the hospital (as
reported by AHA) and the centroid of the patient’s ZIP code (as reported by SID).
14
I exclude federal government hospitals (such as Air Force, Navy, Veterans Affairs hospitals) from my
analysis as these hospitals do not contract with commercial insurers.
15
In my dataset, system hospitals are identified as members of systems that operate multiple hospitals in
a given state. If a hospital belongs to a national system that operates only one hospital in a certain state,
that hospital is coded as an individual hospital in that state for the purposes of my analysis. Hence, the
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Table 2.2: Hospital Characteristics
All
Number of Observations 5,960
Teaching
0.04
Beds
77
Admissions
5,809
Physicians
19
Nurses per bed
2.62
Inpatient days
35,144
For-profit
0.27
Women’s health center
0.49
Kidney transplant
0.05
MRI
0.66
Pain Management
0.52
System Size
-

System
3,424
0.05
92
7,168
20
2.64
40,484
0.33
0.54
0.05
0.70
0.55
8.98

FLF System
2,796
0.05
95
7,644
21
2.65
40,846
0.30
0.57
0.05
0.74
0.57
9.21

Non-FLF System
628
0.03
72
5,048
17
2.61
38,837
0.44
0.41
0.05
0.52
0.45
7.96

Individual
2,536
0.04
57
3,975
17
2.60
27,933
0.18
0.41
0.04
0.59
0.48
1

and FLF-offering system hospitals by state are plotted in Figure 2.1. In Figure 2.2, I plot
the distribution of FLF and non-FLF hospital systems by state.16
In 2014, system hospitals constituted 58% of all hospitals in the United States. Among
these, 82% belonged to a system that offered FLF contracts. 550 out of 681 hospital systems
offer FLF contracts, making 81% of the systems FLF systems. System hospitals are larger
on average in terms of general beds compared to individual hospitals. The same pattern is
observed when comparing number of admissions and inpatient days. Among the system hospitals, hospitals that belong to FLF-offering systems are larger in terms of these measures.
Their system size, measured by the number of member hospitals, is also larger on average.
System hospitals are better-equipped and offer more services compared to individual hospitals on average, and the same is true when comparing FLF system hospitals to non-FLF
system hospitals. According to these figures, hospitals that belong to FLF-systems offer
better resources on average, which might make them more appealing to insurers.
Table 2.3 reports average health plan characteristics using 989 health plans that operate
number of systems hospitals should be taken as a lower bound at the national level.
16
Figures A.3 and A.4 in the Appendix report the same distributions using the strictest definition of FLF.
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Figure 2.1: Number of individual, non-FLF system member, and FLF system member
hospitals by state

Figure 2.2: Number of non-FLF and FLF-offering hospital systems by state
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Table 2.3: Health Plan Characteristics
All
Number of Observations
989
Premiums ($)
348
Network Size
69
Pct of Hospitals Covered
0.54
Age
46
Physicians
36,458
Total Enrollment
217,255
PPO/Indemnity
0.72
Consumer satisfaction
3.17
Treatment
2.98
Prevention
3.17
NCQA rating
3.47
NCQA accreditation
0.83
BCBS
0.45

FLF
Non-FLF
827
162
349
345
79
15
0.59
0.25
47
41
37,106
33,149
230,551 149,382
0.76
0.5
3.18
3.13
2.95
3.16
3.14
3.28
3.45
3.60
0.84
0.75
0.48
0.30

in 50 states and Washington DC.17 Average premium per patient per month ranges from
$41.7 to $1139.7 with an average of $348.2. The range is large since all types of plans
(low-premium HMOs, high-premium indemnity plans etc.) are present in the dataset. The
average premium is similar between the insurers that accept FLF and the ones that do not.
Average insurer carries 69 hospitals in its network. The average network size of insurers
who accept FLF contracts is substantially larger compared to the average network size of
the insurers who do not accept such contracts, and this figure is not driven by a possible
selection of FLF insurers to larger states. An average insurer in a given state carries 54% of
all the hospitals in that state, and this figure is 59% for insurers that accept FLF contracts,
but only 25% for insurers who do not. FLF insurers are older on average, include a greater
number of physicians in their networks, and have higher enrollment. The average quality
ratings differ between the two kinds of insurers based on the measure used. Insurers that
accept FLF contracts have higher ratings in terms of consumer satisfaction, however non17

The data reported pertains to 380 distinct insurers. Since many of the national insurers offer plans in
multiple states, they are recorded as unique observations as FLF acceptance status and networks change
from state to state for these insurers.
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FLF insurers have higher ratings in terms of treatment and prevention.18 Finally, almost
half of the insurers that accept FLF contracts are Blue Cross Blue Shield (BCBS) plans that
offer large networks and enroll a substantial proportion of the population.

2.3
2.3.1

Reduced-Form Analysis
Premiums

In the context of vertical bundling in health care, efficiency gains are expected to realize if
hospital systems are able to attain higher profits by offering discounts or lower unit prices
for their full-line of products, compared to profits from individually-priced products. If this
is the case, insurers that accept FLF contracts will face lower unit costs, and can pass along
these savings to their enrollees in the form of lower premiums. To investigate the impact
of accepting FLF contracts on insurer premiums, I estimate the following equation using
ordinary least squares:

lnP remiumj = β0 + β1 F LF insurerj + αZj + γMj + Ds + j

(2.1)

where the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of insurer j’s premium (per enrollee per
month), F LF insurerj is an indicator variable that takes on a value of 1 if the insurer accepts
at least one FLF contract, Zj are insurer characteristics, Mj are market characteristics, and
Ds are state fixed effects.
18

The clinical quality measures (treatment and prevention) are calculated using a subset of the Healthcare
Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) measures whereas consumer satisfaction measure comes
from the HEDIS survey which is overseen by AHRQ. Consumer satisfaction measure covers patients’ satisfaction with health plans (handling claims, customer service etc.), satisfaction with physicians (doctors’
communication, care received etc.), and access of getting care in terms of ease and promptness. The treatment measure evaluates scores in subcategories such as asthma, diabetes, heart attack, and mental health.
The prevention score assesses measures such as timeliness of prenatal check ups, breast cancer screening,
and early immunizations.

CHAPTER 2. FULL-LINE FORCING IN HEALTH CARE

75

I estimate Equation (2.1) using national level data where unit of observation is an insurer.
The ideal way to investigate the premium-FLF contract relationship would be to use data
with insurer-state level observations, as several insurers operate in multiple states and their
FLF status change by state. Since my premium data is at the insurer level, I do not observe
different premiums charged by the same insurer in different markets, hence I am unable to
take this approach. Instead, I define F LF insurerj to be 1 if insurer j accepts at least one
FLF contract in any one of the states it operates in, and investigate its impact on insurers’
premiums at the national level. I also aggregate all market-level variables to insurer-level
variables using insurer j’s enrollments in different states as weights. Finally, I include state
fixed effects for every state insurer j operates in.
Results are reported in the first column of Table 2.4. I do not find any significant effect
of accepting FLF contracts on insurer premiums. There are several plausible explanations.
First is lack of detailed premiums data at the state level. Second is the potential absence
of discounts from upstream entities. Hospital systems may not need to offer discounts to
enforce their full-line of hospitals as they have higher bargaining power in the negotiation
process (Lewis and Pflum (2015)). Another possible explanation is the failure of insurers
to pass along the savings to consumers if they receive the discounts. Finally, differences
in compositions of hospital networks might lead to this result. If FLF-accepting insurers
include more system hospitals in their networks compared to insurers that do not accept such
contracts, discounts may be offset by higher prices charged by system hospitals (Melnick and
Keeler (2007)), making the efficiency effect unobservable to the econometrician.
The rest of the covariates have expected effects on premiums. PPO/indemnity plans offer
higher premiums compared HMO/POS plans. Vertically-integrated (VI) insurers offer lower
premiums compared to their non-VI counterparts due to elimination of double marginalization. BCBS plans’ premiums are lower compared to the rest. This specification also controls
for market characteristics such as per capita income, Medicare reimbursement rate to hospi-
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Table 2.4: Reduced-form Results

FLF-insurer
Age
PPO
BCBS
Weiss rating
Vertically integrated
Enrollment
Observations
R2

Premiums
(1)
ln Premium
0.08
(0.09)
-0.003*
(0.002)
0.31***
(0.07)
-0.46***
(0.10)
0.03**
(0.01)
-0.23**
(0.09)
380
0.40

Market Coverage
(2)
(3)
Network Size FLF hospitals
48.18***
25.56***
(14.46)
(6.84)
0.04
0.03
(0.08)
(0.04)
8.10**
3.78**
(3.36)
(1.64)
9.52**
4.29*
(4.00)
(2.50)
2.06**
1.21**
(1.00)
(0.53)
-25.43***
-13.88***
(8.11)
(4.85)
0.003
0.001
(0.003)
(0.002)
989
989
0.72
0.74

Leverage
(4)
(5)
(6)
Individual Non-FLF Rival FLF
18.47***
4.15***
1.88***
(5.35)
(0.91)
(0.10)
0.002
0.009
0.003*
(0.04)
(0.007)
(0.002)
3.94**
0.37
0.28***
(1.61)
(0.39)
(0.09)
5.24***
-0.01
0.47***
(1.50)
(0.37)
(0.09)
0.79**
0.11
0.07***
(0.39)
(0.14)
(0.01)
-9.41***
-2.15***
-0.94***
(2.98)
(0.79)
(0.11)
0.001
0.0006
-0.00002
(0.001)
(0.0004) (0.00005)
989
989
8583
0.72
0.74
0.53

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. All specifications include state fixed effects. Enrollment
is in thousands. *** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant
at 10%.

tals, hourly mean wage for physicians and surgeons to account for input price, percent black,
percent uninsured, unemployment rate, and hospital and insurer market concentration as
measured by Herfindahl-Hirschman index. The main finding that accepting FLF contracts
does not influence premiums is robust to inclusion of different market characteristics and
other covariates. Results are also robust to use of difference measures of FLF, as reported
in Table A2 in the Appendix.

2.3.2

Market Coverage

Next, I estimate the following equation to investigate the impact of accepting an FLF contract on insurers’ market coverage:

N etworkSizejs = β0 + β1 F LF insurerjs + αZj + Ds + js

(2.2)
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where the dependent variable is the number of hospitals included in insurer j’s network in
state s, F LF insurerjs indicates whether insurer j accepts at least one FLF contract in state
s, and Zj are insurer characteristics. I also include state fixed effects, Ds , to control for
differences in state size. The estimation is done at the insurer-state level as data contains
hospital networks offered by insurers at the state level. Standard errors are two-way clustered
at the insurer and state level.
Results are reported in the second column of Table 2.4. Insurers that accept FLF contracts carry 48 more hospitals in their networks, on average, compared to insurers who do
not take such contracts. The positive market coverage effect might be arising from the potential discounts given to FLF-accepting insurers. If these insurers face lower unit costs, they
might choose to include a greater number of hospitals in their networks. The coefficients in
front of the other explanatory variables all have anticipated signs and magnitudes. Insurers
with higher enrollment include a greater number of hospitals in their networks. Verticallyintegrated health plans carry 25 fewer hospitals on average, whereas BCBS and PPO plans
offer larger networks compared to the rest.
In column (3) of Table 2.4, I report results from a similar estimation where the dependent
variable is the number of FLF-offering system hospitals included in insurer j’s network in
state s. Results indicate that a major portion of the positive market coverage effect can
be attributed to inclusion of FLF-offering hospitals. FLF-accepting insurers carry 25 more
FLF hospitals in their networks compared no non-FLF insurers. This result is as expected
because FLF-accepting insurers carry the full-line of hospitals from FLF systems, whereas
non-FLF insurers do not. However, it is important to note that the dependent variable here
is all hospitals covered from all FLF-offering systems in the market, regardless of agreement
on FLF terms. As such, it includes FLF-offering system hospitals the FLF-accepting insurer
successfully contracts on FLF terms as well as other FLF-offering system hospitals whose
FLF contracts were not taken. As explained in the next subsection, increased coverage of
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FLF hospitals by FLF-accepting insurers is due to the increased market coverage in both
categories, and does not result solely from the presence of FLF contracts.

2.3.3

Leverage

The leverage effect is presumed to be present if contracting on FLF terms with at least
one system leads to reduced coverage of rival hospitals in the market. In this context, rival
hospitals are individual hospitals, non-FLF system hospitals, and FLF system hospitals
whose FLF contracts were not taken.
In order to estimate the impact on the inclusion of individual hospitals and non-FLF
system hospitals, I estimate the same specification as Equation (2.2), using number of hospitals covered in the relevant category as the dependent variable. Estimating the impact on
rival FLF hospitals requires restructuring of the data to insurer-system-state level as rival
systems change for each insurer-system pair in a state. To measure the effect of accepting
an FLF contract from a system on the number of hospitals covered from other FLF systems
whose FLF contracts were not taken by insurer j, I estimate the following equation:

Yjks = β0 + β1 F LF otherjs + γZj + Ds + Dk + jks

(2.3)

where the dependent variable is the number of hospitals covered by insurer j from FLFoffering system k who does not have an FLF contract with insurer j in state s, and the
independent variable of interest is whether insurer j has agreed to FLF contracts from any
other system. The specification also controls for state and system fixed effects. The sample
used here includes only the hospital systems that offer FLF contracts, and excludes insurersystem pairs who successfully contracted on FLF terms.
Results are reported in the last section of Table 2.4. Insurers that accept FLF contracts
carry 18 more individual hospitals and 4 more non-FLF system hospitals, on average, com-
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pared to their counterparts. Results from rival FLF system hospital regression exhibit a
similar pattern. Accepting an FLF contract from a hospital system does not reduce hospital coverage from rival FLF-offering systems. In fact, FLF-accepting insurers carry 2 more
hospitals per system from rival FLF-offering systems, on average, compared to non-FLF
insurers. These results are robust to use of alternative FLF measures as well as inclusion of
insurer fixed effects, as reported in the Appendix.
The absence of leverage effect should be evaluated in relation to the positive market
coverage effect. The previous subsection demonstrated that FLF-accepting insurers carry 48
more hospitals in their networks, on average. The decomposition here shows this expansion
in market coverage is due to inclusion of not only all member hospitals from FLF-offering
systems, but also rival hospitals in all categories. The first plausible explanation is again
related to efficiency spillovers. If FLF-accepting insurers receive discounts and hence can
include a greater number of hospitals in their networks, they can do so by including rival
hospitals. However, it is not likely that these discounts are the only source, especially given
the magnitude of the differences in network size. Another possible scenario is that the
FLF-offering systems do not offer discounts or offer infinitesimal discounts, yet their FLF
contracts are taken due to their high bargaining power. Since system hospital prices are
likely to be higher compared to prices of individual hospitals (Melnick and Keeler (2007)),
insurers might then choose to include more individual hospitals in their networks to divert
their patients to cheaper hospitals.
The overall conclusion from the reduced-form analysis is that FLF contracts should improve consumer welfare. Insurers that accept FLF contracts offer larger networks but not
higher premiums. Moreover, these insurers are not including hospitals from FLF systems
at the expense of rival hospitals. In order to quantify the change in welfare as well as to
understand the network formation strategies of insurers, I structurally model the market in
the next section.
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Structural Analysis: Model and Methodology

The structural estimation here is identical to the one presented in Chapter 1. For the sake
of completeness, I repeat the model, estimation details, and results in this chapter. The
text in the rest of Section 2.4 is verbatim the same as the text in Section 1.5. I also repeat
the estimation details and results from Section 1.6 in Section 2.5, with slight changes in
interpretation that focus on FLF contracts instead of vertical integration. The new material
for FLF analysis resumes in Section 2.6.
The estimation of the structural model consists of three main stages. First, I estimate
consumer demand for hospitals and consumer demand for insurance plans. Second, I estimate
a cost function to understand how hospital costs are determined. Third, I combine parameter
estimates from demand and cost estimation to estimate a bargaining model. The bargaining
model captures the hospital-insurer negotiations process and is modeled in a Nash-bargaining
framework. Result from all three stages are used in a counterfactual policy experiment where
I simulate a market without FLF contracts.

2.4.1

Estimation of the Demand Side

The vertical relationship between the three agents in the health care market calls for two
separate demand models: demand for hospitals by consumers and demand for insurers by
consumers. First, I estimate the hospital demand model using a conditional logit framework.19 Next, I use the results from hospital demand estimation to construct an “expected
utility” measure and use this as an insurer characteristic in health plan demand estimation.
This measure captures the predicted utility an average patient gets from a network of hospitals offered by an insurer. Finally, I estimate health plan demand using the contraction
mapping algorithm developed by Berry et al. (1995) (henceforth BLP) taking into account
19

I use the standard conditional logit model proposed in McFadden (1974).
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unobserved plan characteristics as well as heterogeneity in consumer preferences towards
certain insurer characteristics.

2.4.1.1

Hospital Demand Model

Let utility of patient i from visiting hospital h in market m given diagnosis l be:

uihlm = u(Xhm , Vilm |λ, θ)

(2.4)

where (λ, θ) are parameters to be estimated, and Xhm is a vector of observed hospital characteristics. Vilm = [Dim , Cilm ] is a vector of observed consumer characteristics where Dim
represents demographic characteristics such as sex, age, location and Cilm represents clinical
attributes such as diagnosis. Patients choose hospitals to maximize utility, so if patient i
with diagnosis l chooses hospital h, then the following inequality must hold for all other
hospitals h0 in the market, where the market subscript m will be suppressed for notational
ease:
uihl = u(Xh , Vil |λ, θ) ≥ uih0 l = u(Xh0 , Vil |λ, θ)

(2.5)

In particular, let the utility specification be:

uihl = θXh + λ1 Xh Di + λ2 Xh Cil − γ(Vi )OP C(Cil ) + ihl

(2.6)

where OP C(Cil ) is the out-of-pocket cost for patient i with diagnosis Cil and γ converts
money into utils based on patient characteristics Vil and informs us about the price sensitivity
of patients.20 I assume that the independently and identically distributed error term ihl
20

In practice, a patient’s hospital choice depends on out-of-pocket expenditures at a hospital. However,
since I do not observe these costs, while estimating the hospital demand model, I make the common assumption (as in Capps et al. (2003), Ho (2006), Lewis and Pflum (2015)) that they are constant across
hospitals for a given patient and therefore do not affect hospital choice. Nonetheless, I still estimate the
price sensitivity parameter γ jointly with the parameters of the bargaining model.
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captures idiosyncratic tastes and has an Extreme Value Type 1 distribution. Then, the
hospital share equation can be written as:
eu(Xh ,Vil |λ,θ)
sh (M) = P u(X ,V |λ,θ)
e h il

(2.7)

k∈M

where M is the set of hospitals that are in the same choice set as hospital h. There is no
outside option because I only observe sick patients who are hospitalized. Since I observe
the actual shares, I use maximum likelihood to obtain the parameter estimates λ̂ and θ̂.
Identification in this model comes from the variation in patients’ hospital choice sets across
markets. Unlike the health plan demand model (presented next), this model does not account
for unobserved quality of hospitals. I have very rich hospital characteristics data, therefore
I assume that the characteristics I use in estimation capture the quality of hospitals.

2.4.1.2

Expected Utility and Willingness-to-Pay

The hospital demand model presented above is used to create two measures: expected utility
from an insurer’s network of hospitals (used in insurer demand estimation) and willingnessto-pay (WTP) of an individual for a hospital to be included in his choice set (used in
bargaining estimation).21 The common element to both calculations is patient i’s interim
utility from having access to a set of hospitals M:
h
i
hX
i
V (M|Xh , Vil ) = E max û(Xh , Vil |λ̂, θ̂) = ln
eû(Xh ,Vil |λ̂,θ̂)
h∈M

(2.8)

h∈M

The expected utility a type q patient22 gets from a network of hospitals M offered by
insurer j is given by:
21

The construction of these measures follows Ho (2006) and Capps et al. (2003), respectively.
Patient types are defined by age-sex-ZIP code cells, where age brackets are 0-17, 18-34, 35-44, 45-54,
55-64.
22
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!
EUqj (M) =

X

pql V (M|Xh , Vql ) =

l

X
l

pql ln

X

eû(Xh ,Vql |λ̂,θ̂)

(2.9)

h∈M

where pql is the probability that patient type q is hospitalized with diagnosis l. That is,
first I calculate a different interim utility for each diagnosis each patient type q might have.
Then, I take a weighted sum across these values where the weights are pql to calculate the
expected utility patient type q receives from having access to insurer j’s network of hospitals
M. The expected utility measure is calculated for type q patient (instead of individual i)
because I do not observe consumers’ choices of health plans. Health plan demand estimation
uses aggregate shares data to obtain the parameter estimates.
On the contrary, I calculate the WTP measure based on individual i’s interim utility
because I observe hospital choice at the individual level. The contribution of hospital h to
patient i’s interim utility from the network of hospitals M can be calculated as:

∆h V (M|Xh , Vil ) = V (M|Xh , Vil ) − V (M \ h|Xh , Vil ) = ln


1
1 − sh (M)

(2.10)

The total ex-ante WTP for inclusion of hospital h in the network of hospitals M is
then given by integrating (10) across a cumulative distribution of patient characteristics and
diagnosis F (Vil ):
Z
∆Wj (M) = Nj


1 
1
ln
dF (Vil )
γ
1 − sh (M)

(2.11)

V

where Nj is the number of patients enrolled with insurer j that visit a hospital.
2.4.1.3

Insurer Demand

I estimate consumer demand for insurers using a discrete choice setting that accounts for
unobserved individual characteristics as well as the expected utility a patient gets from a
network of hospitals. I start by estimating a benchmark logit model that closely follows the
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specification in Berry (1994) and then move onto BLP estimation that takes into account
heterogeneity in individual preferences towards insurer characteristics as an additional layer.

Logit Model:
Let utility individual i gets from plan j in market r be:

wijr =

X

xjkr βk + ξjr + ijr

(2.12)

k

where xjkr is the k th observed plan characteristic of plan j and ξj represents the unobserved
plan characteristic (such as patients’ perception about quality, status, service, reputation,
past experience etc.). For simplicity, I drop the market subscripts in the rest of the analysis.
Therefore, the utility function can be written as:

wij =

X

xjk βk + ξj + ij = δj (xj , ξj , β) + ij

(2.13)

k

where δj represents the mean utility level from plan j. The unobserved characteristics are
assumed to be mean independent of xj ’s and also independent across markets. The error term
ij is independently and identically distributed across consumers and plans and assumed to
have an Extreme Value Type 1 distribution. Normalizing the mean utility from the outside
good to be zero (i.e. δo = 0), the closed-form solution for the market share equation for
product j can be written as:
sj =
1+

eδj
G
P

(2.14)
e δg

g=1

where G is the number of plans in the market. The share of the outside good is given by:

so =
1+

1
G
P
g=1

(2.15)
eδg
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Dividing Equation (2.14) by Equation (2.15) gives:
sj
= eδj =⇒ ln(sj ) − ln(so ) = δj
so

(2.16)

Hence, I generate δ’s using the market share data. Having obtained the dependent variable,
I estimate the following equation to obtain the parameter estimates:

δj =

X

xjk βk + ξj

(2.17)

k

Before moving on with estimation, the endogeneity problem caused by premiums needs
to be addressed. The unobserved plan characteristic ξj (the error term in Equation (2.17))
is likely to be correlated with the plan’s premium which is one of the observed plan characteristics. One would expect a high-quality, better-service plan to charge a higher premium.
For this reason, I instrument for the premium variable. Traditional instruments used in the
literature for price are cost shifters (these are difficult to find as they are usually correlated
with ξ’s), characteristics of competing products in the same market, and prices of the same
product in other markets (because a shock to marginal cost will be carried to prices in other
markets). I use characteristics (other than premium) of other plans within the same market
as instruments. These instruments and the relevant validity tests are further discussed in
Section 2.5. Given these instruments Z, I form the moment conditions as follows. First, I
calculate the unobserved quality term ξj as a function of model parameters:

ξj = δj −

X
k

xjk βk = ln(sj ) − ln(so ) −

X

xjk βk

(2.18)

k

The instruments should be orthogonal to this unobserved quality term, so I form the moment
conditions as E[ξ(β)0 Z] = 0. In applying iterative Generalized Method of Moments (GMM),
I use the “optimal” weighting matrix W which is the inverse of the variance of moment
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conditions. Therefore, the problem reduces to:

min ξ(β)0 ZW Z 0 ξ(β) where W = (E[Z 0 ξξ 0 Z])−1
β

(2.19)

The analytical solution to this problem is:

β = (X 0 ZW Z 0 X)−1 (X 0 ZW Z 0 δ)

(2.20)

The iterative estimation algorithm starts with W = (Z 0 Z)−1 to get an initial estimate β̂,
and then I re-compute W = (E[Z 0 ξ(β̂)ξ(β̂)0 Z])−1 to get a new estimate of β.
Identification in the health plan demand model comes from the variation in consumers’
choice sets across markets as well as the variation of health plan characteristics within a
market. Markets are defined by states. Results from the health plan demand estimation are
presented in Table 2.6.

BLP:
The major drawback of the previous model is that it does not generate realistic substitution patterns. In this setting, the cross-price elasticity between any two plans depends only
on their market shares. Consider two health plans A and B whose market shares are the
same. Let A be an HMO plan with low premiums, narrow hospital and physician networks,
and low ratings; and B be a PPO plan with high premiums, large provider network, and
top ratings. Assume there is another PPO plan C in the market with high premiums, large
provider network, and high quality ratings. The cross-price elasticity of the previous model
implies that if plan C increases its premiums, the demand for plan A and plan B will increase
equally. This is unintuitive as we expect the cross-price effect to be larger for health plans
that are similar in characteristics. The model presented by BLP solves this problem and gen-
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erates realistic substitution patterns. With the BLP estimation outlined below, cross-price
elasticities are larger for products that are closer together in terms of their characteristics.
Let utility of patient i from insurer j in market r be:

wijr = ξjr +xjr φ+β1 EUjr +β2 P remjr +γ1 νi1 EUjr +γ2 νi2 P remjr +ηijr = δj +µ(νi1 , νi2 )+ηijr
(2.21)
where ξj are unobserved insurer characteristics, xj are observed insurer characteristics,
P remj is insurer j’s premium, νi are random draws from a normal distribution and represent
unobserved individual preferences, and ηij are idiosyncratic shocks to consumer tastes that
are assumed to be independently and identically distributed with Extreme Value Type 1.
The expected utility measure presented in the previous subsection is aggregated to insurer
level by taking a weighted sum across patient types where weights are population shares of
type q individuals obtained from Census data. δj is the mean utility level that a patient
gets from plan j. It is the presence of the interaction terms µ that allows me to capture the
heterogeneity of preferences. In this setting, consumers with similar characteristics prefer
similar products. Therefore, if an insurer is removed from the choice set, consumers will
substitute to other insurers that are similar in terms of characteristics and this generates
more realistic substitution patterns.
Identification in this model comes from the variation in patients’ plan choice sets across
markets. To address the endogeneity issue, I again instrument for premiums using the BLPtype instruments mentioned above. The outside good is defined as having no insurance and
its share is calculated using the Census data. In this setting, the share equation for plan j
cannot be solved analytically. As in BLP, I use simulation techniques to obtain the predicted
shares:
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ns

sˆjr (φ, γ, β) =

1 X
e(ξjr +xjm φ+β1 EUjr +β2 P remjr +γ1 νi1 EUjr +γ2 νi2 P remjr )
P (ξ +x φ+β EU +β P rem +γ ν EU +γ ν P rem )
1 i1
2 i2
kr
kr
kr
ns i=1 1 +
e kr kr 1 kr 2

(2.22)

k∈P

where ns is the number of random draws (1000 in my estimation), and P is the set of plans
in the market. That is, I calculate a different share with each distinct draw of the unobserved
individual preference term νi , and then obtain the predicted share as an average of these
simulated shares across draws. Dropping the market subscript and simplifying notation, one
can write the predicted shares as:

sˆj ns =

1 X
eδj +µ(xj ,νi )
P
ns i 1 + eδj +µ(xj ,νi )

(2.23)

j

Given the equation for predicted shares, I use the contraction mapping algorithm introduced by BLP to obtain δ, the mean utility level vector. This algorithm aims to match the
predicted shares ŝ to the observed true shares s using the following equation:

δ h = δ h−1 + ln(s) − ln(ŝ)

(2.24)

I begin by evaluating the right-hand side at an initial guess of parameters and δ, obtain
a new δ, put it back into the right-hand side and repeat this until convergence is reached.
Once I obtain δ, I rewrite the unobserved plan characteristics as ξj = δj − xj φ. Therefore, I
form the moment conditions as E[ξ 0 Z] = 0 and estimate via GMM.

2.4.2

Hospital Cost Function

I adapt the trans-log specification common in the literature (Fournier and Mitchell (1997),
Capps et al. (2010), Lewis and Pflum (2015)) that is used to estimate cost functions of
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multiproduct firms and hospitals. According to this specification, hospital h’s costs at time
t are given by:
ln(Costht ) = β0 + β1 ln(Yht ) + β2 ln(Yht ) × ln(Yht ) + β3 ln(Wht ) + β4 ln(Wht ) × ln(Wht )
+ β5 ln(Yht ) × ln(Wht ) + κht + t + ht
(2.25)
where Yh are hospital outputs, Wh are hospital inputs, κ are hospital fixed effects, and t is a
time trend. The error term ht is clustered at the hospital level, therefore it is allowed to be
correlated for a hospital across years, but errors are assumed to be distributed independently
across hospitals. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of the total operating
costs at a hospital. The hospital output vector, Yh , consists of inpatient days and outpatient
visits for private insurance, Medicare, and other payer types (such as Medi-Cal, workers’
compensation, county indigent programs, self-pay etc.). The hospital input vector, Wh ,
includes size measures for the hospital (such as number of beds, fixed assets, total number of
hours for registered nurses etc.), governance structure, for-profit status, rural status, vertical
integration status, teaching status, and FLF status. The marginal costs of both components
are allowed to vary by other inputs and outputs through the inclusion of the interaction
terms. The results from hospital cost function estimation are presented in Table A4 in the
Appendix.

2.4.3

Bargaining

The model used for bargaining estimation closely follows the specification in Lewis and Pflum
(2015).23 I use the Nash bargaining framework where the two agents negotiate to split the
23

Different from their setup, I estimate the model at the insurer-hospital and insurer-system level using
data on insurer enrollment instead of aggregating the estimating equation to the hospital level. I explain
data and variable construction for each specification in detail in the next section.
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surplus they jointly generate by successfully contracting. The outcome of the bargaining
game is a contract equilibrium as in Crémer and Riordan (1987) that relies on the following
assumptions:
1. All hospital-insurer pairs negotiate contracts simultaneously.
2. All hospital-insurer pairs negotiate under the anticipation that all other hospital-insurer
pairs will successfully negotiate contracts.
3. The bargaining outcome between a hospital and an insurer does not influence the
bargaining outcome of these parties with other insurers and hospitals.
4. When a hospital is removed from a choice set, patients re-allocate themselves to other
hospitals in the same choice set.
Given these assumptions, the objective function of the Nash bargaining game is:

max[Πh (H) − Πh (H\j)]αh [Πj (M) − Πj (M\h)]1−αh
phj

(2.26)

where Πh (H) are profits of hospital h when it contracts with a set of insurers H, Πh (H\j)
are profits of hospital h when it contracts with the same set of insurers except insurer j,
Πj (M) are profits of insurer j when it contracts with a set of hospitals M, Πj (M\h) are
profits of insurer j when it contracts with the same set of hospitals except hospital h, phj are
the negotiated prices between hospital h and insurer j, αh represents the bargaining power
of hospital h, while 1 − αh represents the bargaining power of insurer j.
The objective function can be expressed as max[∆j Πh ]αh [∆h Πj ]1−αh where:
phj

∆j Πh = Πh (H) − Πh (H\j) = phj Dh (M) − ∆Ch (Dh (M))

(2.27)

∆h Πj = Πj (M) − Πj (M\h) = ∆Wj (M) − ∆R(pMj )

(2.28)
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In the above expressions, the change in hospital h’s profits, ∆j Πh , is the difference between the additional revenues it will generate (phj Dh (M)) and the additional costs it will
bear (∆Ch (Dh (M))) by contracting with insurer j, as a result of the expected change in
hospital visits that emerges from insurer j’s enrollees (Dh (M)). The change in insurer j’s
profits by successfully negotiating a contract with hospital h, ∆h Πj , is the difference between
the change in WTP of its enrollees (∆Wj (M)) to have access to hospital h and the change in
insurer j’s total reimbursements (∆R(pMj )) when hospital h is included in its network, compared to the reimbursements when hospital h is not available as an option and the enrollees
P
P
visit other hospitals instead. Formally, ∆R(pMj ) =
pkj Dk (M) −
pkj Dk (M \ h).
k∈M

k∈M\h

Inserting these expressions into the objective function and taking the first order condition
leads to the estimating equation:

∆j Πh = αh [∆Wj (M) − ∆Ch (Dh (M)) − ∆Rj (pMj ) + phj Dh (M)]

(2.29)

All the elements of Equation (2.29) can be calculated from the previous parts of the
structural model. Change in WTP, ∆Wj (M), is calculated as in Equation (2.11), using
results from hospital demand estimation. Change in costs, ∆Ch (Dh (M)), is calculated by
predicting the change in hospital days using the hospital demand function, and then using
these in hospital cost function to obtain predicted change in costs. Change in reimbursements
of insurer j, ∆Rj (pMj ), is calculated by using the hospital demand model to predict how
patients will re-allocate themselves to other hospitals if insurer j fails to successfully contract
with hospital h. Finally, change in hospital revenues, phj Dh (M), is calculated by using the
predicted change in hospital visits if a contract is reached, again using the estimates from the
hospital demand model. The only unknown, and the parameter of interest, is therefore the
bargaining power αh . I further parameterize αh as follows in order to analyze how hospital
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bargaining power is determined:

αh = α0 + βHh + ηMh + h

(2.30)

where Hh are hospital characteristics such as FLF status, teaching status etc., and Mh are
market characteristics such as HHI measure of market concentration. Therefore, I take the
following equation to estimation and use nonlinear least squares24 to obtain the parameter
estimates:

∆j Πh = (α0 + βHh + ηMh )[∆Wj (M) − ∆Ch (Dh (M)) − ∆Rj (pMj ) + phj Dh (M)] (2.31)

In the above equation, the term in brackets is the surplus generated by hospital h and insurer
j successfully signing a contract. Identification in this model comes from the variation that
identifies each individual component of surplus. In particular, parameters of the hospital
demand model are identified by the variation in patients’ choice sets across markets, while
the parameters of the hospital cost function are identified by relating the variation in hospital
costs to the variation in observable hospital input and output data. The parameters of the
bargaining model are identified by relating the variation in change in hospital profits to
predicted surplus that varies by the above-mentioned sources. Therefore, the parameters are
mainly identified by variation in the data as opposed to the functional form.
24

Consumer price sensitivity parameter γ is estimated via this equation and is a part of the WTP measure
∆Wj (M) as defined by Equation (2.11).
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Estimation Details and Results
Hospital Demand Estimation

The hospital choice model uses two data sources: patient characteristics come from SID for
Arizona, Florida, Kentucky, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Washington while
hospital characteristics come from AHA Survey. I estimate a conditional logit model where
the utility specification25 is given by:

uihl = θXh + λ1 Xh Di + λ2 Xh Cil + ihl

(2.32)

where Xh is a vector of observed hospital characteristics, Di is a vector of demographic
characteristics such as sex, age, location, and Cilm is a vector of diagnosis. One of the
interaction terms Xh Di is the distance the patient travels to visit a hospital. In the model
presented here, patients’ choice sets are defined by ZIP codes. In particular, I put a hospital
in a patient’s choice set if another patient who lives in the same ZIP code visited that
hospital.26
Table 2.5 presents a subset27 of results from hospital demand estimation. Most hospital
characteristics and services offered have positive coefficients that are highly significant. Same
is true for the interaction terms. Consistent with the previous findings in the literature, I
find that having to travel an extra mile to get treated at a hospital decreases the odds of that
hospital being chosen by 3%.28 Odds of an FLF hospital being chosen is 1.04 times higher
25

While the original specification includes out-of-pocket costs (OPC), I exclude this term here as I do not
observe it. The coefficient in front of OPC is estimated along with the bargaining parameters, see Table 2.7.
26
I also estimated specifications where I constructed choice sets based on the Hospital Service Area (HSA)
and Hospital Referral Region (HRR) of the hospital the patient visited and obtained similar results. In
an ideal world, I would construct the choice sets based on the hospital network the patient’s insurer offers.
Unfortunately, I do not observe which individual is enrolled in which health plan in any of my datasets,
therefore I cannot take this approach.
27
For the full set of coefficient (not odds ratio) estimates, see Table A3.
28
The figure reported is for a male patient aged between 55-64 who visits a non-VI hospital. The effect of
distance decreases (becomes more negative) in various individual characteristics such as female and age.
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Table 2.5: Hospital Demand Estimation
Variable
Distance (miles)

Odds Ratio Variable
0.97***
Ultrasound
(0.0001)

Odds Ratio
1.42***
(0.02)

VI hospital

1.05***
(0.005)

Orthopedic services

1.02**
(0.01)

FLF hospital

1.04***
(0.003)

Birthing room × Female

1.16***
(0.02)

Distance × Female

0.987***
(0.0001)

Adult cardiac surgery
× Circulatory system

3.67***
(0.09)

Distance × Age (18-34)

0.98***
(0.0002)

Burn care × Burns

42.35***
(5.43)

Nurses per bed

1.24***
(0.003)

Neurological services
× Nervous system

2.50***
(0.08)

Teaching hospital

1.06***
(0.005)

Hemodialysis
× Kidney and urinary tract

1.41***
(0.04)

Medical/surgical care

1.29***
(0.02)

Oncology services
× Blood disorders

2.14***
(0.24)

Chemotherapy

1.18***
(0.008)

Obstetrics care
× Pregnancy and childbirth

97.10***
(4.66)

Fertility clinic

1.02***
(0.006)

Fertility clinic × Female

0.96***
(0.006)

Notes: Results from maximum likelihood estimation. N=1,152,081 hospital discharges from 7 states. See Table A3 for a full set of covariates included in the estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. *** statistically significant at 1% level, **
statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.
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compared to an individual or non-FLF system hospital. Similarly, odds of being chosen is
1.05 times higher for a VI hospital compared to a non-VI one if both hospitals are at zero
distance to the patient. Finally, patients are more likely to visit hospitals that offer services
that are related to their diagnosis. For example, the effect of an adult cardiac surgery unit
for a patient diagnosed with a circulatory system disease is 3.7 times that of a patient who
is not diagnosed with circulatory system disease, as anticipated.

2.5.2

Insurer Demand Estimation

The insurer demand model uses data at the national level. A market is defined as a state
since health plans are observed to serve residents of specific states. An insurance plan is
assumed to be a competitor in a market if it serves the residents of that state. The logit
framework I use takes into account unobservable plan characteristics and is estimated via
GMM. The utility function is of the form:

wij =

X

xjk βk + ξj + ij = δj (xj , ξj , β) + ij

(2.33)

k

where the observable insurer characteristics xj are FLF-accepting insurer indicator, VI insurer indicator, insurer premium per person per month (in $100s), expected utility, age of the
insurer, physicians per 100 population, Weiss rating, NCQA rating, NCQA accreditation,
prevention quality measure, PPO indicator, BCBS indicator, and a large plan indicator.29
In addition to these variables, the BLP specification includes interactions of expected utility
and premiums with random draws to capture heterogeneity in individual preferences. Both
specifications also include state fixed effects.
Since premiums are endogenous, I instrument for them using the average of characteris29

I define an insurer as large if it operates in multiple states. According to this definition, I mark Aetna,
Anthem, BCBS, CIGNA, Humana, Kaiser Permanente, United Healthcare as large health insurers. Consumers perceptions about these plans are likely to be reflected in their preferences.
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Table 2.6: Insurer Demand Estimation

Premium ($00)
NCQA rating
NCQA accreditation
VI-insurer
FLF-insurer
Age
Weiss rating
Physicians
Prevention
Expected utility
PPO
Large Insurer FE
BCBS FE
State FE

(1)
-0.63*
(0.37)
0.72
(0.55)
0.63
(0.42)
0.96**
(0.48)
0.22
(0.33)
-0.001
(0.005)
-0.10***
(0.03)
0.008***
(0.0003)
-0.94**
(0.44)
0.46***
(0.03)
1.10*
(0.66)
Yes
Yes
Yes

(2)
-0.22***
(0.05)
-0.33
(0.36)
0.46
(0.39)
0.19
(0.44)
0.76
(0.78)
0.007*
(0.004)
-0.11***
(0.04)
0.001***
(0.0002)
-0.15
(0.30)
0.49***
(0.03)
-0.001
(0.26)
Yes
Yes
Yes

Notes: Results from GMM estimation. N=989
insurers from 50 states and Washington DC. Robust, clustered (at the state level) standard errors
in parentheses. First column follows Berry (1994),
second column follows BLP (1995). Physicians are
per 100 enrollee population. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at
5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.
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tics of other plans (xn , n 6= j) in the same market. These characteristics are Weiss rating,
prevention, age, number of physicians, expected utility, and NCQA rating. These instruments satisfy the three traditional conditions of instrumental variables. They are relevant
as they are correlated with premiums via competition and markups30 , they are uncorrelated
with the error term, and they affect utility only through their impact on premiums. To
further support the choice of the instruments, I analyze two statistics. The first stage results
report a partial R-squared of 0.72 and an F-statistic of 17.46. These statistics suggest a large
portion of the unexplained variation in premiums comes from the excluded instruments and
the instruments are not weak since the F-statistic is greater than 10.31
To complete the estimation, the last element needed is the share of the outside good.
Since I observe HMO/POS and PPO/indemnity plans in my data, I define the outside good
as being uninsured. U.S. Census reports number of uninsured and state population by age
group. Therefore, I calculate the share of the outside good, s0 , by dividing the number of
nonelderly uninsured by nonelderly population of that state.
The parameter estimates are reported in Table 2.6. The first column reports results
from Berry (1994) specification while the second column presents results from the BLP
estimation. The coefficient in front of premiums is negative and significant as expected. Its
magnitude implies an average insurer-perspective elasticity of -2.11.32 This suggests that a
$10 increase in monthly premiums per enrollee decreases the demand for that insurer by 6%.
The expected utility coefficient is positive and significant, implying people value the hospital
network offered by an insurer while making their choices. The parameter estimate for FLF
insurer indicator is positive, however not statistically significantly different than zero. This
is reasonable as inclusion of FLF hospitals in insurer networks as well as characteristics of
30

This relationship is implied by the first order conditions in the supply side that leads to the pricing
Equation (2.37).
31
See Bound et al. (1995).
32
This is the elasticity of demand with respect to premiums from insurer’s perspective, as opposed to the
elasticity from the consumer’s perspective that is based on out-of-pocket expenditures.
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these hospitals are captured in the expected utility term. As logit and BLP specifications
give similar coefficients in terms of sign, magnitude, and significance; I use the estimates
from the BLP model in counterfactual estimations as this model better captures individual
heterogeneity in preferences and creates more realistic substitution patterns.

2.5.3

Bargaining

The estimating equation for the bargaining model is:

∆j Πh = (α0 +βHh +ηMh )[∆Wj (M)−∆Ch (Dh (M))−∆Rj (pMj )+phj Dh (M)] = αh ×∆Shj (M)
(2.34)
where ∆Πh are the additional profits earned by hospital h when it successfully signs a contract
with insurer j, the first term in parentheses is the decomposition of hospital bargaining
power, while the second term in brackets is the total surplus generated by insurer j and
hospital h successfully negotiating a contract. In this model, hospital h’s bargaining power
is determined by market characteristics Mh such as hospital market HHI, as well as its own
characteristics Hh such as FLF status, VI status, teaching status, rural status, market share,
integration with a physician group, system membership etc. The elements of total surplus
are each calculated using the models in the previous steps, and their calculations are detailed
below. In an ideal world, the bargaining model would be estimated using data on negotiated
prices between each hospital-insurer pair, the insurance plan the individual is enrolled in,
and the hospital he/she visited. While I observe the hospital visited by each patient in
my data, I do not observe what health plan he/she is enrolled in. Lewis and Pflum (2015)
encounter the same problem, and aggregate the bargaining equation to the hospital level,
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and estimate the following equation at the hospital level:
X
j∈H

∆j Πh = αh ×

X

∆Shj (M)

(2.35)

j∈H

where every term is summed across the set of insurers the hospital contracts with, H. They
also use assumed shares from insurers at a hospital when calculating individual elements of
surplus. I extend their setup by using data on insurers and estimating the bargaining model
at the hospital-insurer level. Since I observe insurer networks as well as market shares, I
disaggregate the hospital level components of surplus into hospital-insurer level by using the
share of insurer for each hospital. For example, in the model outlined above, ∆Wj (M) is the
total WTP of the enrollees for hospital h to be included in insurer j’s network. Following
Equation (2.35), I first calculate the total WTP of all patients in the market for hospital h.
Then, I split this WTP measure into WTP for hospital h of each insurer, based on market
shares.33 Therefore, if the share of patients at hospital h from insurer j is sins−hosp
, then the
jh
WTP of enrollees of j for hospital h is ∆Wh × sins−hosp
where ∆Wh is the total WTP for
jh
hospital h.
In what follows, I discuss the calculation of each element of surplus and then discuss
results from the bargaining model. I use data from California OSHPD to estimate the
bargaining model and obtain welfare results. Note that the hospital demand model forms
the basis of components in bargaining model, therefore I start by estimating hospital demand.
Different from the hospital demand model discussed above, I use choice sets based on Hospital
Referral Regions (HRRs)34 and omit the individual-level variables.35 I estimate this demand
33

Calculation of the share of patients at a hospital from an insurer is outlined in the Appendix.
I also tried using the estimates from choice sets based on the narrower geographic measure, Hospital
Service Areas (HSAs). Since many of the HSAs have only 1 hospital, these choice sets needed to be dropped
while calculating change in insurer reimbursements when an agreement is not reached, as this calculation
requires patients to re-allocate themselves to other hospitals in their choice sets. Moreover, having a single
hospital in a choice set is not credible as many patients choose from multiple hospitals as opposed to one.
Therefore, I conducted my analysis using HRR choice sets.
35
Bargaining model uses data from California OSHPD. While previous papers in the literature used
34
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model with the same set of SID states, and then use the parameter estimates to predict what
hospital shares would be in California. I cannot adopt the alternative approach to create
choice sets based on ZIP codes as patient ZIP codes are not reported in California data.36
For each component of total surplus, I follow calculations in Lewis and Pflum (2015) to
obtain hospital level aggregate measures. The basis of the first element, ∆Wh , is the total
WTP for hospital h. I calculate the WTP of each individual for each hospital as ln(1/(1−sˆih ))
where sˆih is the predicted probability that patient i will choose hospital h. Then, I sum this
across individuals for every hospital to obtain ∆Wh . Then, the WTP of enrollees of insurer j
for hospital h to be included in j’s network is calculated as ∆Wj (M) =

1
γ

× ∆Wh × sins−hosp
jh

following Equation (2.11).
The second element of surplus, ∆Ch (Dh (M)), is the expected change in hospital costs
when hospital h joins insurer j’s network. This term is calculated using both hospital demand
model and hospital cost function. First, I estimate the hospital cost function where hospital
costs depend on hospital inputs and outputs such as inpatient days from private payers,
inpatient days from Medicare etc. Next, using results from hospital demand, I predict
private37 inpatient days at a hospital (predDays) by multiplying predicted probability of
choice with length of stay, and summing it across private patients for a particular hospital.
Finally, using parameter estimates from hospital cost function, I predict hospital costs using
two output measures: predDays and (1 − sins−hosp
) × predDays. The difference between the
jh
two predicted costs gives the change in costs at a hospital if it contracts with insurer j.
individual-level variables from the same data source, OSHPD stopped reporting these variables to protect patient confidentiality starting with 2012 data. Therefore, I am unable to use terms involving sex and
age in hospital demand estimation and prediction, as these are unavailable in the California data.
36
Starting with 2012 data, OSHPD only reports the first 3 digits of a patient’s ZIP code. Based on this,
I randomly assign individuals to ZIP codes starting with those 3 digits based on ZIP codes’ population
weights, and use this to calculate distance to be used in prediction. As these ZIP code assignments are not
precise, however, I refrain from using them as choice sets in hospital demand estimation. Estimating hospital
demand using exact distances from SID gives me more accurate coefficients for the covariates, and especially
for distance.
37
As I only work with commercial insurers in my data, I only consider changes in the private line of
business.

CHAPTER 2. FULL-LINE FORCING IN HEALTH CARE

101

The third component of surplus, ∆Rj (pMj ), is the change in reimbursements of an insurer if it does not include hospital h in its network and its patients re-allocate themselves
to the remaining hospitals.38 The outline of the calculation is as follows. For every hospital
h, I remove h from the market, focus on the choice set affected by removal of h, re-assign h’s
patients to other hospitals in this choice set based on the demand model, and then calculate
extra revenues at these hospitals. Finally, I get an extra revenue per hospital which is equivalent to extra reimbursement the hospital gets from all the insurers it contracts with. I then
decompose this to hospital-insurer level based on shares sins−hosp
. The detailed calculation
jh
of these steps is as follows. First, for every hospital that is removed from the market, I
calculate predicted extra days at other hospitals that are in the same choice set. If hospital
h is removed from the choice set, then the predicted extra days at hospital h0 are calculated
i
h
probh0
39
0
−
prob
In this expression, prob are original
as: extraP redDaysh0 = 1−prob
h × LOSh .
h
choice probabilities based on hospital demand estimation and LOSh is the patient’s length
of stay at hospital h as reported by OSHPD. The term in brackets represents the increased
choice probability of hospital h0 while LOSh represents the extra days available with the
removal of hospital h. In the next step, I use OSHPD Discharge and Financial Reports to
estimate the average revenue per inpatient day at a hospital for each MDC for a non-ER
private (nonERpr) patient, and then use it to calculate extra revenues at a hospital. For
example, average revenues for a patient diagnosed with MDC category 5 that is admitted
38

In an ideal world, I would calculate this component using insurer networks as choice sets. I do not
observe which individual is enrolled in which health plan, however, so I am forced to use HRRs as my choice
sets. While the re-assignment of patients to other hospitals in patient choice sets would be more precise
with insurer networks as choice sets, since the final product is calculated at the hospital level and then
decomposed to hospital-insurer level based on sins−hosp
, I assume the hospital level aggregated measure is
jh
close when using HRR choice sets to what it would be if I used insurer networks as choice sets. The choice
sets in Lewis and Pflum (2015) are also not based on insurer networks (except top five largest HMOs), and
they conduct a similar analysis to obtain the change in reimbursements of insurers using ZIP code choice
sets. Finally, I drop choice sets with only 1 hospital as patients are unable to re-allocate themselves if they
belong in these choice sets.
39
This expression is calculated at the individual level and then aggregated to hospital-MDC level at each
iteration.
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through non-ER is calculated as:

AvgRev/Day =

Net Revenues from Private Payers Total IP Charges for nonERpr MDC5
×
Gross Charges for Private Payers Total IP Days for nonERpr in MDC5

Given the average revenue measure, total extra revenues at a hospital are calculated by
multiplying predicted extra days with the average revenues that correspond to that MDC,
and then aggregating it to the hospital level. This hospital level measure is the total reimbursements from all insurers the hospital contracts with. Therefore, to break it down to
hospital-insurer level, I multiply it with sins−hosp
and use this final term in estimation.
jh
The final component of surplus, phj Dh (M), is the change in revenues of a hospital when
it contracts with an insurer. I use the same average revenue measure in lieu of the reimbursement price vector phj and calculate the change in expected demand for the hospital
Dh (M) based on hospital demand estimation. In particular, I start at the individual level
and calculate predDays as above (by multiplying hospital choice probability with length of
stay of each private individual), then predict the revenues from these days by MDC using
the average revenue measure, and finally aggregate these revenues to the hospital level. This
aggregate measure is again broken into hospital-insurer level using sins−hosp
. Finally, the left
jh
hand side variable, ∆j Πh , is calculated by subtracting the change in costs discussed above
from the total extra revenue generated.
I estimate two specifications of the bargaining model. The first specification is estimated
at the hospital-insurer level where the negotiating hospital unit is a hospital. This specification assumes hospitals negotiate with insurers individually and not as systems. Belonging
to a hospital system can still improve a hospital’s bargaining position in this specification
through the system membership variable. In the second specification, the negotiating hospital unit is a hospital if the hospital is a member of a non-FLF system or an individual
hospital, and a system otherwise. In other words, I only allow FLF-offering systems to nego-
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tiate as a system. In this dataset, binary hospital characteristics are calculated as a fraction
when the negotiating unit is an FLF-offering system.40 Hospital and system shares used
in HHI are calculated based on hospital visits in that hospital/system and in that HRR.
While constructing the components of the bargaining equation, I calculate each variable at
the hospital level first, and then aggregate to the system level by summing across member
hospitals if the hospital belongs to an FLF-offering system. The disaggregation from system level to system-insurer level variables is again done by using sins−hosp
, which in these
jh
instances represent the share of patients at system h coming from insurer j.
The two specifications represent the two extremes of the health care market I observe
in the data. In practice, not all hospitals negotiate individually and independently with
insurers, as some systems tie their hospitals together and negotiate as a system. However,
it is also true that not all systems try to impose full-line of their products to all insurers
they negotiate with. The system level bargaining model in this chapter improves upon the
previous bargaining estimations in the literature that assume all hospital systems negotiate
as systems41 by identifying FLF-offering systems as negotiating units. Nonetheless, while
the hospitals in these systems are often tied together, they also negotiate individually with
some insurers, which is not captured by the system level estimation.
Results from bargaining estimation are presented in Table 2.7. The coefficient estimates
are similar in terms of sign and significance across two specifications. Hospitals with higher
shares have higher bargaining power, as expected. VI hospitals have higher bargaining power
compared to their non-VI counterparts. At the individual level specification, the positive
impact of being a system member on a hospital’s bargaining power is greater in terms of
magnitude compared to the system level specification. This is as anticipated because system
membership is one of the few variables that capture the advantages of being in a hospital
40

For example, if 2 out of 4 system hospitals are teaching hospitals, the teaching indicator variable for
that system is 0.50.
41
See Gowrisankaran et al. (2015) and Lewis and Pflum (2015).
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Table 2.7: Determination of Bargaining Power
Dep. var.: ∆Πh
Base bargaining power
VI-hospital
FLF-hospital
Hospital share
Hospital market HHI
Predicted days
Teaching hospital
Rural hospital
For-profit hospital
Physician group
System member
γ −1 (×1000)
Bargaining Power:
Mean fitted value
Standard deviation
N
Adjusted R2

(1)
(2)
Individual Level System Level
0.98***
0.80**
(0.11)
(0.38)
0.53***
0.02**
(0.09)
(0.01)
-1.19**
-0.14
(0.54)
(0.34)
1.28***
0.11**
(0.47)
(0.05)
-2.78***
0.57
(0.81)
(1.13)
0.002
0.0003***
(0.004)
(0.00002)
-0.34***
-0.03**
(0.09)
(0.02)
-0.13
-0.02
(0.09)
(0.02)
0.02
0.01
(0.10)
(0.01)
0.04
-0.48***
(3.56)
(0.08)
1.33**
0.14***
(0.55)
(0.02)
1.24***
0.83***
(0.10)
(0.08)
0.69
0.19
4936
0.39

0.63
0.20
2163
0.95

Notes: Results from nonlinear least squares estimation using California data. Individual level sample includes 276
hospitals and 32 insurers, system level sample includes 116
systems/hospitals and 32 insurers. Both specifications include HRR fixed effects. Predicted patient days in thousands. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at
10% level.
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system in this specification that does not force systems to tie their products. Belonging to
an FLF-offering system has a negative impact on bargaining power, although this coefficient
is not significant in the second specification. This unexpected result might be arising from
the fact that increased bargaining power through system membership is already captured by
other covariates such as system membership, VI status, and system or hospital share. The
bottom part of Table 2.7 reports the mean fitted values of hospital bargaining power. Like
previous papers in the literature, I find that hospitals, on average, have higher bargaining
power than insurers in the negotiation process. These results are robust to dropping the VI
hospital-insurer pairs from the dataset. These pairs likely do not engage in bargaining since
they own one another. I also estimated specifications where I allowed hospital bargaining
power to depend on the characteristics of the insurer it contracts with. This approach did
not improve the fit of the model and insurer characteristics never proved to be informative
in explaining hospital’s bargaining power. Given the results in Table 2.7, I conclude the
system level regression better models the market as is, given the better fit and more sensible
coefficients such as HHI. However, the individual level regression will be useful in simulating
the counterfactual world where all hospitals are negotiating individually and independently.

2.6

Welfare

Having estimated the demand model and bargaining model parameters, the last step is to
analyze the welfare impacts of FLF contracts. In order to assess the welfare implications, I
simulate a counterfactual world where FLF contracts are banned, hence I allow FLF-offering
system hospitals to negotiate individually with insurers. This simulation of the bargaining
game with new players results in new hospital networks offered by insurers. New networks
imply new costs, prices, and shares for hospitals and insurers, therefore hospital and insurer
profits change. New networks and new prices imply new utility for consumers in the market,
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hence consumer welfare also changes.

I begin my counterfactual analysis by breaking the existing FLF contracts in the California market. As a result, hospitals that belong to a previously FLF-offering system become
independent and bargain as individual entities, not as a system. I use estimates from the
individual level bargaining specification to predict new networks as the market no longer has
systems that impose their full-line of products while negotiating. Estimates from this specification still allow the previously-FLF hospitals to acquire benefits from being in a system
through the system membership variable. Lastly, if an insurer is vertically integrated with
a hospital system, I keep those system hospitals in VI insurer’s network and construct the
hospital network given these filled spots. If the vertically-integrated hospital system contracted with insurers other than its own in my data, I allow these hospitals to negotiate with
insurers in the counterfactual world. Given this setup, I follow the steps below to obtain
new hospital networks offered by insurers:
1. Re-predict individual hospital choice probabilities by setting FLF indicator to zero in
the hospital demand postestimation. Calculate new predDays and extraP redDays at
each hospital given the new probabilities.
2. Use the new hospital choice probabilities to re-calculate every element of the bargaining
model. In particular, I obtain new values for the hospital level variables ∆Wh (M),
∆Ch (Dh (M)), ∆Rh (phH ), and phH Dh (M).
3. Break hospital level variables into hospital-insurer level variables. In the first iteration,
I begin by assuming all hospitals contract with all insurers, and do the decomposition
using sins−hosp
calculated under this assumption.
jh
4. Predict changes in hospital profits, ∆j Πh , for every hospital-insurer pair by using
parameter estimates from the bargaining model by setting FLF indicator to zero in
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the bargaining model, and using the re-calculated elements of surplus from step 3.
Hospital h chooses to sign a contract with insurer j if ∆j Πh > 0, hence new networks
are formed.
Given the new networks, I go back to step 3 and re-calculate hospital shares at a hospital
following the share calculation outlined in the Appendix that accounts for insurer networks
while imposing capacity constraints. I keep iterating using this routine until equilibrium is
reached. At this equilibrium, no hospital has an incentive to deviate and change the set of
insurers it contracts with. This routine relies on the assumption that if a hospital is willing
to join an insurer’s network, the insurer will agree to establish a contract. This assumption
is supported by both theory42 and data.43
Next, I calculate new premiums given the new insurer networks. Insurers maximize a
standard profit function by choosing premiums:

πj = (premj − Cj × pip ) × sj × M

where M is market size, Cj =

P
h∈H

Psh

sk

(2.36)

× ph is the average reimbursement per day by insurer

k∈H

j to the set of hospitals H in its network, and pip is the number of inpatient days at a state
divided by total population. Maximizing the objective function leads to the following first
order condition that determines premiums:

sj + (premj − Cj × pip )
42

∂sj
=0
∂premj

(2.37)

Capps et al. (2003) present a model of network formation which shows that the profit maximizing
strategy for an insurer is to include all the hospitals in the market in its network.
43
Lewis and Pflum (2015) state that their communications with a former contract negotiator for a major
national insurer revealed PPOs’ strategies are to include almost every hospital in the market in their network.
In their data, the median HMO covers 84% of hospitals in the market. Ho (2009b) reports, on average, 87%
of hospital-HMO pairs successfully sign a contract. In my data, the median HMO and PPO cover 42% and
60% of the hospitals in the market, respectively. Therefore, I assume both HMOs and PPOs aim to cover a
substantial portion of the market where possible.
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Finally, given the new networks and new premiums, I calculate the change in producer surplus
and consumer welfare. Producer surplus is the aggregation of all hospital and insurer profits
P
in the market. Hospital profits are calculated as: πh = (ph × pip ×
M sjh ) − Costh where
j∈M

ph is the average revenue per inpatient day at hospital h, and Costh is the predicted cost of
the hospital given new predicted days. Insurer profits are calculated using Equation (2.36).
I use compensating variation (CV) to measure the change in consumer welfare when
vertical bundling is removed from the market. Compensating variation refers to the amount
of money a consumer would need to give up following a change in prices or product quality
(hospital networks) in order to reach his pre-change utility level. Following Small and Rosen
(1981), the compensating variation for consumer i is given by:
#
"
X
X
1
exp(Vijpre )
ln
exp(Vijpost ) − ln
CVi = −
αi
j
j

(2.38)

where the superscripts post and pre refer to the removal and presence of FLF contracts,
respectively. −αi = −(β2 + γ2 vi2 ) is the negative of the premium coefficient and j still
represents an insurer. V is the observed portion of utility defined as:

Vij = ξj + xj φ̂ + βˆ1 EUj + βˆ2 premj + γˆ1 νi1 EUj (Hj ) + γˆ2 νi2 premj

(2.39)

Compensating variation is then the market size times the integral of compensating variation over the distribution of ν as given by:
Z
CV = M

CVi dν

(2.40)

Applying this to the random-coefficients model, I calculate the compensating variation
by simulation. In particular, I calculate compensating variation for each draw of ν, and then
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take the average across these ns draws to obtain:
ns

CV = M

1 X
CVi
ns i=1

(2.41)

Counterfactual results using California data44 are reported in Table 2.8. I present results
for the entire sample, previously FLF entities, and previously non-FLF entities. In the first
panel, percentages represent average changes compared to FLF contracts being present in
the market. In the second panel, percentages represent the split within their own categories
defined by FLF status and entity type.
I find that consumer welfare decreases by $5.9 billion upon removal of FLF contracts
from the market. The decline in consumer welfare is a combination of increase in premiums
and decrease in expected utility.45 Majority of insurers increase their network size when I
ban FLF contracts, which leads to an increase in premiums. Average increase in network size
is 41%, which leads to an average increase in premiums by 34%. Some insurers also increase
premiums because they now contract with more expensive hospitals, which increases their
costs. While the expected utility measure increases for some insurers who expand their
networks, it decreases for others, which contributes to the decline in welfare. Expected
utility decreases for insurers that shrink their networks, as expected. Decrease in expected
utility among the insurers that increase network size stems from the composition of their
networks. While these insurers still include a few hospitals from previously-FLF-offering
systems, they replace the block of FLF system hospitals they were including before with
individual hospitals that are less equipped and offer fewer services, which leads to a decline
44

Among the 32 insurers in my data, 29 accept FLF contracts and 6 are vertically integrated with hospital
systems. Among the 276 hospitals I use, 185 belong to systems that offer FLF contracts. The average
network size is 154 and ranges between 3 and 248.
45
The breakdown of the dollar value of change in consumer welfare in the first panel shows these effects.
When only the premiums change with old networks being kept constant, consumer welfare decreases by $7.7
billion. When the premiums are set at the initial level but the networks change, consumer welfare increases
by $1.8 billion. This increase in consumer welfare is not very large because expected utility for some insurers
fall as explained above.
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in expected utility. Switch to cheaper individual hospitals also prevents a drastic increase in
premiums.
The finding that FLF contracts are welfare improving for consumers is consistent with the
conclusion from the reduced-form analysis, however, the predicted source is not. Reducedform regressions showed that FLF insurers offer larger networks and they include more
hospitals from all categories. The counterfactual simulation here demonstrates that network
size increases when I remove FLF contracts from the market, even above the original size of
FLF-insurers’ networks in most cases. Therefore, FLF contracts do not increase consumer
welfare by increasing network size, rather they contain network size and premiums which
benefits consumers.
Producer surplus decreases by $10 billion when I remove FLF contracts from the market.
The overall decline in producer surplus originates from dominating hospital losses. In the
insurer market, the loss of $1.1 billion is offset by $11.1 billion increase in profits. The
majority of increase in profits comes from insurers who previously accepted FLF contracts.
This is as anticipated, as these insurers now have an expanded choice set and their network
slots are not dedicated to an entire system. Even though insurers are not the decision makers
in network formation, they still have more hospital options to pair with in this counterfactual
world. New networks also increase profits of all non-FLF insurers in the market. 35% of
the FLF insurers in my data lose profits as their shares decline in response to changes in
premiums and expected utility. In the hospital market, 61% of all hospitals lose profits,
while 39% gain. The majority of loss comes from hospitals who belong to FLF-offering
systems, these hospitals lose $50 billion in profits. This is a sensible result because offering
FLF contracts must have been the profitable choice for them to begin with.46 Yet, there are
some FLF-offering systems in the market who benefit from the new market structure. These
46

This result is also consistent with the conclusion in Ho et al. (2012b). They find that offering FLF
contracts is the profitable choice for the upstream companies that choose to offer them.
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Table 2.8: Counterfactual Results: Removal of FLF Contracts
All

FLF

Non-FLF

Premiums
$ CS lost

34%
$ -7.7b

39%

28%

Network Size
$ CS gained

41%
$ 1.8b

51%

15%

Percent of hospitals at loss
Hospital Π lost

61%
$ -77.9b

59%
$ -49.5b

64%
$ -28.4b

Percent of hospitals at gain
Hospital Π gained

39%
$ 57.7b

41%
$ 40.7b

36%
$ 17b

Percent of insurers at loss
Insurer Π lost

31%
$ -1.1b

35%
$ -1.1b

-

Percent of insurers at gain
Insurer Π gained

69%
$ 11.1b

65%
$ 10.9b

100%
$ 222m

∆ CS: $ -5.9b

∆ PS: $ -10b

Notes: Results from counterfactual simulation where FLF contracts are removed from the market.
hospitals gain from increased market share that results from contracting with more insurers
individually. 64% of non-FLF hospitals lose profits and their loss of $28.4 billion offsets the
gain of $17 billion by the remaining non-FLF hospitals. These changes are mostly due to the
changes in shares of individual hospitals. Breaking hospital systems increases the number of
competitors in the market for individual hospitals, and they lose some share to these “new”
players. Switch of insurers to other individual hospitals is the source of increasing profits in
the non-FLF hospital category.
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Conclusion

This chapter investigates the effects of vertical bundling in supply chain on consumer welfare and producer surplus. I focus on the health care industry in the United States, and
analyze FLF contracts imposed by hospital systems in the negotiation process with insurers.
Economic theory suggests such contracts might increase welfare through their impact on
efficiency, but they might also adversely affect welfare if they are used to gain leverage over
the upstream competitors.
Results from my reduced-form estimations show that insurers that accept all members of
at least one hospital system in the market are likely to offer larger hospital networks. Moreover, FLF-accepting insurers do not include FLF-offering system hospitals at the expense of
their competitors. These insurers are likely to include more individual hospitals, non-FLF
system member hospitals, and even rival FLF system member hospitals in their networks,
compared to insurers who do not take FLF contracts. I also find that the premiums of
the two kinds of insurers do not differ significantly, however this result is obtained using
premiums data at the national level, not at the market level.
If FLF contracts lead to increased consumer choice at the same price, they should increase
consumer welfare. To investigate whether this is the case, and to quantify the change in
welfare, I structurally model the market and simulate a counterfactual world absent of FLF
contracts. I find that FLF contracts benefit consumers, but not by expanding their choice
sets. In fact, insurers are inclined to offer even larger networks in the absence of FLF
contracts, which leads to higher premiums that harm consumers. Upon removal of FLF
contracts from the market, consumer welfare drops by $5.9 billion, producer surplus drops
by $10 billion a year. While the results are mixed for individual hospitals and insurers,
majority of the loss comes from the hospital sector. Many previously-FLF-offering system
hospitals and individual hospitals lose profits as they lose shares to the new competitors in

CHAPTER 2. FULL-LINE FORCING IN HEALTH CARE

113

the market. Removal of vertical restraints enable insurers to contract with hospitals from a
less restrictive set, and as a result, they increase their network size, premiums, and profits.
These results are important given the increasing consolidation in health care markets.
The previous literature has shown horizontal consolidation in the upstream market is likely
to decrease consumer welfare through increased bargaining power for hospital systems and
increased hospital prices. In this chapter, I show that hospital system bundling might have
a positive effect on consumer welfare by containing insurer network size and premiums. My
results are partial, as they do not account for change in hospital prices as a result of debundling, which would be another source of change in welfare. Yet, the results in this chapter
imply the impact of horizontal consolidation on consumer welfare does not necessarily need
to be negative. Future research on this subject would ideally use transaction prices between
hospitals and insurers to identify possible discounts offered for bundles, and incorporate
these prices into the framework presented here.

Appendix A
Appendix for Figures
A.1

Chapter 1: Enrollment in VI plans

Figure A.1 plots VI plan enrollment distribution by state. In Figure A.2, I plot enrollment
in VI plans as a percentage of insured population in that state.

A.2

Chapter 2: Hospital and System Distribution by
State

Figures A.3 and A.4 replicate Figures 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter 2 using the strictest definition
of FLF.
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Figure A.1: Enrollment Distribution by State

Figure A.2: Enrollment as a Percentage of Insured Population
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Figure A.3: Number of individual, non-FLF system member, and FLF system member
hospitals by state

Figure A.4: Number of non-FLF and FLF-offering hospital systems by state

Appendix B
Appendix for Reduced-Form
Estimation
B.1

Chapter 1: Upstream Foreclosure Estimation

Results from full specification of upstream foreclosure estimation are reported in Table A1.
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Table A1: Foreclosure Estimation - Hospitals
(1)
Number of Percent of
plans
plans
included
included
-1.45**
-0.04*
VI-hospital
(0.72)
(0.03)
-0.003*
-0.0001*
Physicians
(0.002)
(0.00006)
-0.11
-0.0003
Star rating
(0.28)
(0.009)
0.57**
0.04***
ln(Expenditure per adm.)
(0.23)
(0.008)
-0.004
0.03
Teaching hospital
(0.97)
(0.04)
0.78*
0.02
System member
(0.43)
(0.02)
2.48**
0.08
Physician group
(1.11)
(0.05)
-0.66
-0.01
Birthing room
(0.63)
(0.02)
0.69
0.02
Women health center
(0.62)
(0.02)
1.93**
0.08**
Burn care
(0.90)
(0.03)
-0.36
-0.02
Skilled nursing care
(0.59)
(0.02)
0.57
0.02
Blood donor center
(0.78)
(0.03)
0.27
0.01
Cardiology services
(0.60)
(0.02)
0.10
0.005
Chemotherapy
(0.56)
(0.02)
-1.34**
-0.05**
Neonatal intensive care
(0.63)
(0.02)
-0.74
-0.02
Medical/surgical int. care
(0.70)
(0.03)
0.24
0.01
Cardiac intensive care
(0.59)
(0.02)
1.21
0.05
Kidney transplant
(1.10)
(0.04)
0.02
-0.002
Pain management center
(0.51)
(0.02)
0.04
-0.002
Physical rehabilitation
(0.49)
(0.02)
0.67
0.03
Mammography
(0.62)
(0.02)
0.36
0.007
MRI
(0.62)
(0.02)
R2
0.85
0.85

(2)
Number of Percent of
VI-plans
VI-plans
included
included
0.85***
0.15***
(0.08)
(0.02)
0.0001
-0.00002
(0.0002)
(0.00005)
0.002
0.01
(0.03)
(0.009)
0.08***
0.05***
(0.03)
(0.007)
-0.07
0.006
(0.13)
(0.03)
0.003
0.002
(0.05)
(0.01)
-0.09
-0.01
(0.09)
(0.04)
0.10
0.03
(0.07)
(0.02)
-0.05
-0.005
(0.06)
(0.02)
0.14
0.05
(0.13)
(0.03)
-0.05
-0.01
(0.06)
(0.02)
0.08
-0.02
(0.10)
(0.02)
0.14**
0.04*
(0.07)
(0.02)
0.13**
0.03*
(0.07)
(0.02)
-0.12*
-0.04**
(0.07)
(0.02)
0.04
-0.007
(0.08)
(0.02)
0.02
0.006
(0.07)
(0.02)
0.02
0.02
(0.14)
(0.04)
-0.08
-0.03*
(0.06)
(0.02)
-0.0007
-0.004
(0.06)
(0.02)
-0.05
-0.006
(0.07)
(0.02)
0.03
0.009
(0.08)
(0.02)
0.69
0.71

(3)
Number of
Percent of
non-VI-plans non-VI-plans
included
included
-2.30***
-0.08***
(0.69)
(0.03)
-0.003**
-0.0001*
(0.002)
(0.00007)
-0.11
-0.001
(0.27)
(0.01)
0.50**
0.04***
(0.21)
(0.009)
0.07
0.03
(0.92)
(0.04)
0.77*
0.03
(0.41)
(0.02)
2.57**
0.09
(1.07)
(0.05)
-0.76
-0.02
(0.60)
(0.03)
0.74
0.03
(0.60)
(0.03)
1.80**
0.09**
(0.87)
(0.04)
-0.31
-0.02
(0.57)
(0.02)
0.50
0.02
(0.74)
(0.03)
0.13
0.01
(0.58)
(0.03)
-0.03
0.002
(0.54)
(0.02)
-1.22**
-0.05**
(0.61)
(0.03)
-0.78
-0.02
(0.67)
(0.03)
0.22
0.01
(0.57)
(0.02)
1.19
0.05
(1.05)
(0.04)
0.10
0.004
(0.50)
(0.02)
0.04
-0.0006
(0.47)
(0.02)
0.72
0.03
(0.60)
(0.03)
0.39
0.008
(0.59)
(0.03)
0.84
0.85

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. N = 1285 hospitals. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
All specifications include state fixed effects, and control for hospital bed size category, primary service category,
and control authority.
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Chapter 2: Robustness of Reduced-Form Results

In Table A2, I report results from robustness checks for the reduced-form estimations in
Chapter 2. Only the coefficient in front of the covariate of interest, FLF-insurer, is reported
for each regression. The first row replicates the coefficients reported in the chapter where the
least restrictive definition of FLF was used. As a robustness check, I estimate the same specifications using two alternative measures of FLF: one where a hospital system is considered
as an FLF-offering system if 90% of its hospitals were included in at least one insurer’s network, and another where all (100%) member hospitals are included in at least one insurer’s
network. FLF statuses of insurers are defined analogously. In the second and third rows, I
report the coefficient of interest obtained by using 90% and 100% measures, respectively. In
the fourth row, results from main estimation with added insurer fixed effects are reported.
Results in the chapter are robust to use of the two other FLF measures as well as inclusion
of insurer fixed effects, as reported Table A2.

Table A2: Robustness of Reduced-Form Results

FLF: 80% coverage
FLF: 90% coverage
FLF: 100% coverage
Insurer FE

Efficiency
(1)
ln Premium
0.08
(0.09)
0.13
(0.09)
0.12
(0.09)
-

Market Coverage
(2)
(3)
Network Size FLF hospitals
48.18***
25.56***
(14.46)
(6.84)
48.10***
20.88***
(13.77)
(4.83)
48.70***
17.24***
(13.89)
(3.22)
34.64**
18.61**
(13.61)
(7.43)

Leverage
(4)
(5)
(6)
Individual Non-FLF Rival FLF
18.47***
4.15***
1.88***
(5.35)
(0.91)
(0.10)
18.42***
8.80***
1.55***
(5.10)
(1.64)
(0.09)
18.56*** 12.90***
1.17***
(5.12)
(2.48)
(0.07)
14.50***
1.53*
1.71***
(5.55)
(0.82)
(0.16)

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. Coefficient in front of FLF-insurer reported for each
specification. *** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically significant at
10%.

Appendix C
Appendix for Structural Estimation
C.1

Share of patients at a hospital from an insurer

The share calculation is done based on hospital shares, insurer shares, and capacity constraints. Let M be market size, cch be the capacity constraint of hospital h, and sh and sj
represent market shares of hospital h and insurer j, respectively. Capacity constraints are
defined by the number of beds at a hospital, and hospitals are assumed to operate at full
capacity when the constraints are imposed. To begin with, I allocate patients to hospitals
based on hospital networks offered by insurers, hospital shares, and insurer shares. Share of
patients enrolled in plan j that visit hospital h is calculated as:
sh
sjh = sj × P
sh

(C.1)

h∈K

where K is the set of hospitals insurer j contracts with. However, when the allocation is
done this way, some hospitals exceed their capacity limits. If this is the case, I remove excess
patients from that hospital and re-allocate them to remaining hospitals in the market who
have not reached their capacity constraints at this stage, based on shares sjh . Following this
120
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re-allocation, I calculate shares sins−hosp
.
jh
Formally, if hospital h exceeds its capacity, then I remove Ej many patients from insurer
j’s allocated patients to hospital h, where Ej is given by:

Ej =

h

M×


i
sjh
sjh − cch × P
sjh
j∈H

X

(C.2)

j∈R

In this equation, H is the set of insurers hospital h contracts with and R is the set of insurers
contracted with hospital h who will re-allocate a fraction of their patients to other hospitals.1
First term in brackets is the number of excess patients at hospital h, whereas the second
term represents the share of insurer j among insurers who will re-allocate their patients
from hospital h. Re-allocation of these removed patients to other hospitals is done based on
insurer shares at the destination hospital. For any hospital h0 that is short of its capacity,
I first determine the number of patients it can accept, and then re-allocate patients to h0
based on their initial shares at h0 . Formally, I assume Tj many patients will be added to
hospital h0 ’s network from insurer j as a result of removing excess capacity from hospital h,
where Tj is defined as:
i
h

X
sjh0
sjh0 × P
Tj = cch0 − M ×
sjh0
j∈H 0

(C.3)

j∈L

Here, the first term in the brackets represents the number of patients hospital h0 can accept,
and the second term represents the share of insurer j among other insurers who contracted
with hospital h0 and with at least one other hospital that exceeds its capacity in the previous
step. Given this final allocation, I calculate sins−hosp
=
jh

n
P jh
njh

where njh is the number of

j∈H

patients allocated to hospital h from insurer j.

1

Insurers in set R are insurers who contracted with hospital h and at least with one other hospital that
is short in capacity.
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Hospital Demand Estimation

Estimation results from the full specification of hospital demand model are reported in Table
A3.

C.3

Cost Function Estimation

Results from hospital cost function estimation are reported in Table A4.

C.4

Bargaining Estimation - Robustness

In Table A5, I report results from system level bargaining estimation using data and variables created based on different definitions of FLF. First column replicates the system level
estimation results reported in Chapters 1 and 2. These results are robust to different definitions of FLF, as reported in second and third columns of Table A5.
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Table A3: Hospital Demand Estimation
Variable

Coefficient
-0.03***
Distance (miles)
(0.0001)
0.00002***
Distance squared
(0.0000001)
0.05***
VI hospital
(0.005)
-0.003***
VI × Distance
(0.00009)
-0.03***
Age (0-17) × Distance
(0.0002)
-0.02***
Age (18-34) × Distance
(0.0002)
-0.01***
Age (35-44) × Distance
(0.0002)
0.0008***
Age (45-54) × Distance
(0.0002)
-0.01***
Female × Distance
(0.0001)
-0.40***
For-profit hospital
(0.005)
0.22***
Nurses per bed
(0.002)
0.06***
Teaching hospital
(0.005)
-2.81***
Bed size (6-24)
(0.03)
-2.40***
Bed size (25-49)
(0.01)
-1.48***
Bed size (50-99)
(0.008)
-0.77***
Bed size (100-199)
(0.006)
-0.41***
Bed size (200-299)
(0.005)
-0.20***
Bed size (300-399)
(0.005)
0.01**
Bed size (400-499)
(0.005)
0.26***
Medical/surgical care
(0.02)
-0.24***
Obstetrics care
(0.02)
-0.16***
Medical/surgical intensive care
(0.01)
-0.11***
Cardiac intensive care
(0.004)

Variable
Neonatal intensive care
Neonatal intermediate care
Pediatric intensive care
Burn care
Physical rehabilitation care
Alcohol/drug abuse care
Psychiatric care
Skilled nursing care
Intermediate nursing care
Acute long term care
Alzheimer center
Arthritis treatment center
Birthing room
Breast cancer screening/mammograms
Adult cardiology services
Diagnostic catheterization
Interventional cardiac catheterization
Adult cardiac surgery
Cardiac rehabilitation
Chemotherapy
Computer assisted orthopedic surgery
Optical colonoscopy
Endoscopic ultrasound

Coefficient
0.12***
(0.007)
0.23***
(0.006)
0.02***
(0.004)
-0.18***
(0.005)
-0.19***
(0.003)
0.22***
(0.004)
-0.14***
(0.003)
-0.20***
(0.005)
-0.04***
(0.006)
-0.32***
(0.008)
0.32***
(0.005)
0.04***
(0.005)
-0.02
(0.02)
-0.08***
(0.006)
-0.55***
(0.007)
-0.07***
(0.006)
0.12***
(0.006)
0.10***
(0.004)
0.06***
(0.003)
0.17***
(0.007)
0.10***
(0.003)
-0.17***
(0.005)
-0.11***
(0.004)
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Table A3: Hospital Demand Estimation - continued
Variable

Coefficient Variable
-0.19***
Ablation of Barrett’s esophagus
Full-field digital mammography
(0.003)
Endoscopic retrograde
-0.14***
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI)
cholangiopancreatography (ERCP)
(0.006)
Extracorporeal shock waved
-0.06***
Intraoperative magnetic resonance imaging
lithotripter (ERCP)
(0.004)
0.02***
Fertility clinic
Magnetoencephalography (MEG)
(0.006)
0.18***
Multislice spiral computed
Geriatric services
(0.004)
tomography <64 slice
-0.32*** Multislice spiral computed
Health screenings
(0.007)
tomography 64+ slice
-0.20***
Hemodialysis
Positron emission tomography (PET)
(0.004)
0.27***
HIV-AIDS services
PET/CT
(0.004)
0.05***
Single photon emission computerized
Immunization program
(0.004)
tomography (SPECT)
-0.06***
Indigent care clinic
Ultrasound
(0.004)
0.04***
Linguistic/translation services
Image-guided radiation therapy
(0.004)
0.03***
Intensity-modulated radiation therapy
Neurological services
(0.007)
(IMRT)
0.14***
Oncology services
Proton beam therapy
(0.009)
0.02**
Orthopedic services
Shaped beam radiation system
(0.01)
0.15***
Pain management program
Stereotactic radiosurgery
(0.005)
-0.04***
Palliative care program
Robotic surgery
(0.004)
0.10***
Inpatient palliative care unit
Sleep center
(0.003)
0.11***
Electrodiagnostic services
Sports medicine
(0.003)
Physical rehabilitation outpatient
-0.09***
Tobacco treatment services
services
(0.005)
-0.11***
Psychiatric geriatric services
Bone marrow transplant services
(0.004)
-0.70***
Computed-tomography (CT) scanner
Heart transplant
(0.02)
0.05***
Diagnostic radioisotope facility
Kidney transplant
(0.006)
0.02***
Electron Bean Computed Tomography
Liver transplant
(0.004)

Coefficient
0.08***
(0.006)
-0.21***
(0.007)
-0.11***
(0.004)
-0.16***
(0.004)
-0.09***
(0.005)
0.07***
(0.005)
-0.03***
(0.004)
0.02***
(0.005)
-0.05***
(0.004)
0.35***
(0.02)
0.20***
(0.007)
-0.34***
(0.009)
-0.22***
(0.009)
0.22***
(0.008)
-0.02***
(0.004)
0.41***
(0.004)
0.13***
(0.003)
-0.04***
(0.003)
0.16***
(0.004)
0.22***
(0.006)
-0.25***
(0.006)
0.006
(0.006)
-0.11***
(0.007)
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Table A3: Hospital Demand Estimation - continued
Variable
Lung transplant
Tissue transplant
Virtual colonoscopy
Women’s health center
Adult cardiology services
× Age (35-54)
Acute long term care
× Age (45-54)
Arthritis treatment center
× Age (45-54)
Medical/surgical care
× Circulatory system
Medical/surgical care
× Hepatobiliary and pancreas
Medical/surgical care
× Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast
Medical/surgical care
× Male reproductive system
Medical/surgical care
× Female reproductive system
Medical/surgical care
× Pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium
Medical/surgical care
× Multiple significant trauma
Obstetrics care
× Pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium
Obstetrics care
× Newborn and other neonates
Obstetrics care
× Female
Cardiac intensive care
× Circulatory system
Neonatal intensive care
× Pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium
Neonatal intensive care
× Newborn and other neonates
Neonatal intensive care
× Female
Neonatal intermediate care
× Pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium
Neonatal intermediate care
× Newborn and other neonates

Coefficient Variable
Coefficient
0.11***
Neonatal intermediate care
-0.03***
(0.007)
× Female
(0.006)
0.01***
3.75***
Burn care × Burns
(0.004)
(0.13)
0.20***
Alcohol/drug abuse care
2.94***
(0.003)
× Alcohol/drug induced mental disorders
(0.03)
-0.03*** Psychiatric care
1.87***
(0.007)
× Mental diseases and disorders
(0.02)
0.61***
Birthing room
0.43***
(0.007)
× Pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium
(0.02)
0.26***
Birthing room
0.33***
(0.01)
× Newborn and other neonates
(0.02)
0.12***
Birthing room
0.15***
(0.008)
× Female
(0.02)
-0.69*** Blood donor center
0.19***
(0.05)
× Circulatory system
(0.02)
0.76***
Blood donor center
0.71***
(0.06)
× Blood and blood forming organ disorders
(0.05)
0.73***
Breast cancer screening/mammograms
0.40***
(0.05)
× Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast
(0.05)
0.43***
Adult cardiology services
0.17***
(0.08)
× Circulatory system
(0.05)
0.85***
Diagnostic catheterization
0.38***
(0.03)
× Kidney and urinary tract
(0.03)
-2.58*** Interventional cardiac catheterization
0.58***
(0.05)
× Circulatory system
(0.04)
1.16***
Adult cardiac surgery
1.30***
(0.05)
× Circulatory system
(0.02)
4.58***
Cardiac rehabilitation
0.01
(0.05)
× Circulatory system
(0.02)
1.89***
Chemotherapy
1.36***
(0.02)
× Ear, nose, mouth and throat
(0.10)
-0.05**
Chemotherapy
0.11**
(0.02)
× Respiratory system
(0.05)
0.03
Chemotherapy
0.15***
(0.02)
× Digestive system
(0.03)
0.12***
Chemotherapy
0.31***
(0.008)
× Hepatobiliary and pancreas
(0.06)
0.15***
Chemotherapy
0.39***
(0.007)
× Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast
(0.06)
0.06***
Chemotherapy
0.59***
(0.007)
× Male reproductive system
(0.09)
-0.20*** Chemotherapy
0.14***
(0.007)
× Female reproductive system
(0.03)
-0.17*** Chemotherapy
0.79***
(0.007)
× Blood disorders
(0.11)
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Table A3: Hospital Demand Estimation - continued
Variable
Optical colonoscopy
× Digestive system
Endoscopic ultrasound
× Digestive system
Ablation of Barrett’s esophagus
× Digestive system

Coefficient
0.39***
(0.02)
0.15***
(0.02)
-0.04**
(0.01)
0.55***
ERCP × Digestive system
(0.02)
0.73***
ERCP × Hepatobiliary and pancreas
(0.04)
0.08***
ESWL × Hepatobiliary and pancreas
(0.02)
0.30***
ESWL × Kidney and urinary tract
(0.02)
Fertility clinic
0.14***
× Female reproductive system
(0.02)
Fertility clinic
-0.05***
× Female
(0.006)
Hemodialysis
0.34***
× Kidney and urinary tract
(0.03)
HIV-AIDS services
0.60***
× Infectious and parasitic DD
(0.03)
Neurological services
0.92***
× Nervous system
(0.03)
Oncology services
0.09
× Ear, nose mouth and throat
(0.10)
Oncology services
-0.16***
× Respiratory system
(0.05)
Oncology services
-0.32***
× Digestive system
(0.03)
Oncology services
-0.41***
× Hepatobiliary and pancreas
(0.07)
Oncology services
-0.41**
× Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast
(0.06)
Oncology services
-0.18*
× Male reproductive system
(0.10)
Oncology services
-0.07
× Female reproductive system
(0.04)
Oncology services
0.76***
× Blood disorders
(0.11)
Psychiatric geriatric services
0.10***
× Mental diseases and disorders
(0.02)
Diagnostic radioisotope facility
0.34***
× Ear, nose, mouth and throat
(0.06)
Diagnostic radioisotope facility
-0.06***
× Respiratory system
(0.03)

Variable
Diagnostic radioisotope facility
× Circulatory system
Full-field digital mammography
× Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast
MRI × Nervous system
MRI × Respiratory system
MRI × Circulatory system
MRI × Digestive system
MRI × Male reproductive system
Multislice spiral computed tomography
<64 slice × Nervous system
Multislice spiral computed tomography
<64 slice × Respiratory system
Multislice spiral computed tomography
<64 slice × Circulatory system
Multislice spiral computed tomography
64+ slice × Nervous system
Multislice spiral computed tomography
64+ slice × Respiratory system
Multislice spiral computed tomography
64+ slice × Circulatory system
PET/CT × Nervous system
PET/CT × Respiratory system
PET/CT × Circulatory system
PET/CT
× Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast
Ultrasound
× Pregnancy, childbirth and puerperium
Ultrasound × Female
Heart transplant
× Circulatory system
Kidney transplant
× Kidney and urinary tract
Liver transplant
× Digestive system
Lung transplant
× Respiratory system

Coefficient
0.24***
(0.03)
-0.06
(0.04)
0.50***
(0.03)
0.34***
(0.04)
0.04
(0.03)
0.46***
(0.02)
0.63***
(0.07)
0.14***
(0.02)
0.21***
(0.03)
-0.30***
(0.02)
0.18***
(0.03)
0.21***
(0.03)
-0.11***
(0.03)
0.35***
(0.01)
0.24***
(0.02)
0.07***
(0.02)
0.12**
(0.02)
-0.57***
(0.02)
-0.04***
(0.01)
0.45***
(0.02)
0.88***
(0.02)
0.46***
(0.02)
0.51***
(0.03)
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Table A3: Hospital Demand Estimation - continued
Variable
Coefficient
Tissue transplant
0.20***
× Skin, subcutaneous tissue and breast
(0.02)
Virtual colonoscopy
-0.07***
× Digestive system
(0.01)
0.04***
FLF hospital
(0.03)

Variable
Coefficient
Women’s health center
0.36***
× Female reproductive system
(0.02)
Women’s health center
0.06***
× Female
(0.008)

Notes: Results from maximum likelihood estimation. Standard errors in parentheses. Omitted bed
size category is 500+ beds, omitted age category is 45-54. Fixed effects included for hospitals missing
AHA data. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically
significant at 10% level.
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Table A4: Cost Function Estimates
Coef.
0.40**
Percent ER
(0.17)
-0.35
Percent Medicare
(0.52)
0.54**
Other OP
(0.24)
-0.004
2
Other OP
(0.006)
-0.45*
Medicare OP
(0.24)
0.007
2
Medicare OP
(0.005)
0.005
Medicare IP × Private IP
(0.01)
-0.04*
All IP × Other OP
(0.02)
-0.02
Other IP × Medicare IP
(0.02)
-0.01
Other IP × Private IP
(0.01)
0.04
All IP × Medicare OP
(0.02)
0.005
All IP × Private OP
(0.003)
-0.01
Private FFS OP × Other IP
(0.01)
0.19
Other IP
(0.27)
0.01
Other IP2
(0.02)
-0.01
Medicare IP × Prvt FFS OP
(0.01)
0.18*
Private FFS OP
(0.11)
0.002
Private FFS OP2
(0.003)
-0.45*
Medicare IP
(0.27)
0.02*
Medicare IP2
(0.01)
0.02
Fixed Assets
(0.22)
0.007
Fixed Assets2
(0.008)
-1.95***
Number of Beds
(0.61)

× For-Profit
Coef.
-0.13
(0.15)
0.18
(0.46)
-0.75***
(0.26)
0.003
(0.006)
0.30
(0.25)
-0.004
(0.006)
0.02
(0.02)
0.07***
(0.02)
-0.06**
(0.02)
0.02**
(0.01)
-0.02
(0.03)
-0.002
(0.003)
0.008
(0.008)
0.23
(0.26)
0.004
(0.02)
0.0009
(0.02)
-0.08
(0.14)
-0.001
(0.004)
0.42
(0.34)
-0.003
(0.004)
0.23
(0.28)
-0.009
(0.009)
1.90**
(0.94)

× Govt. × Rural × Teaching
× VI
× FLF
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
0.10
0.48**
-0.29
-0.52*** -0.07
(0.23)
(0.22)
(0.27)
(0.20)
(0.16)
-0.60
-0.99**
1.60
1.43
-0.09
(0.62)
(0.44)
(1.13)
(0.97)
(0.51)
-0.55*
-0.02
0.53
-0.27
-0.27
(0.33)
(0.24)
(0.63)
(0.39)
(0.21)
0.005
0.01
-0.04**
-0.007
0.006
(0.01)
(0.006)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.004)
0.48*
-0.06
0.24
0.62
0.23
(0.29)
(0.25)
(0.84)
(0.38)
(0.24)
-0.01
0.02***
-0.003
-0.04** -0.005
(0.009)
(0.008)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.006)
0.006
-0.003
0.02
-0.03
-0.0002
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.01)
0.04
-0.02
0.02
0.04
0.02
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.06)
(0.04)
(0.02)
-0.09*
-0.07*
-0.15*
-0.05
-0.02
(0.05)
(0.03)
(0.09)
(0.09)
(0.03)
0.02**
0.01
0.0003
0.04**
-0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.01)
-0.03
-0.03
-0.02
0.005
-0.02
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.07)
(0.04)
(0.03)
0.002
0.006
-0.007**
-0.01*** 0.001
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004)
(0.004) (0.003)
-0.01
0.01
0.03
-0.02
0.008
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.009)
0.55*
-0.38*
0.44
0.08
0.33
(0.30)
(0.22)
(0.59)
(0.44)
(0.24)
-0.002
0.04*
0.05
0.03
-0.01
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.04)
(0.04)
(0.02)
-0.008
0.02
-0.07
0.01
-0.004
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.04)
(0.02)
(0.01)
0.11
-0.32***
0.44
0.07
0.02
(0.14)
(0.11)
(0.36)
(0.14)
(0.10)
0.003
0.003
-0.00003
0.002
-0.006
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.007)
(0.008) (0.004)
0.77
-0.41
-0.11
-0.45
-0.55*
(0.33)
(0.37)
(0.61)
(0.43)
(0.28)
0.01
0.04***
0.10*
0.07
-0.004
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.06)
(0.05)
(0.01)
-0.35
-0.17
2.16**
1.86**
-0.17
(0.27)
(0.22)
(0.84)
(0.76)
(0.23)
-0.01
0.002
0.02
-0.05*
0.0007
(0.01)
(0.008)
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.008)
1.56*
1.27*
1.35
1.13
-0.76
(0.82)
(0.68)
(2.60)
(1.25)
(0.60)
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Table A4: Cost Function Estimates - continued

Number of Beds2
Fixed Assets × Beds
RN Hours
RN Hours2
RN Hours × Staff Hours
Empl Hrs × Beds
Empl Hrs × Private IP
Empl Hrs × Medicare IP
Empl Hrs × Fixed Assets
Private IP
Private IP2

Coef.
-0.13***
(0.03)
-0.03
(0.02)
1.12**
(0.44)
-0.04**
(0.02)
-0.05***
(0.02)
0.27***
(0.06)
0.005
(0.004)
0.03***
(0.01)
-0.007
(0.02)
-0.04
(0.13)
0.007***
(0.003)

× For-Profit
Coef.
0.11**
(0.05)
-0.04**
(0.02)
0.32
(0.80)
-0.006
(0.03)
0.01
(0.02)
-0.16*
(0.09)
-0.005
(0.003)
-0.005
(0.01)
0.02
(0.02)
-0.18
(0.13)
-0.01**
(0.006)

× Govt. × Rural × Teaching
Coef.
Coef.
Coef.
0.10**
0.08*
0.09
(0.05)
(0.04)
(0.13)
-0.01
0.007
0.08
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.10)
-1.18**
0.61
-2.87**
(0.46)
(0.41)
(1.11)
0.05**
-0.02
0.11**
(0.02)
(0.02)
(0.04)
0.05**
-0.009
0.004
(0.02)
(0.01)
(0.02)
-0.17** -0.15**
-0.28
(0.08)
(0.07)
(0.19)
-0.001
-0.002
0.003
(0.004)
(0.003)
(0.005)
-0.002
0.04**
-0.01
(0.01)
(0.01)
(0.02)
-0.02
0.02
0.08
(0.03)
(0.02)
(0.05)
-0.11
0.05
-0.06
(0.13)
(0.09)
(0.22)
-0.01*** -0.009**
-0.01
(0.003)
(0.004)
(0.008)

× VI
× FLF
Coef.
Coef.
0.01
0.03
(0.07)
(0.03)
-0.04 0.07***
(0.06)
(0.02)
-0.90
-0.54
(0.86)
(0.39)
0.03
0.02
(0.03)
(0.02)
0.03
0.03**
(0.03)
(0.02)
-0.04
-0.07
(0.12)
(0.06)
0.005
-0.003
(0.006) (0.003)
-0.05*
-0.02
(0.03)
(0.01)
-0.01
-0.01
(0.03)
(0.02)
0.03
0.09
(0.11)
(0.12)
-0.01*
0.002
(0.006) (0.004)

Notes: Results from ordinary least squares estimation. Clustered standard errors (at the hospital level) in
parentheses. All outputs and inputs are in logs. ER is emergency room visits, OP is outpatient visits, IP
is inpatient days, FFS is fee-for-service, Empl Hrs is employee hours, RN is registered nurses. Specification
includes hospital fixed effects and a time trend. R2 is above 0.99. *** statistically significant at 1% level, **
statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically significant at 10% level.

APPENDIX C. APPENDIX FOR STRUCTURAL ESTIMATION

130

Table A5: Bargaining Estimation - Robustness

FLF:
Base bargaining power
VI-hospital
FLF-hospital
Hospital share
Hospital market HHI
Predicted days
Teaching hospital
Rural hospital
For-profit hospital
Physician group
System member
γ −1 (x1000)

80% coverage
0.80**
(0.38)
0.02**
(0.01)
-0.14
(0.34)
0.11**
(0.05)
0.57
(1.13)
0.0003***
(0.00002)
-0.03**
(0.02)
-0.02
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.48***
(0.08)
0.14***
(0.02)
0.83***
(0.08)

90% coverage
0.98
(0.65)
0.06***
(0.00002)
-0.54***
(0.02)
0.08
(0.06)
0.06
(1.94)
0.0003***
(0.00002)
-0.09***
(0.02)
-0.03*
(0.02)
0.01
(0.01)
-0.56***
(0.09)
0.54***
(0.03)
0.84***
(0.08)

100% coverage
0.86*
(0.49)
0.04***
(0.01)
-0.03*
(0.02)
0.13**
(0.06)
0.41
(1.47)
0.0002***
(0.00002)
-0.05***
(0.02)
-0.03*
(0.02)
0.02**
(0.01)
-0.56***
(0.10)
0.03*
(0.02)
0.77***
(0.08)

Notes: Results from nonlinear least squares estimation of system level
bargaining equation using California data. All specifications include HRR
fixed effects. Predicted patient days in thousands. *** statistically significant at 1% level, ** statistically significant at 5% level, * statistically
significant at 10% level.
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